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The thesis aims to address three major issues: what exploitation is, why exploitation is unjust for 
egalitarians, and how we should respond to mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. Thus, it is 
divided into three parts corresponding to the three issues. Part One critically engages with 
prominent accounts of  exploitation developed by Alan Wertheimer and Ruth Sample. It 
defends a distinctive conception according to which exploitation is an egalitarian wrong 
that consists of  exploiters gaining unfairly or disrespectfully by taking advantage of  others. 
In Part Two, I review the debate between luck and relational egalitarianism and then, 
criticise luck egalitarian accounts of  justice for failing to account for instances of  
exploitation that do not arise from unjust background conditions. In Part Three, I examine 
whether or not sweatshop exploitation－which benefits the poor in developing countries 
and generates social inequality－is morally permissible, all things considered, and whether 
third parties ought to interfere with it. Consequently, the thesis aims to deepen our 
understanding of  egalitarian justice by exploring the relationships between exploitation 







Exploitation has been a stubborn fact in human society, either in slave society in which 
masters exploit slaves, in feudal society in which landlords exploit peasants, or in our 
capitalist society in which capitalists exploit workers (Marx, 1990; cf. Wood, 2008, 2012, 
2015). The scope and severity of  capitalist exploitation in our world remains an empirical 
question, one I will not address in the thesis. Instead, the core question I am interested in 
is how egalitarians identify, assess, and respond to exploitation. Thus, the thesis aims to 
scrutinise whether the varieties of  egalitarianism can give an adequate account of  the 
nature and wrongness of  exploitation.  
How to understand the ideal of  equality, among other values, has been one of  the 
main controversies in contemporary Anglophone political philosophy. Political 
philosophers have proposed different conceptions of  equality. Within the controversy, luck 
egalitarianism is the most prominent account of  egalitarian justice. Roughly put, it holds 
that it is unfair for a person to suffer from a disadvantage that is no fault of  their own. 
Luck egalitarianism, then, represents the liberal egalitarian understanding of  the ideal of  
equality. Distinct from the liberal egalitarian tradition and the Christian tradition,1 classical 
Marxism has its notion of  equality (Cohen, 2001: 1-2). Nevertheless, as Cohen indicated, 
classical Marxism retains the claim that a justification for socialism is unnecessary. This is 
partly because, according to historical materialism, socialism arose from a rigorous 
analysis of economics and history, rather than in response to a clarification of the ideal 
of equality. They believe that to change human society causally, we must understand the law of  
transformation of  human society. In addition, they saw no need to justify socialism’s 
desirability since the majority of  society was composed of  the working class (Cohen, 1995: 
4-8), and so the real socialist movement seemed intuitive before the collapse of  Soviet 
 




Union. For these reasons, the socialist or Marxist approach to the ideal of  equality remains 
unspecified and vague.  
Moreover, Marxism－ which endorses historical materialism, an empirical and 
historical theory that studies the structure and transition of  society－seems to contradict 
normative political philosophy, a philosophical and ahistorical discipline that explores and 
reflects normative judgments (Cohen, 1995: 1). Given Marxists’ commitment to historical 
materialism, implicitly they suppose that “either there is no such thing as normative truth 
or it is a truth which changes historically with economic circumstances and requirements” 
(Cohen, 1995:2). The spirit of  historical materialism is best illuminated by Marx’s claim 
that “Communism is for us not a state of  affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which 
reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes 
the present state of  things” (2000: 184-186, his italics). In the quoted sentence, Marx 
explicitly rejects treating communism as a moral ideal worth pursuing; rather, he views 
communism as a social movement that stems from the inevitable social conflict between 
classes. By endorsing historical materialism, Marxists view things primarily from a social 
and historical perspective. Marxist political philosophy then appears to be a paradox, 
because political philosophy, as it has been traditionally perceived, aims to propose 
timelessly normative principles.  
On Cohen’s view, however, Marxists need not resist, but instead have to engage in, 
the enterprise of  normative political philosophy for three reasons. First, Cohen correctly 
points out that Marxists need normative principles to motivate revolutionary workers and 
others who do not have relevant interests in socialism (Cohen, 1995: 3). Normative 
principles can help to recruit comrades.2 Second, the proletariat once consisted of  the 
exploited, the needy, the producers, and the majority in society, but, now, in an advanced 
 




industrial society, there is no single group that has these four features simultaneously 
(Cohen, 1995: 8). Moreover, for Cohen, if  the proletariat were no longer the majority of  
society, Marxists would be impelled to seek a political philosophy that promotes socialism, 
that is, they must find a justification for socialism’s moral desirability. Third, and more 
importantly, Cohen believes that his interpretation of  historical materialism need not 
“reduce all values and principles to rationalization of  class interests” (1995: 2); rather, the 
end of  class conflict is where a real morality begins, because class interests no longer 
constrain people.3 In addition, since historical materialism is an empirical theory that 
explains social structures and the dynamic of  history, it has “nothing to say about what 
justice (timelessly) is” (Cohen, 1995: 3). If  so, for Cohen, one can hold that a principle of  
justice is timelessly true, while insisting that, to change society, normative principles (such as 
Cohen’s rules of  regulation) should reflect certain social facts. Put together, once we follow 
Cohen’s distinction between ultimate normative principles, which are not grounded on 
facts, and rules of  regulation, which are fact-sensitive (2008: ch.6), the apparent 
contradiction between historical materialism and political philosophy ceases. However, if  
the contradiction ceases, one is left to wonder: what is the ideal of  socialist and Marxist 
political philosophy? 
The concept of  exploitation, I believe, is the key to formulate socialist and Marxist 
political philosophy. Given that exploitation is a constant and stubborn fact in human 
society, which is primarily produced by class division, socialist and Marxist political 
philosophy should be able to deal with the exploitation. As such, the termination of  
exploitation is one of  the ultimate goals that socialists and Marxists attempt to achieve. For 
example, Marx’s socialist society is a society where exploitation ceases. Socialist and Marxist 
political philosophy should view exploitation as a form of  objectionable inequality, 
 




condemn the injustice of  exploitation, and aim at liberating people from exploitation. 
Hence, the concept of  exploitation has a pivotal role within socialist and Marxist political 
philosophy, and we might wonder how and whether mainstream egalitarians can respond 
to exploitation appropriately.  
Nonetheless, the two main forms of  egalitarianism, luck and relational egalitarianism, 
seem not to provide satisfactory answers to exploitation. On the one hand, although 
Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler, two leading relational egalitarians, view 
exploitation as a relational egalitarian wrong, they do not offer any account of  it.4 On the 
contrary, although leading luck egalitarians, such as Cohen, John Roemer, Richard Arneson, 
and Hillel Steiner, discuss exploitation more extensively than some relational egalitarians, 
as I will argue in Chapter 4 and 6, their accounts are not satisfactory. Note that I think luck 
egalitarianism can deal with some forms of  exploitation and Marx did share certain luck 
egalitarian intuitions. For example, in ‘Critique of  the Gotha Programme’, Marx argued 
that it is unequal if  we grant that people should be rewarded according to their ability 
because doing so is to tacitly recognise unequal individual endowments (2000: 160-166). 
Instead, in the higher stage of  Marx’s communism, the unequal rights－to each according 
to their contribution－will be replaced by the doctrine “from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs” (ibid.). Since people’s differential endowments belong to 
unfair inequalities, eliminating the inequalities shares some spirit of  luck egalitarianism: in 
that it is unfair for a person to suffer disadvantages, which are no fault of  her own. 
However, as I shall argue in Chapter 6, while Marx’s communism shares some spirit of  
luck egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism fails to deal with exploitation that emerges within 
an otherwise just world. As such, I believe equality demands more than luck egalitarianism. 
Hence, the thesis aims to raise the concern of  exploitation in contemporary egalitarianism.  
 
4 Anderson and Scheffler have rarely discussed exploitation. David Miller (1997), Jonathan Wolff  (1999, 




Having conveyed my research context, I shall now introduce the three questions 
central to the thesis.  
 
1.1. Three Questions 
 
The thesis addresses three major issues: what exploitation is, why exploitation is unjust for 
egalitarians, and how we should respond to mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. Thus, the 
thesis is divided into three parts and consists of  six chapters corresponding to the three 
questions. 
In Part 1 (Chapter 2 to 4), I formulate an account of  exploitation by critically engaging 
with contemporary theories of  exploitation, particularly, Alan Wertheimer (1996) and Ruth 
Sample (2003). Before turning to the main arguments in Part 1, I shall introduce some 
common ground that I take for granted. First of  all, I follow the general formulation of  
exploitation: to exploit amounts to taking unfair advantage of  someone (Wertheimer, 1996; 
Christiano, 2015; 262-265; Ferguson, 2018; Miller, 1990). More specifically, exploitation 
consists of  two components: (1) A, the exploiter, gains by (2) taking advantage of  B, the 
exploitee (Vrousalis, 2018: 2). This means, if  A does not benefit from the interaction with 
B, A does not exploit B, though A might wrong B in ways other than exploitation. Further, 
even if  A benefits from the interaction with B, if  A does not take advantage of  B, no 
exploitation occurs. So understood, giving someone a gift is not necessarily exploitative 
because neither party expects a return of  equivalent value from the interaction (Reiff, 2013: 
80-82) and, more importantly, doing so does not involve (2). Based on various 
interpretations of, and different weights between, (1) and (2), theorists propose different 
accounts of  exploitation. I will follow the general formulation to establish my account of  
exploitation as well. 




consensual, exploitation, rather than harmful and non-consensual exploitation 
(Wertheimer, 1996: 13-16).5 This is because, when identifying exploitation’s wrong-making 
features, mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation raises more theoretical difficulties 
than harmful and involuntary exploitation. And if  the moral wrongness of  mutually 
beneficial and consensual exploitation can be identified, it is easy to condemn harmful and 
involuntary exploitation. Thus, the thesis focuses on mutually beneficial and consensual 
exploitation.  
Third, the other shared consensus is that exploitation need not involve coercion 
(Feinberg, 1983: 201-235; Miller, 1987: 151; Wertheimer, 1996: 25-28; Green, 2007: ch.7; 
Hill, 1994).6 Of  course, one plausible line is to argue that exploitation is coercive in the 
sense that the exploited do not have acceptable choices, even if  an exploitative offer is better 
than no-transaction. However, even if  exploitation can be conceptually related to notions 
such as manipulation, threats, or oppression (Wood, 2014), it is important not to conflate 
exploitation with these notions. Otherwise, we might lose the conceptual clarity of  
exploitation. Rather, an account of  exploitation is successful when it can distinguish 
between exploitative and non-exploitative transactions (Wollner, 2019: 146). This standard 
is adopted to examine whether an account of  exploitation succeeds. Hence, the primary 
task of  Part 1 is to formulate and defend an account of  exploitation by distinguishing 
exploitation from other similar notions. 
Having introduced the common ground, I shall briefly introduce the core arguments 
I make in Part 1. Generally speaking, Chapter 2 and 3 concern (1): how the exploiter gains 
wrongfully in two distinct ways; Chapter 3 concerns (2): the meaning of  advantage-taking 
behaviour. In Chapter 2, I introduce and criticise Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation 
 
5 Exploitation is mutually beneficial in that both A and B gain compared to no-transaction, and it is 
consensual in that both A and B agree to the transaction. Harmful exploitation refers to a situation where B, 
the exploitee, is worse off  compared to no-transaction after the transaction with A, the exploiter.  




(1996), which I shall term ‘unfair exploitation’. This account holds that A exploits B if  and 
only if  A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain unfairly relative to a fairness baseline. 
The core argument in Chapter 2, however, is to contend that since exploitation is a form 
of  wrongful gain, and since unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not necessary for 
exploitation, there are two major ways to understand the exploiter’s wrongful gains, namely, 
unfair gain and disrespectful gain. While unfair gain refers to a situation in which A gains 
unfairly relative to a fairness baseline, disrespectful gain refers to a situation where A gains 
from a disrespectful transaction with B that violates the Merely Means Principle.7 Based 
on the distinction, in Chapter 3, I introduce and criticise Ruth Sample’s account of  
exploitation (2003). Her account represents what I shall term ‘disrespectful exploitation’. This 
account states that A exploits B if  A gains from a disrespectful transaction with B by taking 
advantage of  B’s inferiority. The aim of  Chapter 3, then, is to explain the meaning of  
disrespectful exploitation and how it differs from unfair exploitation.  
Having explained the meaning of  unfair exploitation and disrespectful exploitation 
according to the distinction between unfair gain and disrespectful gain, in Chapter 4, I 
propose and defend a relational notion of  the advantage-taking behaviour, which I shall 
term ‘the Relational condition’. This notion holds that A’s taking advantage of  B’s weaker agency 
(compared to A’s agency) is necessary for exploitation. I explain why the Relational 
condition is better than alternatives, such as those proposed by Steiner (1984, 1987, 2010), 
Roemer (1982a) and Nicholas Vrousalis (2013), in identifying exploitation in a variety of  
asymmetrical human relationships. In short, in Part 1, I propose and defend an account of  
exploitation against leading accounts of  exploitation.  
Having proposed and defended an account of  exploitation in Part 1, I explore why 
exploitation is unjust for egalitarians in Part 2 (chapter 5 and 6). First, the question is dedicated 
 




to egalitarianism, rather than sufficientarianism or prioritarianism, because exploitation is 
a fundamental form of  inequality in that one party in a transaction treats another as inferior. 
(Phillips, 2017: 110). Therefore, before proceeding to the core argument in Chapter 6, I 
survey the varieties of  egalitarianism, particularly the controversy between distributive and 
social egalitarianism, to identify the best interpretation of  egalitarian justice.  
The survey in Chapter 5 will facilitate our understanding of  the nature of  egalitarian 
justice and, therefore, the injustice of  exploitation from the perspective of  egalitarianism. 
Roughly speaking, distributive egalitarianism in general, and luck egalitarianism in 
particular, emphasise the distributive aspect of  equality; social egalitarianism, in contrast, 
treats equality as a social and relational notion. Moreover, by scrutinising three objections
－namely, the intrusive objection, the disrespectful objection, and the harshness objection－ that 
relational egalitarians level against luck egalitarians, and how luck egalitarians can reply to 
these objections, we will have a better understanding of  how luck egalitarians might 
respond to exploitation in particular. Chapter 5 functions as a helpful background to the 
core argument in Chapter 6.  
The core argument of  Chapter 6 contends that luck egalitarianism cannot deal with 
exploitation properly, because exploitation can arise in a just society according to luck 
egalitarian standards. Therefore, to be a complete theory of  justice, luck egalitarianism 
needs an independent principle of  non-exploitation, which I will develop at the end of  
Chapter 6. That is, exploitation is unjust on its own, regardless of  its unjust history. Luck 
egalitarians fail to notice and deal with exploitation that emerges from a just society because 
they adopt a historical account of  exploitation, that is, exploitation must stem from a prior 
injustice. This view, however, is misleading. Exploitation is, in fact, an ahistorical notion 
because it may occur even under just background conditions in which no one suffers an 
unfair disadvantage relative to a doctrine of  luck egalitarianism.  




primarily because of  the exploiter’s inegalitarian behaviour of  pressing her superior 
advantage upon the exploitee to extract wrongful benefits. Contra the luck egalitarian 
account of  the injustice of  exploitation, exploitation is unjust even if  it stems from just 
background conditions, via just steps. Hence, the incompleteness of  the luck egalitarian 
treatment of  exploitation suggests that luck egalitarianism needs an independent principle 
of  non-exploitation. 
Having proposed and defended an account of  exploitation in Part 1 and having 
explicated why exploitation is unjust for egalitarians in Part 2, in Part 3 (Chapter 7), I 
examine two questions, namely, whether mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation is 
morally impermissible and whether it is morally permissible for third parties to interfere 
with it, all things considered. More specifically, I answer these questions by focusing on 
sweatshop exploitation, in which sweatshop owners exploit and benefit the poor in developing 
countries. Even if  it is not controversial that exploitation is, pro tanto, wrong, some contend 
that sweatshop exploitation is, all things considered, morally permissible, because 
sweatshop labour benefits the poor in developing countries. This famous argument is ‘the 
non-worseness claim’ (Wertheimer, 1996; Zwolinski, 2009). More precisely, the non-
worseness claim states that, since sweatshop exploitation is: mutually beneficial relative to 
the no-transaction baseline; and since sweatshop owners and workers agree to sweatshop 
contracts; and since certain instances of  sweatshop exploitation generate no negative 
externalities on any third party; then, even if  sweatshops exploit workers in developing 
countries, they are sometimes morally permissible, all things considered. The non-
worseness claim can cover mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation in a variety of  
social relationships.  
Concerning the first question, however, I contend that even if  sweatshop labour 
benefits the poor in developing countries, once we distinguish between the state of  affairs 




morally impermissible for sweatshop owners to exploit their employees, all things 
considered. Concerning the second question, I contend that it is morally permissible for 
third parties to interfere with sweatshop exploitation if  the exploited will be made better 
off  by the interference. Hence, even if  sweatshop exploitation benefits the poor, it is 
morally impermissible; and the third-party interference with sweatshop exploitation is 
morally permissible when and because the interference will make the exploited better off. 
Thus, the non-worseness claim fails.  
Having introduced three central questions and the arguments that I will present in 
the thesis, in what follows, I turn to methodological issues that are relevant to my 
arguments. 
 
1.2. The Methodological Issue: Conceptual Analysis  
 
In Part 1, I address what exploitation is; this requires analysing the concept of  exploitation. 
According to one view, conceptual analysis involves “scrutinizing, systematizing and 
developing the classifications implicit in ordinary linguistic practices” (Olsthoorn, 2017: 
187), by specifying a set of  conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
for the definition of  a concept. However, given rival accounts of  exploitation, some might 
doubt whether or not a definition of  exploitation is possible. Exploitation, it seems, 
belongs to the category of  “essentially contested concepts”, proposed by W. B. Gallie 
(1955). For Gallie, essentially contested concepts involve endless disputes about the proper 
uses of  a concept, because contestants will and may believe that the concept is best 
understood by reference to different values (1955: 169-172).  
Moreover, contestants acknowledge the fact that others will weight these evaluative 
elements of  a concept differently. According to the essential contestability thesis, people 




differently and attach different weights to each evaluative element of  these notions (Mason, 
1993: 50). If  the essential contestability thesis is correct, it seems to acknowledge, both the 
falsity of  the value-free claim that moral and political concepts are not value-free and the no 
superior claim that one interpretation of  an essentially contested concept cannot justifiably 
claim that it is superior to another. Hence, if  exploitation is an essentially contested concept, 
I can at most provide a conception of  exploitation: I cannot claim that my account is 
superior to rival accounts. However, I shall argue that even if  exploitation is an essentially 
contested concept, it does not follow that we cannot compare rival accounts of  
exploitation or that one account cannot be better than another. Also, I explain how the 
notion of  exploitation could remain value-neutral in some respect to avoid some 
substantive controversy. Let us consider ‘the no superior claim’ first and then ‘the falsity 
of  the value-free claim’.  
Regarding the no superior claim, one version of  the essential contestability thesis 
claims that different interpretations of  an essentially contested concept are all reasonable 
in the sense that the dispute cannot be resolved by “arguments which have the character 
that they should persuade any reasonable person who accepts their premises and applies 
the law of  logic correctly” (Mason, 1993: 56). Nonetheless, as Mason indicated, even if  a 
general principle that decides which interpretation is the best among others is unattainable, 
we could have a strong reason to favour one particular interpretation over another, even 
though others may reasonably reject that the particular interpretation is the best one (1993: 
55). I follow Mason’s view. I believe that one conception of  exploitation is superior to 
another, for example, when and because it can properly identify certain kinds of  domestic 
labour as exploitation and explain its wrongness. Even if  moral and political concepts are 
essentially contested, we can judge the superiority of  one interpretation by assessing 
whether it elucidates the essence of  an essentially contested concept. This approach is the 




even if  there is a variety of  reasonable interpretations of  an essentially contested concept, 
and even if  no single interpretation is the best among others, it is possible to compare two 
interpretations of  the concept. We can claim that one interpretation is better, or more 
plausible, than another. Thus, the no superior claim fails. 
Accordingly, in Part 1, I specify a set of  individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions of  exploitation and defend my account against alternatives. Moreover, since my 
account accommodates two major forms of  exploitation－ unfair exploitation and 
disrespectful exploitation－it can identify exploitation in various social relationships. Thus, 
it is superior to and more comprehensive than the two well-known alternatives in the above 
section. 
Having rejected the no superior claim, I review some positions concerning value-
dependent and value-neutral concepts. To begin, a concept is value-independent “if  its 
definition can be justified purely in terms of  theoretical-explanatory considerations, and 
not in terms of  ethical considerations” (Carter, 2015: 285). In other words, a value-
independent concept is not grounded on any ethical or moral values (Kramer, 2018: 376). 
On my understanding, a value-independent concept is a purely descriptive, or strictly non-
evaluative, notion. In contrast, a concept is value-neutral “if  its use does not imply the 
superiority of  any one of  a set of  contrasting substantive ethical points of  view” (Carter, 
2015: 285; cf. Kramer, 2018: 376). Although exploitation could be treated as a value-neutral 
notion in the sense that a farmer exploits her lands, I treat it primarily as a value-dependent 
notion. Nonetheless, theorists differ in whether we should formulate a value-dependent or 
value-neutral concept. For example, Dowding (2016: 205) contends that it is advantageous 
to expand a concept to be as value-neutral as possible so that we do not distort unnaturally 
the concept to fit a normative principle.8 In contrast, Ronald Dworkin argues that some 
 




political and moral concepts are interpretive in the sense that, even if  people agree that these 
concepts are values, they nevertheless disagree about how these values should be 
characterised (2011: ch.8; 1986: ch.2).9 Furthermore, since the concept of  exploitation, as 
I acknowledge, is essentially contested, it is clear that exploitation is a value-dependent or 
moralised, notion in that the evaluative elements that it has permit different interpretations 
and could be weighted differently. I thus take for granted that the notion of  exploitation 
is value dependent.  
Having explicated some conceptual issues, I will now outline the content of  each 
chapter. 
 
1.3. An Outline of  The Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of  six chapters corresponding to the three central questions: what 
exploitation is (ch.2 to 4), why exploitation is unjust for egalitarians (ch.5 and 6) and how 
to deal with sweatshop exploitation (ch.7).  
The first three chapters aim to offer an account of  exploitation by critically engaging 
in contemporary exploitation theorists’ works. The core idea is that exploitation is a form 
of  wrongful gain, and there are two major ways to understand how the exploiter gains 
wrongfully. Consequently, exploitation, in my view, consists of  two necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. That is, the exploiter, (a) gains either unfairly relative to a fairness 
baseline, or disrespectfully in the sense that it violates the Merely Means Principle, or both, by (b) 
taking advantage of  the exploitee’s weaker agency, compared to A’s agency. Then, Chapter 
2 and 3 illustrates (a) and Chapter 4 explicates (b) against alternatives.  
Chapter 2 scrutinises Alan Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation. Of  the various 
 




accounts of  exploitation, his account is perhaps the most prominent. His account 
represents what I shall term ‘unfair exploitation’, which insists that unfairness is necessary 
for exploitation. For him, exploitation occurs when A takes unfair advantage of  B. 
Wertheimer’s account is ground-breaking in the sense that ‘unfair advantage’ is construed 
as the unfair terms of  a transaction, but not as one’s disadvantages caused by unchosen 
circumstance, as luck egalitarians contend. However, contra Wertheimer, I argue that 
unfairness is not necessary for exploitation, though it is an important way to perceive A’s 
wrongful gain in terms of  exploitation. There are cases where the terms of  a transaction 
are fair relative to a fairness baseline, yet A exploits B in some other way. Ruth Sample’s 
account (2003) provides another way to understand how A gains wrongfully by exploiting 
B, namely, through disrespectful gain. The core argument in Chapter 2 is that since 
exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain, and since unfairness is an important element, 
rather than a necessary condition, of  exploitation, an exchange could be fair and 
exploitative. It follows that there are two major forms of  wrongful gain in terms of  
exploitation, namely, unfair gain and disrespectful gain. The conclusion brings us to Chapter 3 
in which I will explain the meaning of  ‘disrespectful exploitation’ and its relationship to 
unfair exploitation.  
Chapter 3 examines Sample’s account of  exploitation. Her account is different from 
Wertheimer’s account in that, in her view, unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not 
necessary for exploitation. Instead, Sample argues that A exploits B if  and only if  A takes 
advantage of  B in a disrespectful way. However, contra Sample, I argue that there are cases 
where A engages in Sample’s formulation of  disrespectful relationship, but A does not 
exploit B because the terms of  their transaction are fair relative to a fairness baseline. 
Hence, the core argument in Chapter 3 is that, for Sample’s disrespectful account to be a 
plausible conception of  exploitation, it has to pass “the fairness test”, that is, the removal 




non-exploitative. If  so, a transaction could be exploitative, not in the sense that its terms 
are unfair, but in that it violates the Merely Means Principles by treating the exploitee 
merely as a means. Moreover, it follows that the disrespectful transaction is morally 
impermissible, and all of  the exploiter’s gains are unjustified. This is the meaning of  
disrespectful exploitation.  
Having explained the meaning of  disrespectful exploitation, based on the distinction 
between unfair gain and disrespectful gain, I propose further two connections between 
exploitation and anti-commodification: external and internal connections. The external 
connection claims that we should not commodify certain things just because the 
commodification of  these things may lead to, or increase the possibility of, individuals 
being exploited. In contrast, the internal connection claims that the commodification of  a 
person in a way that violates the Merely Means Principle, in itself, constitutes exploitation. 
In some cases, when people are commodified, individuals are degraded and treated merely 
as a means. Thus, the further implication is that we ought not to benefit from disrespectful 
commodification. If  some did, all of  the benefits gained from these transactions are 
morally unjustified, and so the exploiters are not entitled to them. Chapter 2 and 3 jointly 
explicate one of  the two conditions of  my account of  exploitation: (a) two major forms 
of  wrongful gain in exploitation. In Chapter 4, I shall explicate why (b)－taking advantage 
of  the exploitee’s weaker agency－is necessary for exploitation and defend my definition 
of  (b) against alternatives. 
Chapter 4 defends a relational notion of  the advantage-taking behaviour, arguing that 
A’s taking advantage of  B’s weaker agency (compared to A’s agency) is necessary for 
exploitation. I term this the Relational condition. Moreover, I shall defend the Relational 
condition against four alternatives to advantage-taking behaviour. First, contra Roemer’s 
purely distributive account (the advantage-taking behaviour is unnecessary for exploitation), 




exploitation must involve (b). Second, contra the Historical account (taking advantage of  a 
past injustice that B suffers), which argues that a prior injustice is necessary for exploitation, 
I argue that exploitation need not stem from a past injustice. Third, the Non-Comparative 
account (taking advantage of  the exploitee’s vulnerability as insufficiency of  basic needs) 
contends that we should focus on the exploitee’s absolute, rather than comparative, 
features. In contrast, I argue that we have to take the relation between A and B as a whole, 
rather than focus exclusively on B’s absolute character. Lastly, contra the Complex Notion 
(advantage-taking behaviour as domination), which argues how exploiters dominate 
exploitees, I argue that exploitation need not involve domination or other complex notions. 
Hence, the Relational condition offers a better definition of  advantage-taking behaviour 
than the four alternatives in that it can identify a variety of  asymmetrical social relationships 
and explain why (b) is necessary for exploitation.  
Put together, from Chapter 2 to 4, I offer an account of  exploitation by reflecting on 
the main accounts of  exploitation. Moreover, my account is more comprehensive than its 
alternatives in two aspects. First, I resolve the dispute between Wertheimer’s and Sample’s 
accounts by turning their controversy into two understandings of  wrongful gain in 
exploitation. My account of  exploitation then permits two major ways to understand how 
A gains wrongfully through exploitation. Second, since I remain open on how people 
interpret what constitutes a fairness baseline, and since my inclusive definition of  (b) can 
identify a wide range of  asymmetrical relationships between parties, my account can 
identify various forms of  exploitation in different social spheres. Having proposed and 
defended my account of  exploitation, in Chapter 5 and 6, I explore why exploitation is 
unjust for egalitarians. 
Before proceeding to explicate the injustice of  exploitation, I review the controversy 
between the varieties of  egalitarianism. The detour is because exploitation is a fundamental 




varieties of  egalitarianism will help us better understand what makes exploitation unjust 
for egalitarians. Chapter 5, then, surveys the controversy between distributive and social 
egalitarianism about the best way to understand the ideal of  equality. Over the past three 
decades, luck egalitarianism, among others, has been one of  the most prominent theories 
of  egalitarian justice; nonetheless, it has also attracted many critiques, especially those from 
Social and Relational Egalitarianism. Social egalitarians criticise distributive egalitarians for 
misinterpreting the idea of  equality as a distributive notion. Rather, they contend that the 
ideal of  equality should best be construed as a social and relational notion. After 
introducing the basic ideas of  both luck egalitarianism and social egalitarianism, I assess 
whether or not the three objections that social egalitarians level against luck egalitarians 
are successful. These are the intrusion objection, the disrespectful objection, and the harshness objection. 
Reflection on how luck egalitarians reply to these objections will facilitate our 
understanding of  the nature of  egalitarian justice. Chapter 5 then serves as a preliminary 
stage for the core argument in chapter 6. In what follows, I argue that my criticism of  the 
luck egalitarian response to exploitation provides a stronger critique of  luck egalitarianism 
compared to existing relational egalitarian critiques to which luck egalitarians have 
reasonable or plausible replies.  
Chapter 6 provides two distinct ways to understand the injustice of  exploitation: free-
standing and derivative views. The Free-standing view holds that exploitation, in itself, is an 
independent injustice, irrespective of  whether it stems from just or unjust background 
conditions, via just or unjust steps. The Derivative view, in contrast, claims that exploitation 
is unjust if  and only if  it stems from a prior injustice. Based on the distinction, the core 
argument of  Chapter 6 contends that, since leading luck egalitarians, such as G. A. Cohen 
and John Roemer, employ the Derivative approach, they fail to notice, and cannot deal 
with, the exploitation that emerges from a just background via just steps. Therefore, the 




exploitation they implicitly adopt cannot identify exploitation generated under the luck 
egalitarian agenda. Consequently, luck egalitarians need an independent principle of  non-
exploitation, namely, exploitation as free-standing injustice, which I develop at the end of  
Chapter 6. Instead, the Free-standing view maintains that the anti-egalitarian conduct－the 
exploiter’s pressing her superior advantage against the exploitee to extract wrongful gain
－constitutes the fundamental injustice of  exploitation. Hence, Chapter 5 and 6 jointly 
answer why exploitation is unjust for egalitarians and, more importantly, the exploitation 
objection poses a challenge to luck egalitarianism.  
Having analysed the nature of  exploitation (chapters 2 to 4) and having established 
whether and why it is pro tanto wrong (chapters 5 and 6), we now turn to consider whether 
exploitation is all things considered wrong and whether actions should be taken to 
eliminate it (chapter 7). Chapter 7 aims to answer how we ought to respond to sweatshop 
exploitation that benefits the poor in developing countries. I scrutinise the non-worseness claim, 
endorsed by Matt Zwolinski (2007). Roughly stated, this holds that mutually beneficial and 
consensual exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered. It follows that the 
state and other third parties should not interfere with sweatshop exploitation. However, 
when we distinguish between the moral assessment of  the state of  affairs and our moral 
assessment of  the exploiter’s action in our analysis of  sweatshop exploitation, it is clear 
that it is misleading to claim that sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible just because 
it benefits the poor. Once we distinguish discretionary exploiters, who can pay non-exploitative 
wages at little cost, from structural exploiters, who pay non-exploitative wages at fatal cost, it 
is clear that sweatshop exploitation by discretionary exploiters is morally impermissible, all 
things considered, even though sweatshop exploitation benefits the poor.  
Moreover, in the case of  structural exploiters, although paying non-exploitative wages 
is very costly for them, they at least have a moral duty to act jointly with other agents to 




for third parties to interfere with sweatshop exploitation, contra Zwolinski, I contend that 
it is morally permissible for third parties to interfere with sweatshop exploitation when and 
because they can ensure that the exploited will be made better off. Hence, sweatshop 
exploitation is morally impermissible. The impermissibility, in some cases, justifies third-
parties’ protection of  the exploited.  
In sum, the thesis has the following contributions. First, it provides a critique of  
leading accounts of  exploitation (those of  Wertheimer, Sample, Steiner, Roemer, etc.). 
Drawing on my critique, I outline and defend my account of  exploitation. Second, I 
illustrate why the notion of  exploitation is crucial for our thinking of  egalitarian justice. 
While relational egalitarians have criticised luck egalitarians for failing to capture the wrong 
of  inegalitarian relationships, I show that luck egalitarianism is not vulnerable to many of  
the objections that many relational egalitarians have levelled against it. Rather, luck 
egalitarianism cannot properly capture the wrong of  exploitation. Third, concerning the 
practical case of  sweatshop exploitation, I rebut the claims that mutually consensual and 
beneficial exploitation is morally permissible and that third parties should not interfere. We 
thus have reason to regulate sweatshop labour in developing countries. These are the 
contributions the thesis achieves. 
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2. Exploitation and Unfairness 
 
In Part 1 (Chapter 2 to 4), I aim to offer an account of  exploitation by critically engaging 
with contemporary accounts of  exploitation, particularly Alan Wertheimer (1996) and 
Ruth Sample (2003). In general, exploitation consists of  two elements: (1) the exploiter 
gains by (2) taking advantage of  some feature of  the exploitee (Vrousalis, 2018: 2). Chapter 
2 and 3, then, examine the nature of  the exploiter’s wrongful gain and Chapter 4 discusses 
various conceptions of  the advantage-taking behaviour. Consequently, at the end of  Part 
1, I propose and defend my account of  exploitation against alternatives. The core argument 
in Chapter 2 and 3 is to contend that since exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain, and 
because the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not necessary for exploitation, there 
are at least two ways to understand the quality of  the exploiter’s wrongful gain, namely, 
unfair gain and disrespectful gain.  
Unfair gain and disrespectful gain are individually sufficient for exploitation when 
equipped with my conception of  advantage-taking behaviour. To be precise, unfair gains 
refer to a situation where the exploiter gains unfairly relative to a fairness baseline; in 
contrast, disrespectful gains refer to a situation where the exploiter gains from participating 
in a transaction that ought not to take place at all because it treats the exploitee as merely 
a means. As such, in Part I, I outline two forms of  exploitation: unfair exploitation and 
disrespectful exploitation. Roughly put, in unfair exploitation, A exploits B when A takes 
advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain unfairly. In disrespectful exploitation, A exploits B 
when A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain benefits in ways that A treats B merely 
as a means. Having delineated the outline of  my account of  exploitation, let us turn to the 
arguments in Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 2, I introduce Alan Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation, which I shall 
term unfair exploitation and argue, contra Wertheimer, that unfairness in the terms of  a 
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transaction is not a necessary condition of  exploitation. After the publication of  his book 
Exploitation in 1996, Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation has represented the most 
prominent account of  exploitation over the last two decades. Based on Joel Feinberg’s 
discussion of  ‘harmful exploitation’,10 Wertheimer substantially advances the discussion 
of  the concept of  exploitation by asking a further question: that is, can a mutually 
beneficial and consensual transaction still be exploitative? If  it can, what makes such a 
transaction exploitative? A critical examination of  his account is where I begin my research 
on exploitation.  
The structure of Chapter 2 is as follows. In section 2.1., I introduce Wertheimer’s 
account of  exploitation, particularly his distinction between taking unfair advantage of  
another’s unfairness and taking advantage of  another’s unfairness. Section 2.2. scrutinises 
Wertheimer’s understanding of  what makes a transaction unfair, and, therefore, 
exploitative, according to his idea of  the hypothetical market price. Section 2.3. presents 
Richard Arneson’s objection to Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price as a fairness 
baseline, and how Wertheimer might respond. Section 2.4. examines Allen Wood’s 
objection to Wertheimer’s claim that the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is 
necessary for exploitation and how Wertheimer might respond. The disagreement between 
Wood’s and Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation represents two distinct ways of  defining 
the nature of  exploitation. In section 2.5., I argue that exploitation is a form of  wrongful 
gain, and, contra Wertheimer, the unfairness is not necessary for exploitation, and, 
therefore, there are two fundamental ways to perceive the quality of  the exploiter’s gain: as 
unfair gain and disrespectful gain. Hence, contra Wertheimer, the fact of  unfairness in the 
terms of  a transaction is not necessary for exploitation. Section 2.6. is the conclusion. 
 
 
10 Harmful exploitation refers to a transaction in which the exploitee gains less than no-transaction. See Joel 
Feinberg (1990: 177-210) for a discussion of  harmful exploitation. 
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2.1. Unfair Exploitation: Alan Wertheimer’s Account 
 
I shall start with some contextual information that is helpful to locate Wertheimer’s 
position. First of  all, Wertheimer develops a fairness-based, micro-level account of  
exploitation: an account based on a liberal egalitarian political theory framework (1996: x). 
More precisely, unlike Marxism which considers exploitation from a social-structural 
perspective, Wertheimer’s account focuses on how agents in the market bargain or agree 
with each other, and how their interactions become exploitative transactions. However, his 
micro-level focus is more than an attempt to tackle a different problem from the problems 
Marxists have attended. Instead, it indicates his rejection of  the necessary connection 
between exploitation at the micro-level and background injustice. As we shall see, merely 
taking advantage of  an injustice would not constitute exploitation for Wertheimer.  
Second, like most exploitation theorists, Wertheimer focuses on mutually advantageous 
and consensual exploitation,11 rather than harmful and involuntary exploitation. The reason is 
that the moral wrongness of  harmful and non-consensual exploitation is clear. People 
often expect that the exploited is harmed and left worse off  after transacting with 
exploiters. We also worry that the exploited did not properly consent to the transaction. In 
either case, harmful and involuntary exploitation is pro tanto morally wrongful. Besides, the 
moral wrongness of  mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation is less clear. For 
him, it is the unfairness of  the transaction’s terms that makes mutually advantageous and 
consensual exploitation wrongful. Hence, his account represents what I shall term ‘unfair 
exploitation’, that is, A exploits B if  and only if  A takes unfair advantage of  B in terms that 
their transaction is unfair relative to a fairness baseline. Now let me introduce each element 
in Wertheimer’s account. 
 
11 We will see how Wertheimer defines ‘mutually advantageous’, but for now we need only know that he is 
dealing with a specific form of  exploitation. 




2.1.1. The Elements of  Exploitation 
 
Wertheimer’s understanding of  exploitation is based on modern mainstream economics, 
which seeks to explain and predict how people interact with each other in the market by 
assuming them to be rational and self-interested agents. They also assume that a 
commodity’s price is determined by supply and demand in the market, rather than – as 
many classical economists maintain – by the fixed amount of  labour power within a 
commodity.12  Modern mainstream economics reject ‘the labour theory of  value’: the 
theory that the value of  a commodity is determined by the amount of  labour power within 
that commodity.13 Wertheimer develops his theory of  exploitation using these sorts of  
assumptions. He considers how agents bargain about the price of  a commodity, and how 
they share the social surplus generated by any resulting transaction.  
Wertheimer distinguishes between harmful exploitation and mutually advantageous 
exploitation. Whether the alleged exploitation at stake is harmful or mutually advantageous 
is, as Wertheimer suggests, decided by “its net effect on B” compared to B’s status quo 
before the transaction, that is, B’s “no-transaction baseline” (1996: 20).14 Accordingly, 
harmful exploitation refers to a situation where the agreement is beneficial to A but harmful 
to B, because B is worse-off  compared to his no-transaction baseline (Wertheimer, 1996: 
20-21; 1997a: 897). Thus, the wrongness of  harmful exploitation is more serious than 
mutually advantageous exploitation. 
Concerning mutually advantageous exploitation, Wertheimer refers to a transaction after 
which both A and B are better off  than their no-transaction baseline (1996: 14). In mutually 
 
12 See Saad-Filho & Johnston (2005) and David Dequech (2014). 
13 See Richard Arneson (1981), G. A. Cohen (1979, 1983a), and Peter Dooley (2005), for a discussion of  the 
labour theory of  value. 
14 Wertheimer refers to the exploiter as A, and to the exploitee as B. In the rest of  chapters, A refers to the 
exploiter and B refers to the exploited.  
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advantageous exploitation, the transaction must generate a social surplus between them, 
making both parties better off  (Wertheimer, 1996: 14-20). Thus, while harmful exploitation 
can be zero-sum, negative-sum, or positive-sum,15 mutually advantageous exploitation 
must be, by definition, positive-sum. 16  Having distinguished between harmful and 
mutually advantageous exploitation, I explain what makes mutually advantageous 
transactions exploitative on Wertheimer’s account.  
According to Wertheimer, “A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of  B” (1996: 
16, 207). How to construe his understanding of  ‘taking unfair advantage’ is crucial here. 
The transaction can be unfair, Wertheimer argues, both in terms of  its outcome and the process 
that generates the unfair outcome (1996: 16). Let us start with the unfairness of  the process. 
In terms of  the process of  a transaction, Wertheimer focuses on the role of  consent. He 
questions whether a defect of  consent is necessary for exploitation. In reply, he examines 
several possibilities that may result in a defect of  consent, such as inequality of  bargaining 
power, hard circumstances, and false consciousness. For Wertheimer, however, a 
transaction can be exploitative but voluntary and, therefore, a defect of  consent is not 
necessary for exploitation. However, since the focus of  the thesis is not the role of  consent, 
and since it is widely accepted that exploitation is often voluntary, I shall presume that the 
exploitee’s consent to an exploitative contract is not defective and leave the issue aside.17 
Let us turn to how Wertheimer considers the outcome to be unfair. For him, a 
transaction’s outcome has two elements: the benefit to A and the effect on B. With respect 
to the benefit to A, the crucial point is that, unless A obtains some benefits through the transaction 
 
15 Harmful exploitation is zero-sum in that A gains what B loses and the total sum is zero; it is negative-sum 
in that A gains is less than what B loses and the total sum is negative; it is positive-sum in that “A gains by 
imposing a loss on B that is less than A’s gain” and the total sum is positive (Wertheimer, 1996: 18-20). since 
harmful exploitation is not his main concern, I shall leave his discussion of  harmful exploitation aside.  
16 A transaction that benefits A but which leaves B no better off  but also no worse off, is not mutually 
beneficial exploitation according to this definition.  
17 In the rest of  discussion, I will focus only on the outcome of  a transaction. See Wertheimer (1996: 247-
277) for a detailed discussion of  consent in exploitation.  
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with B, the transaction is not exploitative.18 For example, during the transactions, A can abuse, 
oppress, or discriminate against B, but none of  these wrongful treatments by A leads to 
exploitation if  A does not benefit from these behaviours compared to his no-transaction 
baseline (Wertheimer, 1996: 208). With regard to the effect on B, the resulting distribution 
of  social surplus must be unfair to B. On Wertheimer’s view, a transaction is unfair and, 
therefore, exploitative just because the distribution of  social surplus, generated by the 
transaction, is unfair to B relative to a fairness baseline. Now it is important to illustrate 
how Wertheimer perceives market transactions.  
As Wertheimer sees it, any potential transaction in the market involves a range of  
bargaining prices, whose lower and upper limits are fixed, respectively, by A’s and B’s 
reservation prices. The reservation price is “the value that the person must receive if  he or 
she is to agree to the transaction” (Wertheimer, 1996: 20, 211-212).19 Hence, each party’s 
reservation price will create a zone of  agreement, and any outcome generated within this zone 
will result in a social surplus. For example, suppose that A is a car seller and that B is a car 
buyer. Suppose that B will not pay more than ₤6,000 for A’s car and that A will not sell to 
B for less than ₤3,500. A’s reservation price is ₤3,500, and B’s reservation price is ₤6,000. 
The space between A’s and B’s reservation prices constitutes the zone of  agreement. Any 
outcome that locates within this zone is a social surplus. If  they agree on, say, ₤4,500, their 
social surplus is ₤2,500: B receives the car for ₤1,500 less than his reservation price 
(₤6,000), and A receives ₤1,000 more than his reservation price (₤3,500). The transaction 
between them is mutually advantageous that both A and B gain benefits compared to the 
no-transaction baseline, and they are better off  after the transaction.  
 
18 Wertheimer considers that A’s gain can take many forms, such as entertainments, or an infant benefiting 
from their adoptive parents, or in psychotherapy, the doctor gains sexual pleasure, but not limited to surplus 
value. See Wertheimer (1996: 210). 
19 Wertheimer distinguishes further A’s actual reservation price and A’s morally justified reservation price 
when describing the details of  A’s decision-making process. A’s morally justified reservation might be more 
or less than A’s actual reservation price (Wertheimer, 1996: 211-214).  
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However, as we saw, Wertheimer also thinks that even if  both A and B benefit from 
the transaction, it will still be exploitative if  the social surplus generated by them is unfairly 
distributed between them. Take a garden-variety case of  alleged exploitation, for example. 
Suppose that an unexpected storm hits a village. Residents rush to the hardware store to 
buy a shovel, the price of  which is raised from ₤20 to ₤40 by the store owner, A. B is 
willing to pay ₤40 for the shovel, because, in his view, the shovel is worth more than ₤40 
to him. Then clearly, both parties gain. Nevertheless, B might correctly feel exploited 
because A seems to take advantage of  the disaster to raise the price of  the shovel, as it is 
unreasonable to expect B to pay ₤40. The price of  the shovel is unfair to B because the 
social surplus generated from their transactions is unfairly distributed between them.  
If, however, exploitation is conceived of  as Wertheimer does – as a distributive issue 
– then the morally distinctive quality of  exploitation lies in the unfair distribution of  social 
surplus. Then, the fairness relevant to exploitation is transaction-specific fairness, rather than 
background fairness (Wertheimer, 1996: 216). If  so, exploitation only occurs if the terms of  a 
transaction are unfair to B, whereas if  B receives a fair amount of  social surplus, no 
exploitation occurs (Wertheimer, 1996: 208). The unfairness of  social surplus distribution becomes 
an independent criterion of  exploitation, at least for a mutually advantageous and consensual 
transaction to be exploitative.  
For Wertheimer, the upshot is that the unfairness of  the transaction－the unfair 
distribution of  social surplus－is necessary for exploitation. Consequently, “[n]o unfairness 
in the terms of  the transaction, no exploitation” (Wertheimer, 1996: 208).20 Nonetheless, 
some may argue that the unfair terms of  a transaction are not necessary for exploitation. 
For them, a transaction could be fair and exploitative and taking advantage of  B’s 
disadvantageous situation, in itself, constitutes exploitation. In response, we need to 
 
20 Note that the unfair outcome is not sufficient for exploitation on Wertheimer’s view. 
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introduce Wertheimer’s principal distinction between taking advantage of  another’s unfair 
circumstance and taking unfair advantage of  another’s unfair circumstances, which is one 
of  Wertheimer’s major contributions to exploitation theory (Phillips, 2017: 106). The 
distinction marks a critical divergence from other contemporary theorists of  exploitation. 
If  the unfairness is necessary for exploitation, taking advantage of  B’s unfairness does not 
suffice for exploitation; whereas, if  taking advantage of  B’s unfairness is sufficient for 
exploitation, the unfair terms of  a transaction is not necessary for exploitation. Let us turn 
to it now.  
 
2.1.2. The Distinction Between Taking Advantage of  Unfairness and Taking 
Unfair Advantage of  Unfairness 
 
According to Wertheimer (1996: 298-299), taking advantage of  unfairness (or misfortune) 
should be distinguished from taking unfair advantage of  unfairness (or misfortune).21 To see 
how the distinction operates, consider the case of  the greedy snowstorm rescuer. Suppose 
that A is a rescuer and the price for a rescue is ₤50 under normal circumstances. B is 
stranded in the severe snowstorm, willing to pay ₤250 to be rescued. A offers to rescue B 
for ₤50. Given that ₤50 is below B’s reservation price, B accepts. In this case, even if  A 
takes advantage of  B’s misfortune, given that the price is fair to B, A does not take unfair 
advantage of  this misfortune. So, no exploitation occurs. Consider another case. Lawyers 
sometimes earn their living from their customers’ unjust situations, but this would not be 
considered exploitation when the retainer fees are fair relative to a fairness baseline. Thus, 
on Wertheimer’s view, simply taking advantage of  B’s suffering a past injustice will not 
 
21 Chapter 4 will further distinguish different kinds of  advantage-taking behaviour, such as taking advantage 
of  another’s injustice, vulnerability, or bargaining inferiority. Chapter 4 will also consider that B might be 
worse off  but not unfairly so. Taking advantage of  another’s unfairness, then, will be shown to be different 
from taking advantage of  another’s misfortune. These differences do not matter here. 
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constitute exploitation (1996: 70, 95, 298-299).  
Wertheimer reminds us that his aim is “to distinguish the wrong-making 
characteristics of  exploitation from other forms of  wrong” (1996: 13). People can wrong 
one another in many ways, but we should not confuse a charge of  exploitation with other 
forms of  wrong, such as manipulation or domination. Indeed, these are serious 
wrongdoings, but they are not cases of  exploitation. An account of  exploitation is deficient 
if  it fails to explicate the distinctive character of  exploitation: when explaining the wrong 
of  exploitation, an account cannot simply appeal to other forms of  wrong. For example, 
Robert Goodin argues that to take advantage of  B’s vulnerability constitutes exploitation 
(1987) and to exploit is deemed a violation of  our duty toward the vulnerable (1986: 109-
144). The problem with this vulnerability approach to exploitation, for Wertheimer, is that 
it simply appeals to the concept of  vulnerability.22 It seems right to argue that we should 
not exploit the vulnerable, but the point is that the vulnerable are not identical to the 
exploited. People can be exploited and be non-vulnerable and vice-versa. To take advantage 
of  another’s vulnerability may constitute a form of  wrong, but, in Wertheimer’s view, this 
form of  wrong is not unique to exploitation. A can take advantage of  B’s vulnerability 
without exploiting B when the terms of  their transaction are fair relative to a fairness 
baseline. For example, a doctor taking advantage of  her patients’ vulnerability to gain 
benefits. This case is not exploitation if  the terms of  their interaction are fair relative to a 
fairness baseline. Similarly, other theorists of  exploitation endeavour to connect 
exploitation to other forms of  wrong, such as domination, oppression, or coercion, but 
none of  these explicates the nature of  exploitation. Hence, Wertheimer’s transaction-specific 
account of  exploitation poses a challenge to theorists who view taking advantage of  B’s 
unfairness as exploitation.  
 
22 I will criticise the vulnerability approach in Chapter 4. 
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However, as we will see in Chapter 3, to take advantage of  another’s unfair 
circumstance may constitute exploitation even if  the terms of  the transaction are fair 
according to a fairness baseline. I will take a stand on the issue at stake at the end of  this 
chapter. However, for now, what remains unspecified in Wertheimer’s account of  
exploitation is how he understands the idea of  unfairness. We need to clarify Wertheimer’s 
understanding of  a fairness baseline to appreciate what he means by fairness.  
 
2.2. The Hypothetical Perfect Market Price as a Fairness Baseline 
 
Before proceeding, we should note two things. The first is that the hypothetical market 
price, as Wertheimer (1996: 216) emphasises, is not a principle for the distribution of  
resources or opportunity. Even if  the hypothetical market price can be rightly viewed as a 
principle of  fair transactions, it does not follow that such a principle can be applied to the 
issue of  social justice. A principle of  fair distribution that governs interpersonal 
transactions should not be confused with a principle of  social justice that governs basic 
social institutions. Second, Wertheimer is fully aware of  the limitations of  a hypothetical 
perfect market price. This ideal price, he concedes, has two restrictions. One is that, even 
if  we are situated in a perfectly competitive market, exploitation may take place, such as 
the systemic or structural exploitation that Marx and Marxists emphasise, though 
Wertheimer did not specify the meaning of  it (1996: 217). Another is that a hypothetical 
market price is not always a relevant measure; in many cases, it is unknown or simply 
inapplicable (Wertheimer, 1996: 234-236). We should not overestimate the force of  a 
hypothetical market price. Let us see what such a price is.  
 
2.2.1. The Hypothetical Perfect Market Price 
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What is the character of  the price generated in a hypothetical perfect market? Wertheimer 
assumes there would be many buyers and sellers, perfect information, and “all buyers and 
sellers are price-takers” in a hypothetical perfect market (1996: 217). A hypothetical market 
is competitive such that no one can affect the price of  any potential transactions. Agents in 
such a market need not bargain for a commodity’s price, and the bargaining process has 
no place in a perfectly competitive market. With perfect information and competitiveness 
among market agents, any commodity’s price represents its cost; otherwise, sellers will 
choose to withdraw from the market.  
Further, all buyers can either take the commodity at the fixed price or choose not to 
buy it: “after all, a competitive market price reflects the cost of  providing the good or service” 
(Wertheimer, 1996: 233, my italics). In a perfectly competitive market, everyone has to 
compete with each other. A seller will ruin her business either when she charges too little 
to cover her costs, or when her commodity’s price is higher than her potential competitors’. 
As a result, the price of  any commodity in a perfectly competitive market will reflect the 
costs of  supplying the commodity. In brief, any commodity’s hypothetical competitive 
market price reflects its production cost, and so no agent can affect the price. 
 
2.2.2. The Hypothetical Market Price as a Benchmark of  Fair Distribution 
 
Why, however, is a price fixed at the cost of  production a fair one? Recall the reason why 
we need criteria for a fair transaction. In Wertheimer’s definition of  exploitation, A exploits 
B when, and only when, A takes unfair advantage of  B. Although both parties benefits from 
the transaction, somehow the distribution of  social surplus is unfair to B according to a 
fairness baseline. Thus, a benchmark of  fair division is needed to indicate why a mutually 
advantageous transaction is unfair to B (Wertheimer, 1992: 222, 1997b: 1221).  
We should also bear in mind that the hypothetical perfect market price does not 
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reflect “any deep principle of  desert or value” (Wertheimer, 1996: 231). In explaining this, 
Wertheimer attempts to point out that, if  an NBA basketball player’s salary is more than 
that of  a rural doctor, this does not mean that the NBA basketball player’s job is morally 
more valuable than the doctor’s. Furthermore, that one productive person can obtain more 
rewards than another, does not mean that the less productive person does not correspond 
to any deep principle of  desert or justice. Yet, if  the hypothetical market price does not 
ground anything of  value, one might wonder how it is a benchmark of  a fair transaction. 
As Wertheimer writes: 
 
[E]ven though a competitive market price does not reflect a deep principle of  justice, it does 
reflect a crucial moral dimension of  the relationship between the parties to the transaction. 
The competitive market price is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of  
particular defects in the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in the other party’s 
situation. It is a price at which the specific parties to this transaction do not receive greater 
value than they would receive if  they did not encounter each other. It may or may not be a 
“just price,” all things considered, but it may well be a nonexploitative price, for neither party takes 
unfair advantage of  the other party. (1996: 232, my italics) 
 
Two distinctive advantage of  the hypothetical market price can be obtained from this 
paragraph. First, the ideal market price is where sellers and buyers can receive no excessive benefits. 
The price corresponds to Wertheimer’s emphasis that exploitation involves the unfair 
distribution of  social surplus to the exploitee. The second suggests that the hypothetical 
market price’s moral attraction is that nobody takes special unfair advantage of  particular defects in 
the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in the other party’s situation. By 
stipulating how we define the competitive market price, the terms of  trade do not depend 
on any special or particular features of  the party with whom one is contracting. While 
people can choose between the two distinctive characters for interpreting the moral 
attraction of  the hypothetical market price, I interpret Wertheimer as contending that we 
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should take them as two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for exploitation. Now 
I offer my explanation.  
 
2.2.2.1. No Excessive Benefits Can Be Taken 
 
As we have seen, Wertheimer regards exploitation as a micro-level wrong. For him, taking 
advantage of  another’s unjust background conditions－ the macro-level condition－
cannot solely constitute wrongful exploitation; rather, to be exploitation, the unfair terms 
of  a transaction－ the micro-level distribution－ are a necessary condition. Bearing 
Wertheimer’s logic in mind, we now turn to the first advantage of  the ideal market price.  
I suggest that we should not overlook Wertheimer’s emphasis that the hypothetical 
market price reflects the seller’s costs.23 As the economist Michael Parkin points out, “[t]he 
cost of  producing one more unit of  a good or service is its marginal cost. Marginal cost is 
the minimum price that producers must receive to induce them to offer one more unit of  
a good or serve for sale” (2018: 150). Therefore, a supply curve represents a marginal cost 
curve (ibid.). Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price then is in line with mainstream 
economics and has two features. One is that any commodity’s cost represents the minimum 
price for the very existence of  goods and services provided in the hypothetical competitive 
market. Ideally, no one will provide goods and services below their cost. This first feature 
simply explains how things work in the economic domain. In this sense, Wertheimer 
believes that no one can complain about paying the cost of  any commodity (1996: 233, 
236). Another feature is that no one can take excessive benefits when any commodity’s 
price just reflects its cost. This suggests that the price above the commodity’s cost would 
be considered excessive benefits and, therefore, we may inquire how benefits above the 
 
23 Both Richard Arneson (2013) and Ruth Sample (2003) overlook this emphasis.  
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cost of  a commodity come about.24  
What is more, if  we follow Wertheimer’s emphasis on the unfairness of  the terms of  
the transaction, the advantage of  the hypothetical market price would appear to be its 
appropriation of  that price that no one can complain about it, since no unfairness of  the 
terms can be taken from transactions in the hypothetical market. In the last sentence of  
the cited paragraph, we can see his emphasis that the competitive market price “may well 
be a nonexploitative price, for neither party takes unfair advantage of  the other party” 
(Wertheimer, 1996: 232). Whenever he uses ‘taking unfair advantage’, it refers to the 
unfairness of  the terms of  the transaction. Thus, his focus still lies in the micro-level 
distribution. This is the first distinctive character of  the ideal market price. 
 
2.2.2.2. No One’s Special Vulnerability or Bargaining Inferiority is Being 
Taken of 
 
Another salient character of  the ideal market price is that nobody can take unfair advantage 
of  another’s special vulnerability or bargaining inferiority. Wertheimer is aware of  the role 
that background conditions play in exploitative transactions. In his discussion of  
Unconscionable Contracts, Wertheimer analyses the notion of  bargaining power (1996: 64-70). 
Wertheimer distinguishes several notions, such as bargaining potential, bargaining 
incapacity, and bargaining weakness; these factors may affect the result of  a transaction 
(1996: 64-68).  
Moreover, in Exploitation of  Student-Athletes, Wertheimer asserts that the 
hypothetical market price varies by reference to different background conditions－current 
 
24 This is quite problematic. As Arneson (2013) argues, no market agents are prevented from paying more 
than the hypothetical market price. It is neither unfair nor exploitative to pay more than the cost of  a 
commodity when one’s moral incentive requires her to do so. Wertheimer owes us an explanation for the 
reason that when the price of  a commodity is above its cost, it would be considered ‘excessive benefits’. 
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or hypothetical (1996: 93-95). For instance, when the tuition fees for higher education in a 
country are unaffordable for many, and when the current background condition is unequal 
to specific groups, some students might be willing to accept the offer to become a student 
athlete in order to gain access to higher education. However, things differ under an ideal 
background condition. When education in a country is free for all citizens, students with 
lower familial income need not accept the university’s offer to be a student athlete, and the 
wage for the university to recruit student athletes might increase. Under different 
background conditions, the hypothetical market price of  a commodity appears to differ. 
These two cases show that Wertheimer does worry about the role of  the macro-level 
features in exploitative transactions.  
Now consider another way to interpret the moral character of the hypothetical market 
price. Rather than focus on the unfair profits, Wertheimer argues that the hypothetical market 
is non-exploitative because it is a price that means no one can take advantage of  another’s vulnerability or 
lack of  bargaining power. Since the hypothetical competitive market is where all the sellers 
offer the same price for a particular commodity and where all the buyers can only decide 
to take that price or leave it, no unequal treatments can occur in such a market, and no 
exploitation can take place. The perfect competition among all the sellers results in a 
situation in which no one can take advantage of  another’s special vulnerability or 
bargaining inferiority. Thus, since everyone, as buyers or sellers, receives equal treatment, 
the price generated in the hypothetical market is non-exploitative. This is another way to 
understand the moral character of  the hypothetical market price. 
Having explained Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation and his idea of  the 
hypothetical market price, I present two main critiques of  Wertheimer’s account of  
exploitation. One, provided by Arneson (2013, 2016), contends that the hypothetical 
market price is not a fair price. The other, proposed by Allen Wood (1995, 2016), insists 
that the distributive unfairness is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation.  




2.3. Richard Arneson’s Critique of  The Hypothetical Market Price  
 
Let us start with Arneson’s critique of  Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation. For 
Wertheimer, a transaction is exploitative because the distribution of  the social surplus 
generated by them from a transaction is unfair relative to the hypothetical market price. 
However, Arneson contends that the hypothetical market price is not a fair price.  
 
2.3.1. The Hypothetical Market Price is not a Fair Price 
 
To take unfair advantage of  another is widely shared as the general formulation of  
wrongful exploitation (Arneson, 1992; Zwolinski & Wertheimer, 2017). However, all 
fairness-based accounts of  exploitation confront a crucial issue: there will be as many 
competing conceptions of  exploitation as there are theories of  fairness (Arneson, 1992: 
350). Fairness-based accounts of  exploitation need to defend a conception of  fairness 
underlying their views. Arneson finds implausible the conception of  fairness to which 
Wertheimer’s account appeals. He argues that the price in a hypothetical competitive 
market is not a fair price because it has no moral significance.  
Arneson’s objection consists of  two arguments. The first is that agents (both sellers 
and buyers) in a hypothetical competitive market can do better than just take the 
competitive market price or leave it, especially when morality requires that they do so 
(Arneson, 2013: 402). To elaborate, agents in the ideal market have options other than 
taking the competitive market price, and more importantly, the departure from the 
competitive market price is not necessarily unfair. People’s compliance with moral 
requirements may result in a change in the market price. For instance, the fair-trade 
movement illustrates how consumers’ motivation to behave as they ought – namely, to 
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reduce producers’ deprivation – changes a commodity’s price, such as coffee beans or 
bananas. In this case, the consumers will be willing to pay more if  this improves the 
producers’ situations, and this movement did change the market price and thus the 
producers’ situation (MacAskill, 2015: 158-167).  
Second, and more importantly, since the market price reflects people’s preference of  
all kinds and is morally arbitrary, it contains no substantive moral property, such as fairness 
or being non-exploitative (Arneson, 2013: 402-403). For Arneson, market prices change 
when people’s preferences change. Preferences determine the market prices whether these 
preferences reflect moral, immoral or amoral reasons (or, indeed, whether they reflect 
reasons at all). Because of  this, “there is nothing normative about market prices and there 
should be no presumption that competitive market prices are by any substantive moral 
standards fair or non-exploitative” (2013: 403). Hence, the market price that lacks moral 
significance cannot ground a fair price.  
 
2.3.2. Wertheimer’s Response 
 
Wertheimer, I believe, would agree with Arneson on the first argument. He acknowledges 
that the hypothetical market price does not reflect “any deep principle of  desert or value” 
(Wertheimer, 1996: 231). The fact that a lawyer’s salary is higher than a nurse’s salary does 
not mean that being a lawyer is morally more valuable than being a nurse. Moreover, he 
would agree that agents can do better than just take the fixed market price even in the 
hypothetical competitive market and that the upshot of  their aggregate behaviours that 
reflect moral reasons may be a fairer price than the ideal market price. For instance, if  justice 
demands an employer to offer her employee a sufficient wage which is above the average 
market wage, nothing prevents her from so doing by reducing her own profits. Wertheimer 
does not presume that the hypothetical market price is the only plausible benchmark of  
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fairness in the market.  
However, Wertheimer would disagree with Arneson on the second argument. One key 
element of  the hypothetical market price proposed by Wertheimer is that it represents 
nothing more than the cost of  any commodity (1996: 218, 224-226, 233). By definition, the 
hypothetical price would not fluctuate along with people’s preferences, because there is no 
bargaining in the ideal market. Rather, it merely reflects the seller’s production cost. The 
hypothetical market price that reflects the seller’s cost of  production is a fair price to sellers 
and buyers as neither gain excessive benefits from the transaction. On the other hand, 
regarding cases where the market changes in response to consumers’ willingness to do 
good, Wertheimer could reply that these changes occur precisely because relevant markets 
are imperfect. Multinational corporations affect people’s terms of  transactions, by 
monopolising distribution channels of  raw materials, so upstream producers cannot but 
accept unprofitable prices for those raw materials. What fair-trade movements do, 
Wertheimer could say, is push the market price towards perfection, by making sure that it 
reflects producers’ production cost. 
Wertheimer and Arneson, then, have different things in mind when they refer to the 
substance of  the hypothetical market price. For Arneson, the price fluctuates in accordance 
with market agents’ preferences. By contrast, whenever Wertheimer uses the term, he refers 
to the cost of  any commodity. Arneson might be right to argue that when the market price 
reflects people’s preferences, it carries no normative implications. However, this is no 
objection to Wertheimer’s account, since, for Wertheimer, the hypothetical market price 
amounts to the cost of  any commodity and would not be influenced by people’s 
preferences. In the hypothetical competitive market, where there are sufficient buyers and 
sellers, no one can raise the price of  any commodity above the cost of  producing it. 
Whenever someone wants to do so, there will always be other sellers willing to supply that 
commodity at a lower price. The perfect competition of  the hypothetical market will make 
Exploitation and unfairness 
38 
 
any commodity’s price represent the cost of  production. Thus, Wertheimer and Arneson 
have different understandings of  a hypothetical market price.  
What moral substance, then, does the hypothetical market price have? Wertheimer 
answers that this price is the one that transactors would agree to when they cannot take 
special unfair advantage of  particular defects in another’s bargaining inferiority or special 
vulnerability in another’s situation. This answer is not clear: two kinds of  interpretations can 
be obtained.25 As I have suggested, the hypothetical market price has two distinctive 
features. In reply to Arneson, perhaps we should not be distracted by someone’s 
‘bargaining inferiority or special vulnerability’ being taken advantage of; instead, the focus 
should be on the fact that no one can take ‘unfair’ advantage of  another. No bargains are 
needed in the ideal market, and the bargaining process will generate no social surplus. No 
bargaining-generated social surplus entails no unfair social surplus, and, therefore, no 
unfair advantage. So, the hypothetical market price must be non-exploitative in the sense 
that no unfair profits can be taken. The hypothetical market price at least contains one 
salient moral character: no one can complain that someone has taken special unfair 
advantage of  them. Hence, the hypothetical market price is non-exploitative to all the 
market interactors.  
 
2.3.3. Other Possible Fairness Baselines  
 
A fairness baseline has to define the kind of  good to be distributed and the distributive 
standards for that good (Ferguson, 2018: 4). Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price is just 
one plausible fairness baseline, among others. I hold a pluralistic view that there are many 
 
25 For example, Arneson (2013) regards Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation as concerning the unfair 
division of  social surplus. This interpretation is underpinned by Sample (2003, 2016, 2017). However, 
Arneson (2016) interprets Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation as domination. The two different 
interpretations are also indicated by Snyder (2017: 241-249). See also Nicolas Vrousalis (2016).  
Exploitation and unfairness 
39 
 
plausible, competing baselines of  fair distribution in determining when and why the 
allocation of  social surplus and burdens in a specific domain is fair or unfair. For example, 
Mayer proposes that A exploits B when A fails to benefit B sufficiently (Mayer, 2005: 318-
322; 2007a: 142; 2007b: 608).26 On this view, a baseline is fair when B benefits sufficiently 
from the interaction with A. For instance, the sufficientarian benchmark of  fair 
distribution might apply to the employment relationship, where employers have a prima 
facie duty to pay wages that satisfy employees’ basic needs.  
Next, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Adam Smith, 
endorsed the just price theory as a baseline of  fair distribution (Reiff, 2013: 51). The general 
idea of  the just price theory is that a price is fair or just when it equates to the cost of  
producing a commodity. Just price theory, thus, appreciates the idea of  equal exchanges. 
Take for example, price gouging where a seller raises the price of  limited basic goods to 
gain unfairly. Just price theory might accuse the seller of  exploiting the buyers, where the 
price gouger gains more than the cost of  the limited basic goods. However, many have 
questioned the just price theory’s plausibility because the value theory it must endorse has 
been widely rejected by the mainstream economists.  
Besides, Michael Kates adopts the Rawlsian approach to select a standard of  fair 
wages. Very briefly, for him, people in Rawls’s original position (where they do not know 
their specific information and their social position) will choose to guarantee “the maximum 
level of  income for the least advantageous party” (Kates, 2019: 39-44). Kates’ approach is 
different from the sufficientarian approach and the just price theory in that his approach 
does not offer a substantive criterion of  fair distribution. Rather, in adopting the Rawlsian 
approach, a fair distribution is determined in an ideal background condition. However, 
some may contend whether a principle of  fairness for basic institutions is identical with 
 
26 Sufficientarians may differ in what counts as a fulfilment of  one’s basic needs. See Amartya Sen (2001), 
Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Roger Crisp (2003).  
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that for interpersonal interactions (James, 2014: 292-295; 2016: 240). For instance, when a 
millionaire buys a bottle of  water from a poor street vendor, the Rawlsian approach seems 
to suggest counterintuitively that the millionaire ought to give the poor seller a lot of  
money because the least advantageous ought to receive the greatest benefits. The Rawlsian 
approach’s problem is that it does not offer a substantive criterion of  fair distribution to 
deal with allocating the social surplus in interpersonal transactions where transactors 
experience unequal background conditions. 
The fairness baselines reviewed above might or might not be plausible, and I offer no 
argument to favour any of  them. Rather, I only point out that there are couples of  ways 
to understand what a fairness baseline is and they may be applicable in some cases but are 
not suitable in others. 27  Hence, unfair exploitation refers to a situation where the 
exploiter’s gain exceeds what she ought to receive, or the exploitee’s gain is less than she 
ought to receive. When the allocation of  social surplus is consistent with a fairness baseline, 
unfair exploitation ceases. This is important for us to understand the nature of  exploitation.  
In sum, I think that because Arneson and Wertheimer have different understandings 
of  what constitutes an ideal market price, Wertheimer might agree with Arneson that 
market agents can do better than paying the ideal market price. Perhaps, their dispute will 
cease if  Wertheimer terms the ideal market price as a ‘non-exploitative price’, rather than 
a ‘fair price’. Having addressed Arneson’s objection to Wertheimer’s ideal market price and 
having presented how Wertheimer might respond to the objection, I now turn to Wood’s 
critique of  Wertheimer’s account.  
 
2.4. Allen Wood’s Critique of  Wertheimer’s Account of  Exploitation 
 
 
27 For more discussions of  a variety of  fairness baselines. See David Miller (2017), Ferguson & Ostmann 
(2018), Benjamin Ferguson (2018), Vrousalis (2017) and Carl Mildenberger (2020).  
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When introducing Wood’s criticism, it helps to introduce the distinction between the 
transaction-specific view (exploitation as taking unfair advantage of  unfairness) and the process-
focused view (exploitation as taking advantage of  unfairness) to classify exploitation theorists. 
The transaction-specific view maintains that the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is 
necessary for exploitation; by contrast, the process-focused view insists that transactional 
unfairness is not necessary for exploitation and taking advantage of  B’s unfairness is 
sufficient for exploitation.  
While theorists－such as Wood (1995, 2016), Sample (2003), Nicolas Vrousalis (2016), 
Steiner (1987, 2010) and Anne Phillips (2017)－ endorse the process-focused view, 
theorists－such as Wertheimer (1996), Arneson (2013, 2016), Chris Meyers (2004, 2007), 
Mikhail Valdman (2009), Matt Zwolinski (2012, 2016), Robert Mayer (2007a), Jeremy 
Snyder (2008), and Risse and Wollner (2019)－endorse the transaction-specific view. As 
we have seen, although Arneson rejects Wertheimer’s conception of  fairness, he agrees 
that wrongful exploitation is a matter of  unfairness. In this section, by introducing Wood’s 
version of  this critique, I illustrate how the process-focused view rebuts the transaction-
specific view and indicate their real disagreement. 
 
2.4.1. Wood’s Objection: Exploitation Involves no Distributive Unfairness 
 
Wood claims that exploitation occurs independently of  whether transactions are fair (2016: 
95-96). The unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is unnecessary for exploitation. For 
instance, suppose that sweatshops in developing countries employ children. Suppose that 
the wages for those children provided by the sweatshop owners are higher than average 
and therefore not unfair relative to a fairness baseline. However, employing children 
nonetheless seems exploitative for many.  
For Wood (2016: 100-101), even if, in a mutually beneficial and consensual transaction, 
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the exploitee gains a huge amount – indeed, more than the exploiter – and even if  the 
transaction’s terms are fair, wrongful exploitation can still obtain. A transaction could be 
fair and exploitative. On the other hand, the unfairness is not sufficient for exploitation. 
For instance, one can pay double the cost of  production for candy sold by a disabled adult 
without being (wrongly) exploited, even though the terms are unfair according to 
Wertheimer’s ideal market price. Hence, the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation.  
 
2.4.2. Wertheimer’s Response 
 
In response, Wertheimer will agree that the unfairness of  the terms of  the transaction is 
not sufficient for exploitation. My paying double in price to a disabled seller for a bubble 
gum does not entail that wrongful exploitation occurs. Nonetheless, Wertheimer would 
deny that the unfairness is unnecessary as Wertheimer maintains, “No unfairness in the 
terms of  the transaction, no exploitation” (1996: 208). Let us consider his case of  the 
‘greedy snowstorm rescuer’. 
 
A fair-minded but not overly altruistic entrepreneur roams the highways in a snowstorm and 
offers to rescue stranded motorists for an eminently fair price. He takes advantage of  the 
rescuees’ plight in order to supplement his income. True his rescuees typically feel that they 
have “no choice” but to accept his help at the proposed price. Still, he hardly exploits their 
plight in a pejorative sense. (Wertheimer, 1996: 208) 
 
The key point of  this case is that, for Wertheimer, fairness is sufficient for the absence of  
exploitation: when the terms of  a transaction are fair, even if  one takes advantage of  
another’s plight, no exploitation occurs. His conceptual distinction between “taking 
advantage of  unfairness” and “taking unfair advantage of  unfairness” is still insightful 
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(1996: 298). A cannot exploit B without taking unfair benefits from their transaction. If  
fairness is sufficient for the absence of  exploitation, unfairness is necessary for wrongful 
exploitation.  
The controversy between Wood and Wertheimer, however, remains unsolved and 
represent two major forms of  exploitation. In my view, neither view provides a complete 
account of  exploitation. I thus reject that the unfairness is necessary for exploitation and 
that taking advantage of  B’s disadvantage is always sufficient for exploitation. In what 
follows, I suggest one way to solve the controversy. My account of  exploitation will 
integrate the two distinct accounts of  exploitation.  
 
2.5. Exploitation as Wrongful Gains: Two Understandings 
 
Generally speaking, A exploits B if  and only if  A takes unfair advantage of  B’s disadvantage 
(Ferguson, 2018; Vrousalis, 2018: 2-3; Wertheimer, 1996), in which B voluntarily engages 
in a transaction in which with A.28 To be exploitation, the exploiter must use the exploitee’s 
disadvantage as a chance to gain benefits. Thus, mutually beneficial and consensual 
exploitation consists of  two elementary constituents: (1) A benefits by (2) taking advantage 
of  B (Vrousalis, 2018: 2). In (1), A gains benefits relative to the non-transaction baseline. 
Regarding (2), the minimum interpretation of  ‘taking advantage of ’ is that A “add[s] an 
option to his opportunity set that is better both for him and for me than the option 
preferred by him prior to the expansion” (Elster, 1982: 364).29 However, theorists of 
exploitation differ primarily on the substance of (1) and (2), respectively. As such, theorists 
who endorse the process-focused view put great emphasis on how to interpret (2) and are 
 
28 For the sake of  argument, I shall leave (3): B voluntarily engages in a transaction with A, aside.  
29 I will discuss the conceptions of  advantage-taking behaviour is in Chapter 4. Now let’s put it aside and 
focus on the quality of  A’s gains.  
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less concerned with (1). By contrast, theorists who endorse the transaction-specific view 
insist that the unfairness is the only way to understand the quality of  A’s gains and are less 
concerned with (2). Note that both views hold that (1) and (2) are jointly sufficient for 
mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. In this section, I offer my answer to the 
controversy. 
 
2.5.1. Exploitation is a Form of  Wrongful Gain 
 
Exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain (Feinberg: 1990; Mayer: 2007a). Wrongful gain 
encompasses numerous wrongdoings, e.g., theft, robbery, and exploitation. This means 
that if  the interaction between parties does not involve wrongful gain, no exploitation 
occurs. What distinguishes mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation from other 
wrongdoings, such as murder, theft, or wrongful coercion, is that both parties consent to, 
and benefit from, the transaction without involving coercion, harms, or manipulation. For 
instance, an outraged teenager can harm her boyfriend by stabbing him in the arm without 
gaining wrongfully from such behaviour. However, in exploitation, the exploiter must gain 
wrongfully from the transaction with the exploited. How to understand the quality of  the 
exploiter’s wrongful gain, then, is crucial for theorists of  exploitation. This point becomes 
manifest when considering the paradigmatic case of  sweatshops. 
Sweatshop labour refers to a situation where labourers in factories receive extremely 
low wages and are under poor working conditions, such as strict discipline and restrictions 
on working circumstances.30 Sweatshop labour is widely believed to be exploitative, but it 
would not be if  sweatshop owners do not gain wrongfully from the sweatshop contract. 
In this case, wrongful gain has various explanations. It can be wrongful, either because the 
 
30 See Benjamin Powell (2014) and Alessandra Mezzadri (2017). 
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wages that workers receive are below the minimum wage dictated by the local government, 
or because workers do not receive wages corresponding to their contribution (Marx, 1990: 
283-306), or because the employers of  sweatshops take advantage of  the 
underdevelopment in that country, which enables them to pay lower wages than they could 
if  all countries obtained equal development opportunities. People may have various 
explanations of  what makes the exploiter gain wrongfully, but the point is that wrongful 
exploitation will not occur if  the exploiter does not gain wrongfully. Hence, an account of  
exploitation must define the quality of  A’s gains, whether such a wrongful gain is called unfair 
or not, and whether the exploited receives higher remuneration than the exploiter. 
Theorists may adopt different economic theories to explain how such wrongful gain 
takes place and how the benefits and losses are calculated. Then an account of  exploitation 
is inadequate if  it fails to focus on the absolute or relative gains and losses between 
exploiting and exploited parties. Failing to do so will result in a vague account of  
exploitation, such that some may use the terms ‘benefits more’ or ‘excessive gain’ or 
‘exorbitant price’ to indicate that a transaction is exploitative. However, if  we do not know 
what counts as excessive gain, we do not know why such a transaction can be regarded as 
exploitative. For instance, one can buy Vincent van Gogh’s painting in an auction for, say, 
one billion dollars, without being exploited or exploiting others, however excessive or 
exorbitant this benefit would be to the seller. In other words, we need a more complete 
account of  the moral valence of  benefits and losses in order to form a plausible account 
of  wrongful exploitation. 
 
2.5.2. The Unfairness is not Necessary for Exploitation  
 
Now I contend that the transaction-specific view is incorrect in that the unfairness in the 
terms of  a transaction is not necessary for exploitation. Given that exploitation is a form 
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of  wrongful gain, since the exploiter’s gaining unfairly is not necessary for exploitation, 
there must be another way to understand what it means for A to gain wrongfully. Let me 
first explain why the unfairness is not necessary for exploitation. I will reach a conclusion 
by illustrating that exploitation may occur even if  the terms of  a transaction are fair relative 
to Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price, or some other fairness baselines. 
Let us consider cases such as organ sales, commercial surrogacy, and child labour. 
These cases are widely considered as exploitation and are different from other exploitative 
cases such as sweatshop exploitation and price gouging. What differentiates organ sales, 
commercial surrogacy, and child labour from sweatshop exploitation and price gouging, is 
that in the latter cases if  the terms of  a transaction were fair according to a fairness baseline, 
no exploitation occurs. However, it might be questioned whether or not in the former 
cases exploitation ceases when the kidney seller, the surrogate mother and the labouring 
child receive fair remuneration from the transaction. What the former cases share in 
common is that even if  we remove the consideration of  unfairness from them－whatever 
the benchmark of  that specific commodity would be－such transactions, I believe, would 
still be widely considered as exploitation.31 If  so, what makes the former cases inherently 
exploitative is not the unfair terms of  interactions but the fact that they involve gaining 
wrongfully in some other way.  
Take kidney sales, for example, and presume that kidney sales are exploitative. On 
Wertheimer’s view, the exploitative character of  kidney sales rests on the kidney’s unfair 
price. He may suggest that we imagine the price of  kidney sales in a hypothetical 
competitive market, where there are sufficient providers and buyers of  kidneys. Once the 
kidney’s price reflects its cost, no one can complain that the exchange is exploitative. 
 
31 Suppose that the sellers in these cases receive great benefits from their transaction with a billionaire. In 
this case, I do not think that exploitation occurs. However, this rarely happens in reality. Also, even in severely 
exploitative cases, a benchmark of  wrongful gain is still required. This is why when the sellers in these cases 
receive huge benefits, I would not consider them as exploitation.  
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However, this verdict seems mistaken and counterintuitive. It ignores the fact that for some, 
to wrongly commodify a part of  a person is simply is to treat others as inferior or with a 
lack of  respect (Anderson, 1990; Satz, 2010). As Panitch (2017: 121) suggests, the value of  
at least three things could be regarded as being corrupted when bought or sold: there are 
“the value of  the item itself ”, “the value of  the vendor”, and “the value of  important 
social norms and personal relations”. For instance, human bodies are generally considered 
something that should not be bought or sold for corruption-based reasons. When one’s 
organ is sold and bought in the market, it will bring about enduring harms to one’s body 
and social status. Thus, the commodification theory partly explains our intuition that, even 
when the terms of  some transaction are fair relative to a fairness baseline, somehow, we 
may still regard them as exploitative, especially in paradigmatic cases, such as organ trading, 
prostitution, or child labour. We will think that the exploiter’s gains from such situations 
would be considered exploitative in ways other than unfair gains.  
Hence, if  there are some exploitative cases in which the exploiter gains wrongfully in 
ways other than unfair gains, the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not necessary 
for exploitation, and A’s having gained unfairly is only one way to understand the quality 
of  A’s gains. There must be other ways to understand how the exploiter gains wrongfully. 
Thus, Wertheimer’s account of  exploitation is incomplete. Although Wertheimer’s account 
works properly in cases where the transaction does not involve ‘blocked exchanges’, he 
fails to notice that we ought not buy or sell certain goods, because such transactions 
disrespect people. Consequently, if  the unfairness is not necessary for exploitation, the 
transaction-specific view is incorrect.  
 
2.5.3. Disrespectful Gains 
 
Having contended that the unfairness is not necessary for exploitation and there is another 
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way to understand the quality of  the exploiter’s wrongful gain, I shall briefly introduce it 
now and offer a detailed explanation in Chapter 3. One might wonder since for the 
transaction-specific view the quality of  A’s wrongful gain is determined by unfair gain: what 
is the quality of  A’s wrongful gain in the process-focused view? Although theorists of  the 
process-focused view rarely answer this question, in my view, it belongs to disrespectful 
gain. As Mayer indicated, exploitation is fundamentally a process in which an exploiter 
extracts illegitimate benefits from the exploited group (2007a: 139).  
If  unfair gain is one way to understand the quality of  the exploiter’s gains, what is the 
other way to understand A’s gaining wrongfully? First, as I have indicated, there are many 
ways to interpret what counts as a fairness baseline. All fairness baselines share one thing 
in common: once the distribution of  social surplus and burdens is consistent with a 
fairness baseline, A is morally entitled to some part of  the profits gained from the 
transaction with B. In contrast, the exploiter can gain wrongfully in ways other than 
unfairness when A gains from a disrespectful transaction in which the exploitee is treated 
as a mere means, and, therefore, the further implication is that all of  A’s gains are morally 
unjustified. Call this disrespectful gain. Cases, such as organ sales, commercial surrogacy, and 
child labour, are possible candidates that involve A’s gaining disrespectfully, rather than 
unfairly.  
 Unfair gain and disrespectful gain represent two distinct ways to understand how the 
exploiter gains wrongfully from the exploitative transaction with the exploitee. Moreover, 
what differentiates unfair gain from disrespectful gain is whether or not the exploiter is 
morally entitled to some part of  benefits, obtained from the transaction with the exploited. 
If  yes, and A exploits B, what matters in unfair exploitation is not that A is not morally 
entitled to claim part of  the profit from the transaction with B, but that what A gains is 
above a benchmark of  fair distribution. In contrast, if  A is not morally entitled to any part 
of  her profits gained from the transaction with B, then what matters in disrespectful 
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exploitation is not that A’s gains exceed a standard of  fair share, but that all of  A’s gains 
are morally unjustified. This is the further difference between unfair gain and disrespectful 
gain. In Chapter 3, I will explain fully what disrespectful exploitation is and the meaning 
of  disrespectful gain. For now, we only need to know that there are two distinct ways to 
perceive the exploiter’s wrongful gain, and, thus, the transaction-specific view fails.  
 
2.5.4. The Relationship Between Unfair Gain and Disrespectful Gain 
 
I have contrasted unfair gain and disrespectful gain. Nonetheless, note that although unfair 
gain and disrespectful gain are conceptually distinct, they may overlap in some cases. 
Consider organ trading, in which the exploiter may gain unfairly and disrespectfully. Let me 
assume that organ selling is exploitative and disrespectful. On the one hand, some think 
that since organ trading fails to respect the organ seller, the exploiter gains disrespectfully 
from the transaction and, therefore, she is not morally entitled to any profits from the 
transactions. On the other hand, the organ seller may be exploited because the price of  her 
organ is unfair relative to Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price. Organ trading, then, 
involves unfair and disrespectful exploitation at the same time. When the exploitee suffers 
unfair and disrespectful exploitation simultaneously, in my view, this is a case of  severe 
exploitation. In showing this, I treat the concept of  exploitation as a continuum notion 
(Phillips, 2017: 105), where its severity increases as the unfairness to B increases.32 
To sum up, one of  the necessary conditions of  my account of  exploitation is as follows:  
 
(a) Two Forms of  Wrongful Gain: A must gain benefits from her interaction with B 
 
Unfair Gains: A gains unfairly relative to a norm of  fair distribution  
 
 
32 The concept of  exploitation can also be regarded as an absolute concept. As Goodin argues, “people are 
either exploited or they are not”. See Robert Goodin (1987: 181).  
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Disrespectful Gains: A gains from a disrespectful transaction with B, one that  
violates the Merely Means Principle.33 
 
In (a), unfair gain and disrespectful gain represent two different ways to understand the 
quality of  A’s gains. Either unfair gain or disrespectful gain is individually sufficient for 
exploitation when equipped with the Relational condition.34 However, some questions 
remain unspecified. Chapter 3 will explain when and why a transaction turns into 
disrespectful exploitation by critically engaging with Sample’s account of  exploitation. In 
Chapter 4 I will present another necessary condition of  my account: (b) the Relational 
condition: A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, compared to A’s agency; and (a) and (b) 




Let us return to the controversy between the transaction-specific view (exploitation as 
taking unfair advantage of  unfairness) and the process-focused view (exploitation as taking 
advantage of  unfairness). I have rejected the transaction-specific view because the 
unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not necessary for exploitation. However, the 
process-focused view fails to define the quality of  A’s gains against unfair gains. In my view, 
the quality of  A’s gains in the process-focused view belongs to disrespectful gain, where A 
gains benefits from the disrespectful transaction with B. If  the process-focused view is 
correct, this denies that the unfairness is necessary for exploitation.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should embrace the process-focused view 
unconditionally. Even if  the unfairness is not necessary for exploitation, it remains an 
 
33 I will explain the Merely Means Principle in Chapter 3. 
34 I will explain the Relational condition in Chapter 4. 
35 Concerning volition exploitation, (c), B voluntarily engages in a transaction in which A (or someone, C, 
who is accountable to A), is necessary. See section 4.6. 
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important way to perceive the quality of  A’s gain. In Chapter 3, I will argue that taking 
advantage of  B’s disadvantage is sufficient for exploitation only if removing the unfairness 
in a transaction would not cease our worry of  exploitation in the exploiter’s advantage-
taking behaviour. I will also scrutinise and criticise Sample’s process-focused account of  
exploitation and explain why and when taking advantage of  B’s disadvantage is sufficient 
for exploitation.  
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3. Exploitation and Disrespectfulness 
 
Having argued that there are two ways to perceive the exploiter’s wrongful gain in Chapter 
2, the core question in Chapter 3 is to explain what disrespectful exploitation is and how it is 
different from unfair exploitation by examining Ruth Sample’s account of  exploitation. I 
do so because Sample is the most prominent theorist of  disrespectful exploitation. 
Disrespectful exploitation is distinguished from unfair exploitation where the exploiter 
gains unfairly relative to a fairness baseline. In Chapter 3, I explicate disrespectful exploitation, 
which affirms that A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain benefits in a 
way that violates the Merely Means Principle. However, Sample’s account is flawed because it 
is vulnerable to what I shall term the fairness test. This holds that her account conflates unfair 
exploitation and disrespectful exploitation. Instead, I shall argue that her account is 
sufficient for exploitation only if the removal of  the unfairness would not resolve our 
concerns about A’s gains. If  my argument succeeds, disrespectful exploitation and unfair 
exploitation are two distinct accounts of  exploitation. Consequently, Chapter 2 and 3 
jointly offer one of  the conditions of  my account of  exploitation.  
On the other hand, based on the distinction between unfair gain and disrespectful 
gain, I offer two conceptual connections between exploitation and anti-commodification. 
The external connection, as I shall call it, states that we ought to object to commodifying certain 
things because doing so may increase the possibility of  the market agents (sellers and 
buyers) being exploited. By contrast, the internal connection states that we ought to object to 
commodifying certain things because to gain benefits by commodifying a person (or an 
attribute of  that person) in a way that violates the Merely Means Principle concomitantly 
constitutes exploitation. The two connections offer two different exploitation-based 
reasons to object to commodifying certain items.  
The structure of  Chapter 3 is as follows. In section 3.1. I introduce Sample’s accounts 
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of  exploitation: exploitation as degradation. Sample offers three interpretations of  
exploitation as degradation, namely, (D1) taking advantage of  B’s vulnerability, (D2) taking 
advantage of  a past injustice done to B, and (D3) commodifying a person as a fungible 
object of  market exchange. Her accounts explain why taking advantage of  B’s disadvantage 
constitutes exploitation without involving the issue of  unfairness. Section 3.2. criticises 
(D1) and (D2), and I argue that they are overinclusive in that they may include cases of  
unfair exploitation. Therefore, I contend, for her accounts to be sufficient for exploitation, 
it has to remain exploitative even if  the terms of  a transaction are fair. In section 3.3., I 
propose two conceptual connections between exploitation and anti-commodification: 
external and internal connections. Based on the two connections, in section 3.4., I turn to 
(D3) and argue that (D3) is not an exploitation claim and revise (D3) according to the 
internal and external connections. Section 3.5. considers and replies to two objections to 
my distinction between unfair gain and disrespectful gain. Section 3.6. is the conclusion.  
 
3.1. Exploitation as Degradation  
 
“[E]xploitation”, Sample argues, “involves interacting with another being for the sake of  
advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being” (2003: 
57). Sample views exploitation as degradation: failing to respect a human being’s or thing’s 
intrinsic value constitutes exploitation. Exploitation then takes place “when the value of  
persons is not appropriately respected” (Sample, 2003: 83). In this understanding, Sample 
assumes that every human being has intrinsic value, and such value is worthy of  our respect. 
Moreover, in her view, degradation is “treating someone or something as having less value 
than that person or thing actually has” (2003: 4). Thus, exploitation is a disrespectful 
behaviour that degrades another being’s intrinsic value, which we have an obligation to 
respect and honour. This is to say that A exploits B when A degrades B. So, for Sample, the 
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term ‘exploitation’, ‘degradation’, and ‘disrespect’ are intertwined. However, what does it 
mean to disrespect a person? 
“[R]espect, and in particular respect for persons, is the core requirement 
underpinning our judgments of  exploitation” (Sample, 2003: 62). Sample adopts Immanuel 
Kant’s view－we ought to treat people as an end but not merely as a means－to define what 
constitutes disrespectful behaviour. A disrespects B when A treats B as a means only. What 
counts as treating another as a means only? For Sample, A treats B merely as a means when 
A is “refusing to acknowledge the value of  our interactor by refusing to take her genuine 
interests seriously” (2003: 70). Exploitative interactions occur when one fails to take 
another’s genuine interests into consideration. Hence, A exploits B if  and only if  A fails to 
take B’s genuine interests into account in their interaction. This is the core idea 
underpinning Sample’s account of  exploitation. 
On Sample’s view, people may fail to respect others in three ways. First, one might 
fail to respect others simply because she believes her interactors are “not deserving of  
respect” (Sample, 2003: 58). For instance, a lord would show no respect to his serfs since 
he believes serfs are inferior beings, which justifies treating serfs as less valuable. The lord’s 
misbelief  is sufficient for disrespect. Second, people might fail to respect others because 
they misunderstand “what respect requires” (ibid). This often happens. People in different 
regions have unique ways to treat people with respect, and people might feel disrespected 
when they are not treated in a way that they perceive as respectful. This concerns how to 
express respect with proper forms. Third, people might fail to respect others because they 
fail to fulfil a requirement of  respect, even if  they know what respect requires in general 
(2003: 59). For instance, an employer knows that respect requires her to pay her employees 
enough wages so that their basic needs can be satisfied; however, she might misunderstand 
the cost of  living in a metropolis and disrespect her employees unintentionally. These are 
possibilities that one can disrespect others unintentionally, and for Sample, these are 
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“unintentional exploitation” (2003: 58). People might contest the substance of  respectful 
behaviour. However, to operationalise ‘exploitation as degradation’, Sample needs to 
specify the substance of  disrespectful behaviour.  
In Sample’s view, although people can disrespect others in various ways, she specifies 
three distinct forms of  disrespectful behaviour, and believes that various forms of  
degrading behaviour would fall into these three categories. A fails to acknowledge B’s 
inherent value when:  
 
(D1) A disrespects (exploits) B “by neglecting what is necessary for that person’s  
well-being or flourishing.”36 
(D2) A disrespects (exploits) B “by taking advantage of  an injustice done to him.”  
(D3) A disrespects (exploits) B “by commodifying, or treating [a person] as a  
fungible object of  market exchange” (Sample, 2003: 57). 
 
Note that (D1) to (D3) are at the same time forms of  exploitation. Also, as noted in 
Chapter 2, although the process-focused view that Sample endorses is less concerned with the 
wrongness of  A’s gain, (D1) to (D3) are three mains ways to obtain disrespectful gains by 
taking advantage of  B’s feature. Now let me explain (D1) to (D3).  
 
3.1.1. (D1) Taking Advantage of  Another’s Vulnerability 
 
The notion of  vulnerability connects to (D1) and Sample’s understanding of  exploitation in 
 
36 Later on, I will redefine (D1) as A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of  B’s vulnerability. This is 
because Sample considers ‘taking unfair advantage of  B’s vulnerability’ as a significant way of  ‘neglecting 
what is necessary for B’s well-being or flourishing’. Much of  her discussion focuses on the notion of  
‘vulnerability’. This is why (D1) should be redefined as ‘A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of  B’s 
vulnerability’. However, we should notice that ‘taking unfair advantage of  B’s vulnerability’ is merely an 
instance of  ‘neglecting what is necessary for B’s well-being or flourishing’. They are different behaviours.  
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a significant way. For Sample, “to take unfair advantage of ” another’s vulnerability is “to 
interact with another so as to disregard what is necessary for human well-being” (2003: 74). 
Although people can ignore what is necessary for another’s well-being or flourishing in a 
number of  ways, Sample centres on the behaviour of  using another’s vulnerability to gain 
benefits. Therefore, I redefine (D1) as follows: 
 
(D1) A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s vulnerability.37 
 
In general, whenever Sample uses the notion ‘vulnerability’, she refers to B’s deficiency 
which leads B to accept an inferior contract. Sample maintains that whenever B is exploited, 
B’s vulnerability must be made use of  (2003: 83). In other words, to take advantage of  B’s 
vulnerability is sufficient for exploitation. However, what does the notion ‘vulnerability’ 
mean in Sample’s view? In Sample’s view, the notion ‘vulnerability’ has three meaning that 
involves basic needs, capabilities, or bargaining inferiority. Let us start with basic needs and 
capabilities.  
 
3.1.1.1. Vulnerability as Basic Needs and Capabilities 
 
According to Sample, “[t]he principal form of  vulnerability in such cases is need” (2003, 
74). A need can be for physical goods, mental health, or well-being conditions more 
generally. What counts as basic needs can vary from one culture to another. In this 
understanding, vulnerability is determined by the requirements of  human flourishing.  
When determining what is necessary for human flourishing, welfare, resources, and 
 
37 Sample uses ‘taking unfair advantage of ’ but not ‘taking advantage of ’ to refer to (D1) (2003: 74). However, 
for her, the phrase ‘taking unfair advantage of ’ seems no different from the phrase ‘taking advantage of ’. 
She uses the two phrases in the same manner. So, I use the phrase ‘taking advantage of ’ in order to distinguish 
between ‘taking unfair advantage of ’ and ‘taking advantage of ’. 
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capability are potential candidates. Welfarism focuses on the satisfaction of  personal 
preferences; resourcism suggests that “primary goods” are required to be “a fully 
cooperating member of  society” (Rawls: 2001: 57-58).38 However, Sample follows the 
capability approach, proposed by Amartya Sen (2001) and Martha Nussbaum (2000), in 
defining her criterion of  exploitation. The capability approach claims that “basic powers 
of  choice that make a moral claim for opportunities to be realized and to flourish” 
(Nussbaum, 2000: 298; cf. Sen, 2001: 40-41). It focuses on whether or not citizens can turn 
resources into capabilities. Even if  citizens can receive an equal amount of  resources, their 
resources do not guarantee that they can all achieve a basic level of  functioning. For Sample, 
with regard to human flourishing, the capability approach is better than welfarism and 
resourcism (2003: 76-80). 
Vulnerability, thus, is understood as one’s insufficiency of  capabilities. Exploitative 
interactions occur when A takes unfair advantage of  B’s vulnerability, that is, B’s 
insufficiency of  capabilities (Sample, 2003: 80-81). When people’s capabilities are below a 
threshold, they will become vulnerable to others whose capabilities are satisfied. In so 
understanding, vulnerability is an absolute, rather than comparative, notion in regard to 
exploitation. Thus, deficiency may generate exploitation. For example, if  one is vulnerable 
in the sense that she desperately needs food, others could take advantage of  her 
vulnerability to gain benefits. Besides, since to take advantage of  B’s vulnerability is to 
neglect what is necessary for B’s well-being and flourishing, the advantage-taking behaviour 
is disrespectful and constitutes exploitation. Therefore, (D1) is sufficient for exploitation.  
On the other hand, Sample reminds us that it is the disrespectful behaviour－
neglecting what is necessary for B’s well-being and flourishing－that accounts for our 
fundamental understanding of  exploitation. Sample (2003, 81) argues that an interaction is 
 
38 See Rawls (2001: 58-59) for his five kinds of  primary goods.  
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exploitative when A fails to take B’s capabilities into consideration, where the social surplus 
from the interaction is pertinent to these needs. For instance, suppose Ann attempts to 
hire a janitor, Bob, to keep her office clean. As an unskilled worker, Bob has looked for a 
job for a while and has two children to raise. However, Ann is only willing to pay Bob 
wages that fail to meet Bob’s basic needs, not to mention the fulfilment of  Bob’s 
capabilities. When Bob asks for a better salary, Ann refuses. In this case, Ann disrespects 
Bob in the sense that Ann fails to take Bob’s basic needs into account. When Ann 
determines the wage to be paid to Bob, Bob’s basic needs are not a concern for Ann. Ann, 
then, disregards Bob.  
Note that for Sample, even if  Ann is capable of  offering a fair wage for Bob, she does 
not have to ensure Bob’s capabilities in individual transactions (Sample, 2003: 81). We do 
not have a duty to supply our interactors with whatever they need in terms of  flourishing—
which seems too demanding and almost impossible to do (ibid). Instead, what makes Ann’s 
behaviour exploitation is her failure to take Bob’s basic needs and capabilities into 
consideration. In brief, it is Ann’s attitude, not whether Ann can fulfil Bob’s well-being in 
a single transaction, that matters (Ferguson & Steiner, 2018: 537). 
 
3.1.1.2. Vulnerability as Bargaining Inferiority 
 
Apart from vulnerability as the insufficiency of  capabilities, vulnerability, in Sample’s view, 
can be viewed as one’s inferior bargaining position. With respect to bargaining inferiority, 
Sample agrees with Robert Goodin (1987: 184-187), who argues that exploitation is playing 
for advantage when the bargaining power between parties is asymmetric. Goodin perceives 
exploitation as taking advantage of  an unusual situation. The four main types of  unusual 
situations proposed by Goodin all violate a moral norm: that is, to protect the vulnerable, 
especially those who are particularly vulnerable to us (ibid). We become vulnerable to an 
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interactor when our interactor possesses more bargaining power than us. Our inferior 
bargaining position renders us vulnerable－whether or not this inferiority results from our 
bargaining weakness or our interactor’s superior bargaining capacity or potential, where 
this includes the power to agenda-set. In short, people will become vulnerable when they 
possess less bargaining power than their interactors. 
Therefore, even if  B’s basic needs and capabilities are met, B can be exploited because 
of  B’s bargaining inferiority (Sample, 2003: 82-83). Besides, Sample holds that bargaining 
inferiority can sometimes be caused by a past injustice (Sample, 2003: 82-83). This leads to 
(D2). Now we only need to know that the notion ‘vulnerability’ is construed by Sample as 
basic needs, capabilities, or bargaining inferiority, respectively. To take advantage of  such 
vulnerabilities is sufficient for exploitation.  
 
3.1.2.  (D2) Taking Advantage of  an Injustice 
 
To take advantage of  an injustice that one suffers, for Sample, is another form of  
exploitation as degradation. This is because “[t]aking advantage of  injustice fails to respect 
the value of  other beings who deserve to be treated justly and hence fits the model of  
Exploitation as Degradation” (Sample, 2003: 82). Under such conditions, A exploits B 
because A took advantage of  an injustice done to B. (D1) and (D2) are connected when A 
takes advantage of  B’s bargaining inferiority, compromised by a past injustice, to gain 
benefits (ibid.). Hence, (D2) represents another form of  exploitation as degradation.  
 
3.1.3. (D3) Failure to Respect People by Commodifying Inappropriately 
 
The final form of  exploitation as degradation is to commodify inappropriately a part of  a 
person’s being that ought not to be sold and bought in the market (Sample, 2003: 57, 83). 
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Sample acknowledges that some attributes of  a person are sold and bought in the market 
without raising any moral concerns, such as talents, capacities, or human labour; but still, 
human beings and some features of  a person should not be commodified (2003: 58). To 
commodify a person or a part of  that person would diminish the concept of  personhood, 
which violates the Kantian norm that we should treat people as an end but not merely as 
a means (Radin, 1996: 84). “[T]he Kantian person”, Radin argues, “cannot be conceived 
of  as a fungible exchangeable object” (ibid). In other words, to commodify a person, or 
some attributes of  that person fails to respect that person in the Kantian sense. Thus, 
according to Sample’s exploitation as degradation, treating a person as a commodity is 
disrespectful and, thus, exploitative.39 
 
3.1.4. The Connection Between (D1), (D2) and (D3) 
 
(D1), (D2), (D3) are mutually independent statements. So, in some cases, even if  (D1) and 
(D2) are unmet, the satisfying of  (D3) is sufficient to count as exploitation. Let me assume 
commercial surrogacy is a form of  degradation because it would treat reproductive labour 
as a commodity (cf. Anderson, 1990; Satz, 2010: ch.5). 40  Supposing that a surrogate 
mother has her basic needs considered by her employer, and supposing she encounters no 
serious injustice that compromises her bargaining position; still, exploitation may occur in 
Sample’s sense when and because her reproductive capacity is inappropriately 
commodified and, therefore, she is exploited. In this case, although (D1) and (D2) are 
unmet, if  (D3) is met, then exploitation occurs. On the other hand, (D1), (D2), and (D3) 
can overlap with each other. Prostitution, for example, can satisfy (D1), (D2), and (D3) at 
 
39 This might be odd, and I shall explain why, later on. 
40 I do not mean to take a standard on commercial surrogacy but only to use it as a case to illustrate the 
connection between (D1), (D2) and (D3).  
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the same time. A prostitute might work in a morally wrong sex market, find her basic needs 
disregarded by her pimp, and she might suffer a past injustice－a civil war that forces her 
to escape from her country. In this case, (D1), (D2), and (D3) are met simultaneously.  
 
3.1.5. Two Distinct Features of  Sample’s Account 
 
Now I specify two distinct features of  Sample’s account of  exploitation. One is that Sample 
employs the process-focused view; exploitation as taking advantage of  a feature of  B. 
Another is that while (D2) is historical, (D1) and (D3) are ahistorical in the sense that the 
cause of  B’s insufficiency makes no difference to identify exploitation.  
 
3.1.5.1. Sample’s Process-Focused Account of  Exploitation  
 
Sample’s account represents the process-focused view. To identify exploitation, she 
suggests that we should focus on the disrespectful behaviour that A makes use of  B’s 
vulnerability for advantage, to decide whether their interaction is exploitative or non-
exploitative (Ferguson & Steiner, 2018: 534-535). As we have seen, for Sample, the three 
major forms of  exploitation as degradation are all individually sufficient for the occurrence 
of  exploitation. There is no need to refer to any substantive benchmarks of  fair 
distribution of  social surplus between parties to assess whether or not exploitation occurs. 
This means that, for Sample, taking advantage of  another’s vulnerability, taking advantage 
of  past injustice, and commodifying an aspect of  the person’s well-being that should not 
be commodified, are themselves independent and sufficient sources of  judging whether or 
not an interaction is exploitative. In this understanding, exploitation becomes a matter of  
how A interacts with B in a disrespectful manner. 
Yet, Sample agrees that a transaction can be mutually beneficial and exploitative. Even 
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if  both parties gain benefits relative to the no-transaction baseline, their transaction can 
still be exploitative. While the transaction-specific view contends that it is the unfair terms 
of  a transaction that make the transaction exploitative, Sample just leaves the concern of  
the unfair terms of  a transaction aside and puts all her emphasis on A’s disrespectful 
manner toward B. In her book Exploitation: What it is and Why it’s Wrong, only a few 
paragraphs are spent on the issue of  the distribution of  benefits. Sometimes she seems to 
assert that exploitation involves gaining benefits disproportionately, sometimes that 
profiting from an injustice that B suffers suffices for exploitation (2003: 13, 83). The 
concern of  unfairness in a transaction, it seems, plays no role in her account, and this leaves 
her account vulnerable to the fairness test. That is, some might contend that (D1) to (D3) 
are not exploitative if  the terms of  a transaction are fair relative to a fairness baseline. I 
shall explore the point later.  
However, even if  Sample’s account is vulnerable to the fairness test, which I will argue 
in the next section, this does not suggest that the process-focused view is false. Instead, 
when revised, the process-focused view is sufficient for exploitation. What distinguishes 
the process-focused view from the transaction-specific view is that the process-focused 
view involves the concern of  disrespectfulness, that is, a person is treated as merely a means 
(the Merely Means Principle). For instance, some might insist that a person’s inappropriate 
commodification, such as organ sales and child labour, involves treating that person or an 
attribute of  that person as merely a means. On Sample’s view, since such transactions are 
disrespectful, they constitute exploitation in a way different from unfair exploitation. In 
other words, it is the disrespectfulness, rather than the unfairness, that makes these 
transactions exploitative. The disrespectfulness that market exchanges involve turns the 
focus from unfairness to concerns regarding whether we ought to benefit from demeaning 
market exchange. In the following sections, I revise the process-focused view by criticising 
Sample’s account and argue that the revised version of  the process-focused view is 
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sufficient for exploitation.  
 
3.1.5.2. Sample’s Historical and Ahistorical Account of  Exploitation  
 
Sample’s account of  exploitation is historical and ahistorical simultaneously. (D1) and (D3) 
are ahistorical, which means she disregards the causes that lead to B’s insufficiency (Ferguson 
& Steiner, 2018: 536). For Sample, the causes of  B’s insufficiency are irrelevant to assessing 
whether or not a transaction is exploitative. In (D1) and (D3), we do not have to know the 
exact causes of  B’s insufficiency to decide whether or not a transaction is exploitative. To 
make a judgment on exploitation, Sample only offers the following three criteria－taking 
advantage of  another’s vulnerability, taking advantage of  injustice done to another, and 
commodifying an aspect of  the person inappropriately. The ahistorical accounts of  
exploitation, proposed by Sample (2003) and Goodin (1987), hold that whether B’s 
insufficiency is self-caused or due to other factors beyond B’s control, is of  no concern 
(Ferguson & Steiner, 2018: 535).  
(D2) is a historical account of  exploitation, which means the cause of  B’s 
disadvantage matters in determining whether exploitation occurs. Contra the ahistorical 
account of  exploitation, for historical accounts of  exploitation, what causes B’s disadvantage 
is crucial to the charge of  exploitation. In Ferguson and Steiner’s classification, the causes 
of  B’s inferiority can be partitioned into three forms: natural, other-caused, and self-caused 
(2018: 535). That is, B’s insufficiency may be caused by natural events, or others, or himself. 
To elaborate, if  B’s disadvantage is a natural disadvantage or other-caused disadvantage, A 
should constrain her advantage when interacting with B. On the contrary, if  B’s 
disadvantage is self-caused, A does not need to constrain her advantage when interacting 
with B. Thus, Ferguson and Steiner (2018: 543) deny the claim that A exploits B when A 
fails to constrain her advantage when B’s insufficiency is self-caused. In brief, for historical 
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accounts of  exploitation, exploitation stems from B’s unjust circumstances.  
The distinction between historical and ahistorical accounts of  exploitation is crucial 
to our understanding of  the injustice of  exploitation, which I will explore in Chapter 6. 
For now, my purpose is to note the features of  Sample’s account of  exploitation. After 
presenting Sample’s account, I criticise her accounts by illustrating that her accounts in 
particular (and the unrevised version of  the process-focused view in general) are vulnerable 
to the fairness test. This means the unrevised version of  the process-focused view is 
overinclusive that it will include non-exploitative cases. I shall suggest that the process-
focused view, in general, is sufficient for exploitation only if a fair distribution between 
parties would not satisfy our moral concerns. Having explicated Sample’s accounts of  
exploitation, I criticise them.  
 
3.2. A Critique of  Sample’s Accounts: (D1) and (D2) 
 
By criticising (D1) and (D2), I indicate that accusations of  exploitation, raised by the 
process-focused view, sometimes cease when the terms of  the transaction are fair relative 
to a fairness baseline. This suggests that for the process-focused view to be sufficient for 
exploitation, it has to pass what I call the fairness test. That is to say that the process-focused 
view is sufficient for exploitation only if a fair distribution between parties would not cease 
our worry of  exploitation in disrespectful advantage-taking behaviour. In other words, for 
the process-focused view to be true, exploitation must remain even if  the terms of  the 
disrespectful transaction are fair.  
 
3.2.1. A Critique of  (D1) 
 
(D1) claims that A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s vulnerability (the insufficiency 
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of  one’s basic needs or capabilities for human flourishing). To take advantage of  such 
vulnerabilities constitutes exploitation mainly because, for Sample, A fails to take B’s 
capabilities for flourishing into account and, therefore, disrespects B. However, (D1) is not 
sufficient for exploitation because it is vulnerable to the fairness test. It is possible that, 
although A takes advantage of  B’s vulnerability, no exploitation occurs so long as the terms 
of  their transaction are fair relative to a fairness baseline,. This means that (D1) includes 
(D1’): A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of  B’s vulnerability relative to a fairness baseline. 
If  so, (D1) will include exploitative cases in which its exploitation stems from unfair terms, 
rather than disrespectfulness. 
Consider a case in which Anna is the only doctor in a village and, it seems, Anna takes 
advantage of  her patients’ vulnerability to gain benefits. The doctor-patient relationship 
fits (D1) and, therefore, is exploitation on Sample’s view. However, this is implausible 
because in the doctor-patient relationship, when the terms of  their transaction are fair, 
even if  Anna takes advantage of  her patients’ vulnerability to gain benefits, it is not 
exploitation. Hence, (D1) is too broad because (D1) includes the possibility of  (D1’)－a 
form of  the transaction-specific view.  
 
3.2.2. A Critique of  (D2) 
 
(D2) claims that A disrespects (exploits) B “by taking advantage of  an injustice done to 
him” (Sample, 2003: 57). Such behaviour is so disrespectful that it constitutes exploitation. 
However, (D2) is vulnerable to the fairness test.  
Consider the following example. An attorney, Ann, defends her client, Bob, who 
suffers a past injustice. Suppose that Bob is the survivor of  a terrible assault. Although 
Bob’s situation is so desperate that any attorney with a sense of  justice would like to help 
him without charging any fees, Ann, however, runs her own business and cannot defend 
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Bob for free. So, Ann decides to charge only the minimum remuneration from Bob that 
covers her basic expenses. In this case, Ann is surely taking advantage of  a past injustice 
that Bob suffers to gain benefits.  
Nonetheless, few would consider that Ann exploits Bob in a pejorative sense, 
especially when Ann only takes the basic expenses of  defending Bob in the court without 
gaining extra benefits from Bob. In other words, even if  Ann takes advantage of  a past 
injustice done to Bob, no one can complain that Ann exploits Bob since the terms of  their 
transaction are fair. Conversely, if  Ann takes advantage of  Bob’s desperate situation to gain 
unfairly, she exploits Bob.  
And from the case, we can derive a transaction-specific version of  (D2). 
 
 (D2’) A exploits B when A takes advantage of  a past injustice that B suffers to  
gain unfairly relative to a fairness baseline.  
 
Nonetheless, the case is exploitative for Sample. Even if  Ann only takes the minimum 
remuneration from Bob, Ann is still guilty of  exploitation because taking advantage of  a 
past injustice that one suffers, constitutes exploitation. This conclusion seems implausible. 
If  my critique is correct, then (D2) is not sufficient for exploitation because it fails to pass 
the fairness test in the sense that (D2) includes (D2’).  
 
3.2.3. Revising the Process-Focused View 
 
We can conclude from my critiques that (D1) and (D2) (and the process-focused view in 
general) are overinclusive. Sample’s formulation of  the process-focused view fails to give 
a plausible account of  disrespectful exploitation; that is, exploitation in which an exploiter 
gains as a result of  disrespectful treatment rather than unfairness. Hence, I suggest that 
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(D1) and (D2) are sufficient for exploitation only if  the removal of  unfairness would not terminate the 
worry of  exploitation. When so revised, the process-focused view is separated from the 
transaction-specific view. The process-focused view constitutes exploitation only if  the 
exploiter gains wrongfully from the disrespectful transaction with the exploitee in ways 
other than unfairness. When the concern of  unfairness has been removed from Sample’s 
account (and the process-focused view in general), the process-focused view can, in itself, 
constitute exploitation. The exploiter takes advantage of  the exploitee’s vulnerability to 
gain benefits from their disrespectful transaction, in which all of  the exploiter’s benefits 
are morally unjustified.  
Before proceeding to my discussion of  (D3)－A exploits B when A commodifies or 
treats B as a fungible object of  market exchange－I offer two conceptual connections 
between exploitation and anti-commodification according to my distinction between unfair 
gain and disrespectful gain, namely, the external and the internal connections. Based on 
the distinction, I return to (D3) and argue that (D3) conflates two forms of  exploitation 
via commodification.  
 
3.3. Exploitation and Anti-Commodification: External and Internal 
Connections 
 
In this section, I first clarify wrongful exchange, exploitation, and commodification. 
Although commodification is akin to exploitation, their relationship remains unclear. I then 
introduce two ways of  understanding the relationship between exploitation and 
commodification according to my distinction between unfair gain and disrespectful gain. 
The first version affirms what we might term the ‘external’ connection: this holds that we 
ought not to commodify a person or a part of  that person, because doing so will increase the 
possibility of  being exploited unfairly. The second version affirms what we might term the 
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‘internal’ connection. The internal connection holds that we ought not to commodify a 
person, or a part of  that person because doing so constitutes exploitation. Once their 
relationships have been clarified, it will become clear that (D3) conflates two forms of  
exploitation via commodification.  
 
3.3.1. Wrongful Exchange: Exploitation and Commodification 
 
Let us start with wrongful exchanges. Exchanges can be wrongful for various reasons. One 
reason is that the exchange is exploitative. Note, however, that this is not the only way that 
an exchange can be wrongful. For instance, when an exchange is harmful or coercive, such 
an exchange is often considered wrongful, and we may have reason to ban such exchanges. 
Wrongful exchanges may occur outside the market. For instance, a parent can promise to 
buy a video game for their child in exchange for better achievement in school. For some 
experts of  education, to motivate a child’s performance by giving the child material 
enjoyment would be harmful to the child’s long-term achievement. If  so, we should 
discourage that kind of  domestic exchange not because it is exploitative, but because it is 
harmful. Exploitative exchanges, thus, are a particular kind of  wrongful exchange.  
While wrongful exchanges and exploitation may take place in various domains, anti-
commodification claims focus on market exchanges and attempt to confine the scope of  
the market. Unlike Karl Marx, who endeavours to ultimately reject the market’s whole 
existence, most theorists only aim to confine the commodification of  certain contested 
goods. They provide different reasons to deny the commodification of  contested goods.  
One anti-commodification claim is that when some goods are sold and bought in the 
market, such commercial behaviours are against the essence of  these goods (Andre, 1992: 
32-35). Friendship, love, or honour are paradigmatic instances of  this category. Take 
honour, for example. When the Nobel Prize, one of  the highest honours of  academia, is 
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sold in the market, it loses its meaning as one of  the highest awards for academic 
achievement immediately and can no longer be viewed as a prize. The nature of  honour is 
that it ought to be bestowed by others using a standard of  desert. However, when the prize 
is commodified and can be bought in the market, whoever wants the prize can access to it. 
The essence of  the prize has been corrupted.  
Another anti-commodification claim is that when some goods are exchanged for 
money in the market, workers are alienated, which they ought not to be (Andre, 1992: 35-
36). Alienation can be described as a phenomenon where a thing is disconnected from its 
producer or owner, but yet it continues to exist (Ollman, 2012: 132). Alienation happens 
frequently. For instance, commercial surrogacy involves selling women’s reproductive 
capacity and, thus, women are alienated from their reproductive capacity. Since women’s 
reproductive capacity is so crucial to their human flourishing, women will lose control of  
their capacity to flourish when reproduction is sold in the market. (Fabre, 2013: 3, 2006, 
ch. 8).  
The reasons above, though not exhaustive, make us perceive some exchanges as 
wrongful exchanges. However, although it is clear that exploitation and anti-
commodification are two independent reasons to conceive some exchanges as wrongful, 
their complex relationship has not yet been elucidated. In what follows, I explicate two 
ways to object to the commodification of  certain things because of  the concern of  
exploitation. Our notion of  exploitation will lead to different relationships between them. 
In the light of  my distinction between unfair exploitation and disrespectful exploitation 
according to the different quality of  A’s gain, I offer two anti-commodification claims as 
regards the charge of  exploitation. Let us begin with their external connection.  
 
3.3.2. External Connection: Commodification Facilitates Unfair Exploitation 
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One thing is clear: if  we want to explore the relationship between exploitation and 
commodification, we centre on market exchange. The most relevant to the charge of  
exploitation is the anti-commodification claim that some things should not be transacted for gain 
(Andre, 1992: 36-42). The anti-commodification claim and the charge of  exploitation share 
the similarity that it is morally impermissible to transact something for gain. Besides, the 
subject that we concern could be either a buyer and seller or the object exchanged. When 
some goods are exchanged in the market, the market participants (sellers and buyers) and 
the object exchanged would be affected. Thus, the anti-commodification claim suggests 
that some things should not be transacted for gain because such transactions would affect 
the market participants and the object exchanged, respectively. Let us start with their 
external connection.  
The first and manifest connection between exploitation and commodification is to 
treat the concern of  unfair exploitation as a reason against the commodification of  certain 
things. The external connection claims that certain goods’ commodification may exploit 
sellers or buyers (Andre, 1992: 40-41). Selling these goods in the market may increase the 
possibility of  buyers or sellers being exploited. If  so, prohibiting exploitation serves as a 
reason to object to the commodification of  certain things.  
Debra Satz (2010: 97) defends this view. She argues that when market participants are 
in an inferior bargaining position, or are so vulnerable that they would accept any terms 
available to them, they are more likely to be exploited than those situated in an advantageous 
position. Their tendency to be exploited would not occur had certain things not been 
commodified. In some cases, individuals would not be taken unfair advantage of, had an 
attribute of  that person not been sold in the market. The commodification of  a person (or 
a part of  that person) then may increase the chance that others would take unfair advantage 
of  them.  
Note that in their external connection, exploitation and anti-commodification are still 
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treated as two separate claims, and their connection is external. In their external connection, 
only after a person, or a part of  that person, has been commodified, can we assess whether 
such market exchanges will increase the chance of  being exploited. Chronologically, the 
process of  commodification precedes that of  exploitation. Their connection is external 
because the commodification of  a person is not concomitantly the exploitation of  that 
person. Rather, the commodification of  a person only increases their chances of  being 
exploited: it does not necessitate exploitation.  
The external connection is widely used by theorists concerning human tissue or 
commercial surrogacy (Malmqvist & Zeiler, 2015: 7; Walker & van Zyl, 2017; Wilkinson, 
2003; Fabre, 2006: Ch.6 & 8). For them, human organs and women’s reproductive capacity 
ought not to be commodified and transacted in the market, just because this will increase 
the chance of  the sellers to be exploited. Once human organs and women’s reproductive 
capacity are forbidden to be sold for money, even if  these sellers are vulnerable, buyers or 
firms would not have any chance to exploit them.  
Cécile Fabre is another advocate of  the external connection. She first provides three 
jointly sufficient conditions of  wrongful exploitation, which are borrowed from 
Wertheimer (1996) and David Miller (1987): they are,  
 
(a) “A benefits from the transaction.” 
(b) “[T]he outcome of  the transaction is harmful or (in the case of  a mutually  
advantageous transaction) unfair to B.” 
(c) “A gets B to agree to the transaction by seizing on some features of  B’s, or of   
his situation, such that B would not agree to the transaction otherwise.” 
(Fabre, 2006: 142) 
 
For Fabre, it is sometimes true that organ sellers are very poor and that organ buyers or 
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firms take advantage of  them. However, the organ sellers are similarly taking advantage of  
the organ recipient’s desperate need (2006: 145). Both the organ sellers and recipients could 
be the victim of  unfair exploitation. Indeed, in the case of  organ exchange, the terms of  their 
transaction could be unfair to the sellers or the recipients. The external connection, then, 
relates to unfair exploitation where the occurrence of  exploitation depends on whether the 
terms of  a transaction are fair or not. Whatever criteria one takes, if  the transaction’s terms 
are fair, no exploitation occurs. This is the case even if  the commodification of  certain 
goods may allow the vulnerabilities of  buyers or sellers to be used, or may place buyers or 
sellers in a position of  weak agency. Hence, the first connection between exploitation and 
anti-commodification is to adopt the notion of  unfair exploitation as a reason to object to 
the commodification of  certain goods for gain. This is their external connection.  
The external connection, however, does not exhaust the relationship between 
exploitation and anti-commodification. In addition to unfair exploitation, there is another 
way to understand the notion of  exploitation, and, therefore, the second connection 
between exploitation and anti-commodification.  
 
3.3.3. The Merely Means Principle: Commodification Mistreats What is 
Exchanged 
 
The second consideration of  the anti-commodification claim argues that some market 
exchanges mistreat what is exchanged (Andre, 1992: 37-39). Apart from the consequence of  the 
exchange, one prominent reason to object even to the harmless and non-exploitative 
commodification of  a person for gain is that human beings should not be treated as a mere 
means (Andre, 1992: 38). The objection concurs with Kant’s idea that people ought to treat 
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human beings always an end and never merely as a means (Kant, 2017: 171-218).41 For 
instance, involuntary exploitation violates Kant’s Merely Means Principle in the sense that 
the exploitee does not consent to an exploitative contract. 
However, the Merely Means Principle can be interpreted and extended in couples of  ways 
(Parfit, 2011a: 212-232, 2011b, 145-147). On Parfit’s interpretation, we treat people as 
merely a means, either when our actions fail to obey relevant moral belief, or when we 
choose not to bear relevant burdens for that person (2011a: 214). Concerning the Merely 
Means Principle, the moral belief  that guides our interactions with others, and whether we 
take relevant burdens for the sake of  others, are two important factors that determine 
whether we treat people as a means only. Besides, imposing harm on a person in certain 
ways will violate the Merely Means Principle. According to Parfit’s Harmful Means Principle, 
to impose harm on a person to achieve some aim triggers the Harmful Means Principle if  
the act is not the least harmful way to achieve the aim and the harm we impose is 
disproportionate to the goodness the aim will bring about (2011b: 145-147). 
However, it is controversial to hold that the Merely Means Principle is an absolute 
principle under any circumstances. Victor Tadros, for example, proposes and defends a 
version of  the Merely Means Principle, which claims that “it is permissible to harm a 
person as a means to an end if  that person would have had an enforceable duty to avert 
the threat were she able to do so, even if, in exercising her duty she would be harmed to 
the same degree” (2011: 127-137). All of  these could be further contested and interpreted; 
but it is clear that in some cases, when people are commodified for gain, they are treated 
as a means only.42 Especially when the exploiter has better ways than imposing harm on a 
person by commodifying that person, to achieve her aim, the exploiter treats that person 
 
41 See Wood (2007) and Onora O’Neill (1989; 2013) for Kant’s ethics. 
42 It is contested that what kinds of  goods should not be commodified according to Kant’s ethics, and I 
leave it open. 
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as merely a means (Parfit, 2011a: 229; 2011b, 145-147).  
Now we are focusing on another kind of  the exploitation-based anti-
commodification claim, which is different from the external connection. Take commercial 
surrogacy, for example. Both the surrogate mother’s reproductive capacity, and the children, 
are commodified and sold in commercial surrogacy. Opponents of  commercial surrogacy 
tend to argue that since commercial surrogacy treats women’s reproductive capacity and 
the resultant children as commodities, it disrespects them by treating them merely as a 
means. However, in what sense are the surrogate mother’s reproductive capacity and the 
children treated as merely a means and, therefore, disrespected? According to Anderson, 
surrogacy contract treats the surrogate mother as a means merely in the sense that the 
contract requires them to suppress their love to their children and denies their feelings of  
grief  (1990: 80-87; cf. Fabre, 2006: 196-200). One interpretation of  the Merely Means 
Principle claims that we ought to treat others with consideration by responding “with 
sensitivity to her and to her emotional relations with others” (Anderson, 1990: 81). When 
ignoring the surrogate mother’s emotion and feelings, firms of  commercial surrogacy treat 
the mother as if  it were merely a fungible good. The behaviour is disrespectful and violates 
the Merely Means Principle.  
Moreover, as some empirical research shows, in commercial surrogacy, the surrogate 
mother can suffer psychological harm (Longcope, 1987: 18-19; Peterson, 1987: B1, B4).43 
The surrogate mother tends to suffer from emotional problems, which can hardly be 
compensated for by money (Anderson, 1995: 180-181). Commercial surrogacy, at least, is 
a wrongful market exchange in the sense that it causes harm to the surrogate mother. In 
this case, the exploiter treats the surrogate mother as merely a means by imposing incurable 
harm on the surrogate mother to achieve her aim, without benefiting the mother 
 
43 Cf. Anderson (1995: 172). 
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sufficiently. In parallel, as many argue, the surrogate mother could be exploited in the sense 
that the buyer takes advantage of  her vulnerability to gain unfairly; and we may have reason 
to ban such exchanges.44  The external connection then claims that we ought not to 
commodify women’s reproductive capacity because doing so may lead to unfair 
exploitation. However, do we have a reason other than the concern of  unfair exploitation 
to consider the exchange of  certain goods for gain inappropriately? Yes, some may insist.  
 
3.3.4. The Internal Connection 
 
Donna Dickenson offers another way to understand the notion of  exploitation as a reason 
to object to a person’s commodification. In Dickenson’s view, when considering 
exploitation, it is missing the point to focus on “disparity of  remuneration”; instead, when 
human tissue is turned into a commodity, they are exploited (2017: 63). As she points out 
that: 
 
If  human tissue cannot be turned into a commodity without harming people’s worth as 
persons, then any form of  tissue sale, including but not exclusive to female tissue such as 
eggs, is in a sense exploitative, whatever price is offered for it. (Dickenson, 2017: 63, my italics) 
 
The point in the paragraph is that when gainful commodification of  a person disrespects 
that person, it constitutes exploitation, regardless of  whether or not the price of  the 
commodity is fair or unfair. Dickenson’s understanding of  exploitation is what I called 
disrespectful exploitation at the end of  Chapter 2. Contrary to unfair exploitation where 
the exploiter gains unfairly relative to a fairness baseline, in disrespectful exploitation, the 
exploiter gains from the disrespectful transaction with the exploited, in which all of  her 
 
44 See Anne Phillips (2017) and Agomoni Ganguli Mitra (2017). 
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gains are morally unjustified. This explains why, for Dickenson, it does not matter what 
the price is for an inappropriately commodified person since the commodity’s price relates 
to a concern of  fairness and not disrespect. Dickenson, then, offers another exploitation-
based reason to object to the commodification of  a person for gain than the reason 
proposed by the external connection.  
The internal connection between exploitation and anti-commodification, then, claims 
that we ought not to commodify a person (or an attribute of  that person) for gain. Such 
transactions violate the Merely Means Principle and, therefore, constitute disrespectful 
exploitation, where all of  the exploiter’s gains are morally unjustified. The transactions are 
‘internal’ because the disrespectful market relations, affirmed by the commodification 
theories, guarantee that any profits that the exploiter gains from such disrespectful market 
relations would be considered morally unjustified. In their internal connection, the quality 
of  the exploiter’s gains is not assessed by a standard of  fair distribution, according to which 
the terms of  a transaction could be fair and justifiable. Rather, any profits, gained from 
inappropriate market relations, would be deemed disrespectful and thus, morally 
unjustifiable.  
Moreover, unlike their external connection where the commodification of  a person 
and the exploitation of  that person are treated as two independent variables, the internal 
connection regards the two variables as one thing. In their internal connection, the 
disrespectful commodification of  a person for sale, in itself, is concomitantly the exploitation 
of  that person. There is no chronological order between them. Note that the controversy 
of  how to interpret the Merely Means Principle would not affect my distinction between 
unfair gain and disrespectful gain. At most, it only affects the ratio between unfair 
exploitation and disrespectful exploitation. Hence, when we employ disrespectful 
exploitation, there is another way to object to the commodification of  a person (or a part 
of  that person) via exploitation, that is, the internal connection.  
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Having presented two connections between exploitation and anti-commodification, 
I criticise and revise (D3) according to the internal and external connections. Note that the 
two connections are employed to criticise (D3) without attempting to offer any normative 
implications.  
 
3.4. A Critique of  (D3) 
 
In this section, I argue that (D3) is not an assertion of  exploitation and propose two 
variants of  (D3) according to the internal and external connections. 
 
3.4.1. (D3) is not a Statement of  Exploitation  
 
(D3) claims that A exploits B when A commodifies or treats B as a fungible object of  
market exchange (Sample, 2003: 57). However, commodifying a person does not amount 
to exploiting that person. (D3) is hardly an exploitation claim, but an anti-commodification 
claim, at most. This is because, according to the general definition of  mutually beneficial and 
consensual exploitation, A exploits B if  and only if  (1) A gains benefits by (2) taking advantage 
of  B (3) in their mutually consensual transaction. (D3), however, states neither (1) nor (2). 
To commodify B inappropriately, though it could wrong B in some ways, is not to exploit 
B if  A does not gain benefits from the commodification of  B. Moreover, even if  A benefits 
from B’s commodification, if  A does not take advantage of  B, no exploitation occurs. For 
instance, suppose Ann owns a company in which Bob works for Ann, and Ann’s company 
profits greatly through commodifying Bob’s special tissue, which violates the Kantian 
norm that we ought not to treat people as a means only. Ken, Ann’s son, thus receives a 
great amount of  money from Ann as leisure expenditure. In this case, although Ken gains 
benefits from the commodification of  Bob’s special tissue, Ken does not exploit Bob since 
Exploitation and disrespectfulness 
78 
 
Ken does not take advantage of  Bob. The case reaffirms that to be exploitation, a causal 
connection between the exploiter and the exploitee is necessary (Elster, 1982: 365-366). 
Hence, as Ferguson & Steiner (2018: 541) indicate, while some kinds of  transactions 
of  (D3) are disrespectful and sometimes viewed as exploitation, it is not clear in what sense 
such transactions are exploitation. It seems (D3) has nothing to do with exploitation. (D3) 
can be viewed as an assertion of  exploitation when revised according to the internal and 
external connections. I then offer two variants of  (D3), which would be viewed as an 
exploitation-based anti-commodification claim. 
 
3.4.2. The First Variant of  (D3): The Internal Connection 
 
Consider the internal connection first. The internal connection claims that to gain benefits 
by commodifying a person (or an attribute of  that person)－in a way that violates the 
Merely Means Principle－constitutes exploitation. So, I suggest the first variant of  (D3): 
 
(D3’): A exploits B when A takes advantage of  by commodifying B (or an attribute 
of  B) to gain benefits－in a way that violates the Merely Means Principle that we 
ought to treat people always as an end but not a means only 
 
(D3’) is an assertion of  exploitation according to the internal connection. The significant 
difference between (D3) and (D3’) is that while (D3’) meets (1) and (2)－the two elements 
of  exploitation, (D3) does not. To be exploitation, A must gain benefits from B by taking 
advantage of  B. In (D3), A does not exploit B, because (1) and (2) are unsatisfied. Secondly, 
what distinguishes (D3’) from (D3) is that (D3’) defines the inappropriate commodification 
of  a person by appealing to the Merely Means Principle. As Andre (1992: 36) suggests, one 
reason to object to the exchange of  certain goods is that it violates the Kantian norm that 
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we shall always treat human beings as an end and not as a means only. When we commodify 
a person or a part of  that person in ways that violate the Merely Means Principle, we 
disrespect her intrinsic value and treat that person as a means only (Dickenson, 2017: 63). 
Hence, the Merely Means Principle offers a standard to signify when commodifying a 
person is inappropriate.  
Moreover, in (D3’), what is at stake is not that certain market exchanges are bad for 
the market participants (sellers and buyers). Rather, it primarily concerns the object sold and 
bought in the market. This means that in (D3’) even if  the transaction’s terms are fair 
relative to a fairness baseline, A still exploits B in the way that A gains disrespectfully by 
taking advantage of  the commodification of  B. Hence, (D3’) is a form of  disrespectful, 
rather than unfair, exploitation; A’s profits, gained from the commodification of  B against 
the Merely Means Principle, are morally unjustified. Hence, Dickenson is correct to point 
out that it is misleading to focus on the prices of  B as a commodity. Instead, in (D3’), the 
exploiter ought not to profit from the inappropriate commodification of  B. When 
benefiting from such disrespectful transactions by pressing advantage on B, A exploits B.  
(D3’) then provides an exploitation-based reason to object to the commodification 
of  certain goods, that is, the internal connection between exploitation and anti-
commodification. It claims that we ought not to commodify a person (or an attribute of  
that person) because to gain benefits from the commodification of  a person in ways that 
violate the Merely Means Principle, constitutes exploitation concomitantly. (D3’), then, is 
a form of  the process-focused view, that is, to take advantage of  B’s disadvantage for gains, is 
sufficient for exploitation. More importantly, (D3’) passes the fairness test that (D3’) is 
exploitative in the sense that A gains disrespectfully, rather than unfairly, from the 
inappropriate commodification of  B. (D3’) offers a form of  the internal connection.  
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3.4.3. The Second Variant of  (D3): The External Connection 
 
Apart from revising (D3) according to the internal connection, it is possible to revise (D3) 
in terms of  the external connection. The external connection claims that the 
commodification of  B will increase the possibility of  B’s being exploited. The second 
variant of  (D3), then, is as follows: 
 
(D3’’): A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of  the commodification of  B. 
 
Unlike (D3), (D3’’) is a form of  exploitation in that (D3’’) meets two fundamental elements 
of  exploitation: (1) A gains and (2) by taking advantage of  B. Moreover, (D3’’) is consistent 
with the external connection in that the commodification of  B does not, in itself, 
constitutes exploitation. Rather, the commodification of  B only increases the possibility 
of  B’s being exploited. Hence, (D3’’) is a form of  unfair exploitation, in which the exploiter 
gains unfairly according to a fairness baseline. Note also that (D3’’) is different from (D3’) 
because in (D3’’) the commodification of  B does not trigger the Merely Means Principle. 
Thus, the quality of  A’s gains in (D3’’) belongs to the category of  unfair gain, which 
concerns whether the price of  a commodity is consistent with a fairness baseline.  
Having revised (D3) according to the internal and external connections, let us 
consider two objections to my distinction between unfair gain and disrespectful gain. 
 
3.5. Objections and Replies 
 
In introducing these objections, it may be helpful to provide a summary of  my view so far. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the unfairness in the terms of  a transaction is not necessary for 
exploitation. If  exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain, and if  unfair gain is not necessary 
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for exploitation, there must be another way to perceive exploitation as wrongful gain. 
Contra unfair gains where A gains unfairly relative to a fairness baseline, I have indicated 
that disrespectful gain is another way to perceive exploitation as wrongful gains. Unfair 
gain and disrespectful gain, jointly, constitute the first necessary condition of  my account 
of  exploitation. My central claims in Chapters 2 and 3 could be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) Unfair Gains: A, the exploiter, gains unfairly relative to a norm of  fair distribution. 
 
(ii) Disrespectful Gains: A, the exploiter, gains from a disrespectful transaction with 
B, one that violates the Merely Means Principle. 
 
Now let us consider two objections. The first objection claims that the unfairness of  a 
transaction’s terms is necessary for exploitation and so my inclusion of  (ii) is mistaken. 
The first objection, thus, insists that exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain and that 
unfairness is the only way to understand the quality of  the exploiter’s wrongful gain. The 
first objection is implausible because some market exchanges are exploitative in more ways 
than the unfairness in transactions, such as child labour, organ sales, and commercial 
surrogacy. These cases involve the inappropriate commodification of  an attribute of  human 
beings for sale, and, therefore, they are disrespectful market exchanges in the sense that 
people are treated as merely a means. More importantly, what makes these cases 
exploitative is not that the price of  human tissue is unfair relative to a fairness baseline. 
Condemning the employer of  child labourers for paying unfair wages misses the 
wrongness of  child labour itself. Rather, the more fundamental concern we have is that 
the exchange should not happen—children’s labour is not an item that should be viewed 
as something that adults are morally permitted to buy—but not that exchanges should be 
done on fair terms. If  the unfairness is not what makes these cases exploitative, and if  
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exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain, we must conclude that unfairness is not necessary 
for exploitation and there are other ways to understand the quality of  A’s wrongful gain.  
The second objection questions whether unfair gain and disrespectful gain exhaust 
all possible understandings of  exploitation as wrongful gain. If  so, my account of  
exploitation is incomplete. While these two forms of  the exploiter’s wrongful gain may not 
exhaust all possible understandings of  exploitation as wrongful gain, they are sufficient for 
exploitation. There might be other ways of  exploiting, and I leave that as an open question. 
Moreover, since I adopt a pluralist position of  what a benchmark of  fairness is, A’s 
excessive benefit is only one way to understand the notion of  unfair gain. As I mentioned 
in Chapter 2, other understandings of  fair distribution are possible, and I remain open to 




I have explained when and why the process-focused view－ taking advantage of  B’s 
disadvantage－suffices to exploitation even if  the terms of  their transaction are fair. In my 
view, the process-focused view constitutes exploitation only if  it passes the fairness test. 
The quality of  the exploiter’s gains in the process-focused view belong to disrespectful 
gains, rather than unfair gains. Apart from the distinction of  two forms of  wrongful gain, 
another major difference between unfair exploitation and disrespectful exploitation is that 
disrespectful exploitation violates the Merely Means Principle that we ought not to treat 
people merely as a means. Then, when removed of  the concern of  unfairness, the Merely 
Means Principle explains why (D1) to (D3) constitute disrespectful exploitation. Hence, 
disrespectful exploitation occurs when A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain benefits 
in a way that violates the Merely Means Principle.  
In Chapter 2 and 3, I have explicated one of  the two conditions of  my account of  
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exploitation: the exploiter makes wrongful gain through unfair or disrespectful transactions. 
In Chapter 4, I explicate the second condition of  my account of  exploitation, which I term 
the Relational condition: A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, compared to A’s agency. The 
notion of  advantage-taking behaviour is another key element of  my notion of  exploitation. 
Since the Relational condition is necessary for exploitation, either unfair exploitation or 
disrespectful exploitation has to be met to count as exploitation. The Relational condition 
is crucial to our understanding of  exploitation, but theorists give different interpretations 
of  the causal connection between the exploiter and the exploited. In Chapter 4, I defend 
the Relational condition against four alternatives and explain why it is more plausible than 
alternatives.  
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4. Exploitation as a Relational Notion 
 
In Chapter 2 and 3, I argued that exploitation is a form of  wrongful gain, and there are 
two distinct ways to understand wrongful gain, namely, unfair gains and disrespectful gains. 
The two forms of  wrongful gain constitute one of  the necessary conditions of  my account 
of  exploitation. In Chapter 4, I shall explore and specify another necessary condition of  
it, namely, what it means to ‘take advantage of  another.’ More concretely, for exploitation 
to occur, the exploiter must enjoy some kind of  advantage in an asymmetrical relationship 
with the exploitee. Otherwise, the exploiter would not be able to extract wrongful benefits 
from the transaction with the exploitee. Then, we must have a clear understanding of  what 
‘taking advantage of ’ means and how it differs from theft, coercion, and manipulation. The 
formulation of  ‘taking advantage of ’, thus, is another key constituent of  exploitation.  
In Chapter 4, I propose and defend an interpretation of  ‘taking advantage of ’, namely, 
the Relational condition. It claims that A exploits B only if  A takes advantage of  B’s weaker 
agency, compared to A’s agency. The core idea of  the Relational condition is that the 
exploiter’s advantage in an asymmetrical relationship with the exploitee depends on the 
exploiter’s comparative, rather than absolute, agency. Having articulated my interpretation 
of  ‘taking advantage of ’, I shall present four alternatives of  ‘taking advantage of ’; Roemer’s 
purely distributive approach; the Historical view (suffering from past injustice); the Non-Comparative 
view (basic need-based view of  vulnerability); and the Complex view (exploitation as 
domination). I shall argue that, although these alternatives are correct in that they can 
identify exploitation in some cases, they are too restrictive to serve as a necessary condition 
of  exploitation. In other words, they fail to identify exploitation in a variety of  social 
relations because their views cannot explain why the exploiter has an advantage in the 
asymmetrical relationship with the exploitee in general. Instead, the Relational condition is 
more plausible than the alternatives in that it can identify multiple forms of  exploitation 
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in a variety of  social relationships, where the exploiter obtains more advantages than the 
exploitee.  
I begin Chapter 4 by proposing the Relational condition in section 4.1. The Relational 
condition holds that A exploits B only if A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, compared 
to A’s agency. Section 4.2. then introduces and objects to Roemer’s purely distributive 
account of  exploitation. Section 4.3. introduces the distinction between historical and 
ahistorical accounts of  exploitation and argues that exploitation is ahistorical in nature. In 
sections 4.4. and 4.5., I examine two alternatives of  the ahistorical account of  the causal 
component: the Non-Comparative view and the Complex view. I argue that the Non-Comparative 
view, which appeals to B’s insufficiency of  basic needs, is flawed in that B’s insufficiency 
of  basic needs cannot always explain why the exploiter enjoy advantages in exploitation. I 
then conclude that the Complex view－particularly Vrousalis’s exploitation as domination
－ is flawed because exploitation needs not involve domination. In section 4.6., I 
summarise my account of  exploitation.  
 
4.1. The Relational Condition  
 
The Relational condition states that: 
 
 A exploits B only if A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, compared to A’s  
agency.  
 
Exploitation, as Phillips (2017: 110) points out, is a form of  inequality in which one party 
to a transaction treats another as something inferior. The exploiter is capable of  extracting 
benefits from the transaction with the exploited only when and because the exploiter is in 
a superior position against the exploited. There must be some kind of  asymmetry between 
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the exploiter and the exploited to make the exploiter’s extraction of  wrongful benefits 
possible. Theorists of  exploitation disagree on the moralised feature of  the exploited that 
constitutes the asymmetrical relationship. For instance, proponents of  the process-focused 
view contend that taking advantage of  the exploitee’s vulnerability, in itself, constitutes 
exploitation. The vulnerability approach consists of  two claims concerning the advantage-
taking behaviour: one is that B’s vulnerability makes A’s extraction possible (the causal 
explanation); another is that A’s behaviour is morally impermissible for some reason (the 
moral explanation).  
My view, then, differs from the alternatives in the way that I hold a thin notion of  the 
asymmetrical relationship that makes A’s extraction possible. It is thin in the sense that it 
can include a variety of  kinds of  human interaction, some of  which do not refer to the 
exploitee’s vulnerability or the domination of  the exploiter. We need a thin notion of  the 
asymmetrical relationship because exploitation may take place within a variety of  human 
interactions in different contexts. The asymmetrical relationship may occur on campus, in 
the family, within a society, or in international trade. On the other hand, theorists of  
exploitation connect the advantage-taking behaviour with notions, such as vulnerability, 
domination, or background injustice, to explain the moral wrongness of  exploitation. 
However, the Relational condition aims to preserve the purity of  the notion of  exploitation 
by formulating the advantage-taking behaviour as thin as possible, so that my account of  
exploitation would not be intertwined with other notions. The thin and pure Relational 
condition distinguishes my account from the alternatives. Now let me explain each element 
of  the Relational condition. 
 
4.1.1. The Definition of  Agency 
 
In a very broad sense, agency denotes the performance of  an agent’s capacity to act 
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(Schlosser, 2015: 1). Let us consider the features of  an agent first. According to List and 
Pettit, an agent consists of  three basic elements: “it has representational states, 
motivational states, and a capacity to process them and to act on their basis” (2011: 20). 
For List and Pettit, representational states refer to a function of  portraying the world, while 
motivational states refer to a function of  initiating actions (2011: 21). Moreover, the 
minimum standard that an agent must contain is “standards of  rationality”, which enable 
an agent to connect with others and circumstances (List & Pettit, 2011: 24). Taken together, 
an agent has a capacity to perceive the world, to infer from its knowledge of  the world, 
and to motivate itself  to act. Nonetheless, to exercise agency is more than being an agent.  
One performs her agency when she can act or rearrange an array of  resources 
corresponding to a specific situation. According to Sewell (1990: 20), agency refers to an 
agent’s capacity to rearrange an array of  resources in an innovative way. This means that 
an agent performs her agency when she can reorganise resources in a creative way. 
Although a minimum sense of  agency inheres in all adult humans, both the forms and the 
strengths of  agency vary greatly from one person to another, from one culture to another 
(Sewell, 1992: 20-21). The notion of  agency has its locality. Since the agency is conditioned 
by “a specific range of  cultural schemas and resources available in a person’s particular 
milieu”, the agency is a product of  a specific culture and history (Sewell, 1992: 20). Besides, 
the strength of  agency differs greatly across and within societies and depends largely on 
how one rearranges resources under a specific context. For instance, provided that A and 
B have the same amount of  resources, how they arrange the resources determines their 
different strengths of  agency. The agency of  the president in the U.S. is stronger than that 
of  the president in some other countries because the U.S. has more resources in general 
than other countries. Also, different social groups’ agency differs as well, e.g., the strength 
of  the working class’s agency may differ from that of  capitalists. Thus, to calculate one’s 
strength of  agency, many factors have to be jointly considered.  
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I adopt the notion of  agency to formulate my account of  exploitation because it can 
accommodate most, if  not all, relevant factors that frame the asymmetrical relationship in 
a variety of  social interaction. The notion of  agency serves as an umbrella concept that 
takes all the relevant factors into account and transfers these factors into the term of  
agency. When properly converted, we can turn these relevant factors, e.g., bargaining 
capacity, the level of  basic needs, opportunity, social positions and so forth, into a unit of  
agency. So described, the notion of  agency can help to capture properly multiple forms of  
exploitation. Moreover, in adopting the notion of  agency, my account can receive support 
from sociology, a discipline that concentrates on how people obtain disadvantages within 
multiple forms of  power relationships and, therefore, can adjust itself  according to the 
new development of  social sciences and identify new forms of  asymmetrical social 
relationship. My account of  exploitation can identify more exploitation than alternatives 
because the Relational condition can properly identify one’s relative position in a social 
relationship without sticking to a specific factor.  
 
4.1.2. The Comparative, Rather Than Absolute, Notion of  Agency 
 
The core of  the Relational condition is that it adopts a comparative, rather than absolute, 
notion of  agency. This means one’s level of  agency within an interaction will depend on 
with whom one interacts. Whether or not one will obtain advantages in a transaction does 
not depend solely on one’s absolute agency, which is the sum of  one’s overall wealth, 
education levels and rights, and so on. Rather, it depends on the agency of  one’s interactor 
under a specific circumstance. Therefore, my use of  the notion of  agency adopts a 
comparative form in the sense that the strength of  one’s agency is subject to one’s rivals 
but does not depend solely on one’s absolute attributes. So understood, whether the rich 
will have advantages in a relationship will depend on their circumstances and with whom 




Consider Greedy Mountain Rescuer. Suppose Allen is poor that he has to collect 
mushrooms in the mountains and Bob is rich and loves to climb alone. One day, Bob was 
stranded in a pit accidently, and Allen happened to find Bob and offered to rescue Bob 
only if  Bob gives Allen half  of  his properties. Bob accepts the deal and it is clear that Allen 
exploits Bob. In this case, even if  Allen is poorer than Bob, he can exploit Bob. This means 
that occupying an advantageous position in an interaction will depend on one’s interactor’s 
agency in that specific circumstance.  
Some might contend that Bob is exploited because his agency is below an absolute 
threshold, such that anyone who happened to walk by could exploit him. Therefore, it is 
one’ absolute, rather than comparative, agency that matters. However, this view fails to 
notice that if  Allen fell into the pit as well, he cannot exploit Bob. Moreover, exploitation 
may occur between millionaires whose agency is above an absolute threshold. When Bill 
Gates desperately wants Van Gogh’s paintings, other millionaires who have the paintings 
may exploit Gates. This case illustrates that when assessing one’s agency in an interaction, 
it is the comparative, rather than absolute, agency that matters most.  
 
4.1.3. Two Interpretations of  The Notion of  ‘Taking Advantage of ’ 
 
Roughly, exploitation assumes that the exploiter obtains certain advantages on which she 
“capitalizes to induce the exploited to engage in this relatively less beneficial exchange” 
(Miller, 1990: 186). The advantage-taking behaviour, thus, implies that the exploiter presses 
her advantage over the exploitee to extract wrongful benefits. Nonetheless, regrettably, the 
meaning of  advantage-taking behaviour has not yet been fully explored. Currently, there 
are only two interpretations of  advantage-taking behaviour. One is proposed by Jon Elster 
(1982). According to Elster, A takes advantage of  B by “adding an option to [B’s] 
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opportunity set that is better both for him and for me than the option preferred by [B] 
prior to the expansion” (1982: 364). Elster’s definition correctly grasps the essence of  
exploitation. An exploitative deal is typically worse than a fair deal, but better than the 
options available to the exploited before the exploitative offer. Hence, the exploiter 
expands, rather than restricts, the exploitee’s opportunity set. The first interpretation of  
the notion of  ‘taking advantage of ’ suggests that the exploiter is capable of  providing a 
deal that is worse than fairness, but better than the exploitee’s current opportunity set.  
Another interpretation of  advantage-taking behaviour is proposed by Benjamin 
Ferguson (2013). For him, advantage-taking behaviour involves the exploiter’s intentions 
or attitudes that are morally relevant and problematic (Ferguson & Steiner, 2018: 537). That 
is to say, for Ferguson, the exploiter is meant to press her advantage over the exploiter to 
gain benefits. Conversely, she does not exploit another when she does not intend to gain 
benefits by pressing her advantage over the exploited. Moreover, Ferguson’s definition 
provides a more active interpretation than Elster’s. Since the would-be exploiter can decide 
whether to exploit or not, there is no such thing as exploiting accidentally. Hence, 
intentionality is a necessary condition of  Ferguson’s account of  exploitation. In what 
follows, I shall revise Elster’s interpretation and argue against Ferguson’s interpretation that 
intentionality is not necessary for exploitation.  
 
4.1.3.1. Supplementing Elster’s Interpretation 
 
Elster’s account needs to be revised because his account holds that exploitation always 
involves someone unfairly gaining from a transaction. However, as I have argued in 
Chapters 2 and 3, exploitation involves two distinct forms of  wrongful gain: unfair gain 
and disrespectful gain. His account should take into account both fairness and 
respectfulness as relevant factors for exploitation. A qualified defence of  Elster’s view then 
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claims that the advantage-taking behaviour implies that the exploiter adds an unfair and/or 
disrespectful option to the exploitee’s opportunity set. As such, an exploitative offer is either 
worse than an unfair but not disrespectful, a fair but disrespectful, or an unfair and 
disrespectful offer, and it is better than the options available to the exploited before the 
contract. Let us consider three different cases.  
First, we could have exploitation in which the transaction is unfair but not 
disrespectful. Under certain conditions, wage labour may be a case in point. Since the 
employment relationship in general does not need to involve degrading employees, 
exploitation in wage labour can only take the form of  unfair exploitation. An unfair but 
not disrespectful offer, then, is better than the exploitee’s status quo but worse than a 
fairness baseline. Second, we could have exploitation in which the transaction is not unfair 
but involves disrespectful treatment. One example would be the buying of  organs. The 
purchase of  organs might (in certain circumstances) be fair, but it is disrespectful. Organ 
trading disrespects the seller because we treat people as merely a means when we treat their 
organs as a fungible commodity. Even if  the price of  one’s organ is fair according to a 
fairness baseline, the exploiter ought not to gain benefits by commodifying the exploitee’s 
organ. Thus, a fair but disrespectful offer is better than the exploitee’s status quo but worse 
than a fair and respectful offer.45 This leaves the third possibility. An offer might be both 
unfair and disrespectful. An example here might be child labour. Child labour is 
disrespectful because we think that to hire children as workers fails to take their interests 
seriously and that the exploiter treats them as merely a means. Also, child labour is unfair 
in the sense that since the wage for a child is usually less than the wage for an adult, other 
things being equal, the exploiter gains excessively by hiring child workers. Consequently, 
an unfair and disrespectful offer is better than the exploitee’s status quo but worse than a 
 
45 For instance, the buyer can think of  other ways to help the organ sellers so that the seller does not need 
to sell her organ. So understood, a respectful offer should try to solve the difficulty that the would-be 
exploited faces, and, therefore, it is better than a disrespectful offer.  
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fairness baseline and a respectful offer.46 
Hence, an exploitative offer, in general, is better than the exploitee’s status quo but 
worse than a fairness baseline or a respectful offer. Regarding exploitation, it is important 
that we include cases of  both unfairness and disrespectful treatment into account. Having 
revised Elster’s interpretation, I then reject Ferguson’s view.  
 
4.1.3.2. Intentionality is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Exploitation  
 
The exploiter’s intention to exploit is not necessary nor sufficient for exploitation; 
therefore, Ferguson’s interpretation is flawed. Consider the sufficient condition first. One 
can intend but fail to exploit another. Wertheimer correctly suggests a distinction between 
“the claim that A exploits B” and “the claim that A acts exploitatively towards B” (1996: 209, 
his emphasis). The difference between them lies in whether A succeeds in gaining unfair 
benefits from the transaction. In both cases, even if  A intends to exploit B, if  A does not 
secure any benefits from the transaction－e.g. B declines A’s unfair offer－no exploitation 
occurs. An owner of  garment sweatshops might seek to gain unfairly by paying her 
employees a low salary. Put simply; the owner seeks to exploit her employees. However, if  
the owner fails to obtain any eventual benefits from the employment relationship, her 
intention to exploit would not constitute exploitation. The exploiter’s intention to exploit 
is not sufficient for exploitation.47 
Consider the necessary condition. In individual transactions, the exploiter’s intention 
to exploit is not necessary for exploitation (Steiner, 2018: 6-9). A can exploit B even if  A 
is unaware of  the exploitative effect on B. Exploitation may be performed unintentionally. 
 
46 For instance, the employer can provide free education and training to local children so that the children 
are in a better position in the job market when they grow up.  
47 Since Ferguson holds that the exploiter’s intentionality is necessary for exploitation, he might agree that 
intentionality is not sufficient for exploitation.  
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For instance, A might mistakenly believe that the terms of  her transaction with B are fair 
relative to a fairness baseline. Moreover, the fact that A may exploit B unintentionally is 
particularly manifest in structural exploitation where the wrong of  structural exploitation 
is not caused by a particular person but by all participants within the structures.48 For 
example, some capitalists might feel innocent when accused of  exploiting workers because 
they might have made efforts to provide the best offer to their employees. ‘How could 
capitalists exploit workers unintentionally?’ They might ask.  
In response, by definition, structural exploitation refers to a situation where social 
structures encourage exploitation, and the cost of  non-exploitation is very high (Young, 
2006: 114). Exploitative structures drive employers to exploit, whether or not they intend 
to exploit. Conversely, if  we deny that A can exploit B unintentionally, we then have to 
acknowledge that structural exploiters are not exploiting others. This is a loss, rather than 
a gain, to an account of  exploitation. Hence, although the exploiter may intend to exploit 
others, and their intention to exploit might make their exploitation more culpable, her 
intention to exploit others is not necessary for exploitation.  
Overall, the intention to exploit is neither sufficient nor necessary for exploitation. 
However, this does not reject the relevance of  intentionality in exploitation. The intention 
to exploit can be wrongful in itself. One should not seek to exploit another anyway. 
Moreover, whether or not A intends to exploit does make a moral difference to the 
culpability of  the exploiter. We will think that intentional exploitation is more wrongful 




48 I will explore the issue of  structural exploitation in Chapter 7.  
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4.1.4. The Exploited: Two Further Clarifications  
 
Having explained each element of  the Relational condition, it is worth clarifying two 
further questions concerning the exploitee. One is for the improvement condition: must 
the exploitative offer improve the exploitee’s condition? Another is, even if  the offer 
improves B’s condition, what is the baseline to assess the improvement to B’s condition 
after the offer? I explore the two questions. 
 
4.1.4.1. The Improvement Condition 
 
An exploitative offer should be better than B’s opportunity set prior to the offer and, thus, 
it should improve B’s condition. If  not, the offer is unattractive, and B will decline it. In 
most cases, the exploited can assess whether the offer will eventually improve her condition 
sooner or later. However, it is possible that an exploitative offer does not actually improve 
B’s condition. The case occurs in two major ways. One is that the alleged exploiter makes 
the exploited mistakenly believe that the offer will improve their situation, i.e., A deceives 
B. A fraudulent exploitative offer is obviously wrongful and beyond our attention, because, 
presumably, our focus is mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation without involving 
manipulation, coercion, and fraud.  
Another possibility is that although A does not deceive B, B may misjudge the actual 
effect of  the offer. This case is not rare and belongs to harmful exploitation, that is, B loses 
after the transaction with A. Nonetheless, harmful exploitation is clearly wrongful because 
of  the harm to B, and it is often the harm to B that grasps our attention (Wertheimer, 1996: 
16). What really makes exploitation a distinct wrong is that it could be mutually beneficial 
and consensual without coercion and fraud. Hence, although in some cases an exploitative 
offer would not actually improve B’s condition, if  we can clarify the wrongness of  the 
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mutually beneficial and voluntary exploitation, harmful exploitation becomes less 
theoretically problematic. The point would become clearer when we compare exploitation 
with ultimatum games.49  
An ultimatum game refers to a bargaining situation in which a certain amount of  
money is divided between A and B (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000). While A can decide 
how to divide the amount of  money between them, B can decline A’s allocation. However, 
if  B declines A’s offer, both receive nothing in return; if  B accepts A’s offer, both will win 
the money according to the mode that A decides. Exploitation, thus, is similar to an 
ultimatum game in some respects. For instance, both are mutually beneficial in the sense 
that A and B (the exploiter and the exploited) would gain benefits relative to the no-
transaction baseline, whatever agreement they will reach. Also, for B, it would be better to 
accept whatever A offers than decline the offer since, once again, it is better than B’s 
current opportunity set (or B’s status quo). Still, in either case, no coercion and fraud are 
involved. The similarities make exploitation a case of  ultimatum games.  
Nonetheless, in most ultimatum games, what surprises economists is that an equal 
share tends to be the frequent outcome (Nowak et al., 2000: 1773). The outcome is 
surprising because it seems rational for B to accept whatever allocation A decides because 
it is better than nothing (ibid.). The frequent outcome, therefore, is puzzling for 
economists and they wonder why B, as a rational agent, will decline A’s offer if  it is not for 
an equal share. However, unlike an Ultimatum game in which the experiment is conducted 
in an ideal situation where A and B are roughly situated in an equal position, exploitation 
takes place at a non-ideal situation where A and B are in an asymmetrical relationship. The 
asymmetrical relationship in which the exploitee has less agency could be caused either by 
the exploitee’s own lack of  capacity to assess the quality of  a deal, or by the exploitee’s 
 
49  In an Ultimatum game, the permissibility of  a game is irrelevant, so I leave the consideration of  
disrespectfulness aside and only focus on unfairness. 
Exploitation as a relational notion 
96 
 
poor opportunity set, or both. This differentiates exploitation from ultimatum games and 
explains why the exploitee tends to accept, rather than decline, an unfair offer in contrast 
to the frequent outcome in Ultimatum games.  
Very often, it is the exploitee’s poor opportunity set, rather than her incapacity to 
properly assess the actual effect of  an offer, which makes it the case that the exploited has 
less agency. For instance, even though the working condition of  being a fisherman in 
developing regions has been notoriously unpleasant, an empirical study shows that many 
people in developing countries still prefer to be a fisherman in developed countries.50 The 
reason behind the phenomenon cannot be that people cannot evaluate the quality of  the 
offer properly. Rather, it is their lack of  fair options that make the would-be exploited 
accept, or even prefer, an exploitative offer. Hence, most exploitative deals will improve 
the exploitee’s condition sooner or later.  
 
4.1.4.2. What is the Baseline of  the Improvement Condition? 
 
The improvement condition requires certain baselines to assess whether or not the 
exploitee’s condition improves after an exploitative offer. Intuitively, there are two 
possibilities: the exploitee’s status quo and a counterfactual situation. Thus, we assess both 
whether the offer indeed improves B’s condition right after the contract or in a foreseeable 
future. While it is possible an exploitative offer may not improve and could even worsen 
B’s status quo in the short-term, it could improve B’s condition in the foreseeable fashion. 
Very often, people accept an exploitative offer not because it will improve their status quo 
immediately, but because it will improve their foreseeable future conditions compared to 
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wage only after the work has been done. Some then would accept the offer just because 
they think it will improve their condition in the foreseeable future. However, it is possible 
that the exploitee is better off  in the short-term, but worse off  in the long-term, e.g., the 
seller of  kidney tends to gain a great amount of  money in the short-term, but their health 
will be impaired in the long-term. It is hard to tell whether this case is mutually beneficial 
or harmful exploitation.  
The counterfactual baseline is another baseline to assess whether the exploitee’s 
conditions have improved after an exploitative offer. Theorists differ in what the 
counterfactual baseline is. Most hold the luck egalitarian baseline, that is, whether an 
exploitative offer really improves the exploitee’s condition should be compared to an ideal 
situation where no one suffers unchosen disadvantages. I shall examine this view in chapter 
6. To conclude, by definition, in mutually beneficial exploitation, the exploitee’s status quo 
will be improved after an exploitative offer, sooner or later.  
 
4.1.5. Exploitation as a Relational Notion 
 
Now, the Relational condition consists of  three further sub-conditions: 
 
(i) The Comparative Condition: there is an asymmetrical relationship in which 
A’s agency is superior to B’s.  
(ii) The Sufficiency Condition: A’s agency has to be strong enough that A is able 
to address an exploitative offer to B.  
(iii) The Unequal Treatment: given (i) and (ii), A has to use such superior agency 
to extract wrongful benefits from their transaction.  
 
To elaborate: for the comparative condition, exploitation takes place in an asymmetrical 
relationship in which the exploiter’s agency is superior to the exploitee. In general, we need 
to take relevant factors in their transaction to calculate and compare their relative agency. 
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The relevant factors vary case by case. However, in most, cases, it is the exploitee’s poor 
option set that makes her accept an exploitative offer.  
Regarding the sufficiency condition, the exploiter has to be capable of  providing an 
offer that is better than the opportunity set available to B prior to their transaction and less 
than a fairness baseline, or/and a respectful offer. This suggests that A can exploit B only 
if A is capable of  offering a deal that is better than B’s current option set. If  A is unable to 
provide offers better than B’s existing options, even if  A’s agency is stronger than B’s, 
exploitation ceases to occur. Consider Pit. 51  Suppose A and B are trapped in a pit. 
Somehow, A is able to escape from the pit alone while B cannot. In Pit, although A’s agency 
is better than B in that A is capable of  escaping from the pit, if  A cannot rescue B and 
therefore cannot address an unfair offer to B, no exploitation can ever occur. Hence, A’s 
agency should be stronger than B’s, and A must be in a position to address an exploitative 
offer to B.  
Consider the unequal treatment. The exploiter must interact with the exploitee in 
some way.52 This is crucial because even if  A’s agency is stronger than B, and A is able to 
offer a contract which is better than B’s opportunity set, still exploitation does not occur 
if  A does not take advantage of  B. An actual interaction must occur between A and B. 
Otherwise, A is merely capable of  exploiting but does not actually exploit B. Moreover, 
indirect exploitation, where C exploits B in the represent of  A, satisfies (iii) because to hire C 
as the representative is a way to perform A’s superior agency. Thus, the Relational condition 
claims that exploitation is a relational notion in the fundamental sense that it involves A’s 
using her relatively stronger agency, compared to B’s agency, to extract wrongful gains from 
their transaction.  
 
51 The case is taken from Nicholas Vrousalis (2013). 
52 I take a broad understanding of  what an interaction is. An interaction may take place where we need to 
negotiate with one another so as to distribute benefits and burdens. Thus, an interaction may occur in a 
variety of  social relationships, such as marriage, market exchange, or work organisation. 
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In summary, the Relation condition claims that A exploits B only if  A takes advantage 
of  B’s weaker agency, compared to A’s agency. Now the condition can be further elaborated. 
A exploits B only if  A is able to provide a better, but neither fair nor respectful, deal to B 
than the opportunity set available to B prior to A’s offer. In adopting the comparative 
notion of  agency to evaluate who enjoys advantages in an interaction, my account can 
identify multiple forms of  exploitation within a variety of  social relationships. We should 
note that since the Relational condition is necessary for my account of  exploitation, 
disrespectful exploitation is no exception. Compared with unfair exploitation, what is 
special in disrespectful exploitation is that it violates the Merely Means Principle that we 
ought not to treat people as merely a mean, and, therefore, A is not morally entitled to any 
profits, gained from the disrespectful transaction with B. However, the exploiter in 
disrespectful exploitation still has to be able to provide an exploitative offer that is better 
than the exploitee’s existing options. Hence, the Relational condition serves as a necessary 
condition of  my account of  exploitation. 
In what follows, I present four alternatives of  advantage-taking behaviour and, 
therefore, four objections to the Relational condition. These are Roemer’s purely distributive 
approach, the Historical approach (suffering from past injustice), the Non-Comparative approach 
(vulnerability as insufficiency of  basic needs) and the Complex approach (exploitation as 
domination). However, I shall argue that they all are flawed. Let us examine each approach 
in sequence.  
 
4.2. Objection 1: Exploitation Does not Need A Causal Component Between 
Parties 
 
The first alternative account, proposed by Roemer, contends that to identify exploitation, 
we do not need a causal component between parties. However, I reject Roemer’s purely 
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distributive account of  exploitation by illustrating that we need a causal component to 
distinguish exploitation from other kinds of  wrongdoing and distributive injustice.  
 
4.2.1. John Roemer’s Account of  Exploitation 
 
Roemer’s understanding of  capitalist exploitation is based on property relations. For him, 
capitalist exploitation is “a systematic expropriation of  surplus value” that stems from the 
concentration of  the private ownership of  the means of  production (Roemer, 1982b: 254). 
The concentration of  private ownership divides human society into two main classes: 
capitalists and labourers. Since labourers are propertyless, they have to work for capitalists 
to access productive assets－only through labour can they engage in socially productive 
activities and receive rewards for their efforts. In brief, it is the capitalist property relation
－the unequal distribution of  the means of  production－ that enables the appropriation 
of  surplus value of  labourers by capitalists. Thus, the ability to own productive assets by 
themselves always comes as a benefit to labourers. However, although Roemer’s account 
of  capitalist exploitation appears to take a relational form, his general account of  
exploitation is purely distributive.  
On his general account, Roemer argues that “A coalition S, in a larger society N, is 
exploited if  and only if ”:  
 
(1) “There is an alternative, which we may conceive of  as hypothetically feasible, 
in which S would be better off  than in its present situation.” 
(2) “Under this alternative, the complement to S, the coalition N-S=S’, would 
be worse off  than at present.” (1982a: 194) 
 
According to his formulation, if  a coalition is exploited, its members would be better off  
in a hypothetically feasible alternative than the present situation. For instance, whether the 
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serf  coalition is exploited under feudal society depends on whether the serfs would be 
better off  when they form an autarky society. For Roemer, what kinds of  resource or 
endowments that the coalition S can bring with them are determined by the social rule of  
their society. According to Roemer, the social rule of  feudal society is that “the coalition 
can take with it its own endowments” (Roemer, 1982a: 199). Thus, if  the serf  coalition is 
better off  when forms an autarky society with their own endowments, and if  the non-serf  
coalition would become worse off  when forms an autarky society without serfs, then serfs 
are feudally exploited in Roemer’s view. His general account can be applied to a capitalist 
or socialist society as well to test whether a social group is exploited (Roemer, 1982a: 202-
216).  
For Marxists, Roemer’s account has intuitive appeal, because it provides a structural 
account of  how labourers in capitalist society are exploited: part of  labourers’ surplus value 
is taken by capitalists; and if  those surplus values were consumed by labourers themselves, 
(1) labourers would plausibly be better off  than are in a capitalist society, and (2) the 
capitalists worse-off. As such, Roemer’s account is not relational in that whether B is 
exploited does not depend on A’s behaviour (Wolff, 1999: 106). On this account, to check 
whether a coalition is being exploited, we do not need to know which social group enjoys 
advantages in the asymmetrical relationship or whether the advantageous group presses its 
advantage upon the disadvantageous group to extract wrongful gains. Nor need we check 
whether the terms of  a transaction are fair or unfair to perceive exploitation. Rather, to 
identify exploitation, we only need to know whether a group of  people would be better 
off  in a hypothetical alternative than in the status quo. In brief, for Roemer, the question
－who takes advantage of  whom－is irrelevant to identify exploitation. Hence, Roemer’s 
general account of  exploitation is purely distributive.  
Nonetheless, Roemer does remark on the temptation to add a causal component, but 
he does not follow that temptation. There is a third condition in his general account of  
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exploitation: (3) “S’ is in a relationship of  dominance to S” (1982a: 185). (3) is clearly 
irreducible to (1) and (2). However, Roemer claims, “the game-theoretic conditions (1) and 
(2) are sufficient to characterize exploitation” (1982a: 237). And “since dominance is 
undefined, and is as elusive a concept as exploitation, the addition of  (3) is ad hoc” 
(Roemer, 1982b: fn.15). In later work, Roemer adds that “domination at the point of  
production, so often a concern of  Marxism, is quite distantly related to the concern with 
exploitation” (1988: 107). Roemer then appears to suggest that dominance is not a 
necessary condition of  capitalist exploitation. If  dominance is unnecessary for capitalist 
exploitation, it would not be necessary for exploitation in general. Hence, all these suggest 
that, for Roemer, to identify exploitation, no causal story between the exploiter and the 
exploitee is necessary. 
 
4.2.2. A Causal Component is Necessary for Exploitation 
 
Roemer’s account has two prima facie defects. The first is that it fails to properly identify 
the exploitative interaction between the exploiter and the exploited. As Elster (1982: 370) 
indicates, even if  A is an exploiter and B is exploited, it does not follow from this the 
relation that A exploits B. We need further information to establish the exploitative 
relationship, such that A takes advantage of  B. Roemer’s account identifies who is an 
exploiter and who is exploited, but, oddly, we do not know, for example, whether capitalists 
exploit labourers, which is of  crucial to our understanding of  capitalist exploitation. The 
second is that it is unable to explain exploitation between individuals because we do not 
know whether A exploits B. If  so, we do not know how to eliminate exploitation and who 
is particularly liable for exploitation.  
The above two defects, however, need not erode the foundation of  Roemer’s account 
since he could acknowledge that his account is designed for exploitation between classes, 
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but not between individuals. Nevertheless, there are two further reasons to support the 
necessity of  including a causal component for exploitation. Consider the conceptual reason 
first. The minimum requirement that any account of  exploitation should satisfy is that it 
should be able to distinguish exploitation from other kinds of  wrongdoing, e.g., theft and 
robbery, and, more importantly, an unjust distribution of  resources. Exploitation is 
significantly differentiated from distributive injustice. While exploitation involves A, 
individually or collectively, extracting benefits from B, individually or collectively, in virtue 
of  A’s advantage against B, distributive injustice does not need to make reference to a 
specific relationship between parties. For instance, some argue that there is distributive 
injustice if  C has more opportunity than D, which can be caused by the way the non-
agential world is. As Wollner (2019: 146) indicates, an account of  exploitation is 
unconvincing if  it fails to distinguish between exploitative and non-exploitative 
transactions. Besides, exploitation is not theft or robbery in that while exploitation, in 
general, is neither violent nor involuntary, a robber uses violence to grab valuable things, 
and theft is against the victim’s violation. Also, people may be better off  than before after 
an exploitative offer, but they are worse off  than before after theft or robbery.  
Roemer’s general account, however, seems unable to provide such an important 
conceptual distinction. This is because a coalition of  victims would be better off  in 
withdrawing from a situation of  theft, say; and perpetrators would be (materially) worse 
off  if  victims withdrew. Moreover, his account conflates exploitation with distributive 
injustice, which actually are two distinct concepts. A coalition S could be better off  in a 
hypothetical situation, either because they suffer distributive injustice, or because they are 
exploited. For example, suppose a coalition F suffers an unequal opportunity of  education 
in society N. F will be better off  in an ideal society N’ where everyone has an equal 
educational opportunity. When F withdraws from N, the rest of  people will be worse off  
because they lose the labours and talents of  F. This is a case of  distributive injustice that 
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meets Roemer’s conditions, but actually does not involve exploitation. However, since in 
his account, no such a reference point to A’s behaviour is required to identify exploitation, 
we do not know whether the coalition S suffers exploitation or other kinds of  wrongdoing. 
As Elster indicates, causal components are a constituent of  exploitation (1982: 366). The 
conceptual reason suggests that A’s advantage-taking behaviour is a necessary reference 
point for identifying exploitation. Without an appropriate causal component that 
discriminates between similar notions, it is difficult, if  not impossible, to distinguish 
exploitation from other wrongs that harm victims and benefit perpetrators. Hence, a causal 
component is necessary for identifying exploitation. This is the conceptual reason.  
Now consider the empirical reason. An account of  exploitation needs a causal 
component just because we can hardly imagine how the exploiter can extract wrongful 
benefits from the exploitee without the exploiter’s enjoying advantages in their 
asymmetrical relationship. In other words, people would not normally accept an explicitly 
unfair deal unless they are disadvantageous in a transaction. Consider a case in which A 
and B have no actual interaction in any respect. They do not know each other, not to 
mention communicating or interacting with each other. One day, B voluntarily and 
randomly transfers one million pounds to a bank account for fun and, luckily, it is A’s 
account. Some might think that the case is exploitative because their transaction yields 
unequal flows between them. However, since A’s transaction to B is fully voluntary and no 
actual, asymmetrical interaction occurs between them, even if  the transaction is unequal 
and, pro tanto, unfair, it is not exploitation in any sense. The unequal exchange might be a 
necessary condition of  exploitation, but it is not sufficient for exploitation. Rather, most 
would regard the transaction as a gift. Unequal exchanges are common in human society, 
e.g., gifts between friends or pocket money that parents give to their children. The unequal 
exchange would not be a problem and might even be encouraged. To identify exploitation, 
one cannot assess the outcome of  a transaction alone; we need to know their relative 
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positions in an asymmetrical relationship.  
Nonetheless, it might be argued that exploitation can be distinguished from gifting 
by reference to other non-causal factors. Indeed, even if  some exchanges are unequal, the 
reason that they are widely appraised by society is that they are reciprocal in nature, but 
not because they lack appropriate causes. Furthermore, as some argue, unequal 
transactions between capitalists and labourers are exploitative just because they are non-
reciprocal (See Vrousalis, 2018: 4-5; Warren, 1994; Arneson, 2013: 396-398; Bertram, 2009: 
151-153; Risse & Wollner, 2019: 81-82). The reciprocal view, however, is misleading. Non-
reciprocal behaviours are not necessarily exploitative. Some forms of  gifts, theft, and 
robbery are non-reciprocal, but, as I have indicated, they are not exploitation. A violation 
of  reciprocity cannot, in itself, distinguish exploitation from other similar wrongdoings. 
We need a causal component for identifying exploitation.  
In sum, exploitation must involve an asymmetrical relationship between the exploiter 
and the exploited, not only because A can exploit B only if  a causal interaction occurs 
between them, but because we can only distinguish exploitation from other kinds of  
wrongful gain by differentiating A’s behaviours. So much for the need for a causal 
component. A proper distinction, as I have argued, cannot be grounded on a distributive 
outcome, per se, a causal component is required. Hence, for both conceptual and empirical 
reasons, exploitation must involve a causal component.  
 
4.3. Objection 2: Exploitation Must Stem from Background Injustice 
 
In the following three sections, I examine three accounts of  what a causal component 
should look like and argue that all of  them are too restrictive to serve as a necessary 
condition of  exploitation. The second objection to the Relational condition, then, argues 
that exploitation must stem from a past injustice. More precisely, the asymmetrical 
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relationship that makes the exploited disadvantageous, is caused by a prior injustice. 
Therefore, an account of  exploitation can take a historical or an ahistorical form. The 
historical form holds that a past injustice is necessary for exploitation, while the ahistorical 
form insists that we can identify exploitation regardless of  its unjust history. This section 
then examines and objects particularly to Steiner’s historical account of  exploitation. 
Steiner offers a historical account: a prior injustice is necessary for exploitation and prior 
injustice of  the right kind is sufficient. Contra Steiner, I argue that exploitation may occur 
even if  neither party suffers background injustice. I claim that; first, exploitation is 
essentially ahistorical even though, very often, it may stem from background injustice; 
second, if  exploitation need not have an unjust cause, we cannot distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible advantage-taking behaviours wholly by reference to the 
distinction between fair and unfair advantages.53  
 
4.3.1. Hillel Steiner’s Account of  Exploitation: Suffering from Past Injustice 
 
According to Steiner, exploitation only occurs if  the seller of  X could have obtained more 
profits had a past violation of  moral rights that reduces the price of  X been absent (2017: 
436-437). Steiner’s account is similar to Roemer’s in that whether one is exploited has to 
be compared with a counter-factual situation, in which the seller could have obtained more 
profits. Note that both the seller of  X and a third party who fails to outbid the winner of  
X for some relevant reasons could be exploited (Steiner, 2010: 27, 1987: 146, 1984). The 
underselling of  X is exploitative only if  it results from a past injustice that either prevented 
a third party from outbidding the buyer of  X or made the seller of  X unable to set a higher 
reservation price (Steiner, 2017: 440, 2018: 4). Although many factors could have prevented 
 
53 This would form the main argument in Chapter 6. I shall fully explore its implication later on.  
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the seller from receiving more profits, only some are relevant. For instance, neither a 
person’s changing preferences nor the objective cost of  X can serve as a relevant reason 
for a charge of  exploitation. This is either because since Steiner adopts a liberal account 
of  exploitation, liberals should remain neutral among rival conceptions of  good and take 
one’s preferences as given, or because, for liberals, the price of  X “is worth no more than 
the maximum bid that would be made for it in an auction” (Steiner, 2010: 23, 2013: 336). 
In either case, the change in X’s price would not count as exploitation.  
However, how does a past injustice lead, causally, to exploitation? To illustrate Steiner’s 
answer, consider a case of  an auction, in which Blue is selling X, and Allen and White bid 
for X.54 Suppose that Allen wins the bid at £100, and White loses. The final price of  X is 
£100. Steiner claims that exploitation could occur in two ways. One is that, although White 
is willing to outbid Allen, White is unable to do so due to a violation of  her moral rights. 
For instance, before attending the auction, White was robbed of  £50. A robbery is a 
violation of  White’s moral rights, which makes her unable to outbid Red. Another 
possibility is that a rights violation lowers Blue’s reservation price for X: for example, Blue 
is robbed, and because of  that, he desperately needs a certain amount of  money. In either 
case, Allen exploits Blue, since Blue could have received a higher bid had White or himself  
not suffered from a rights violation (Steiner, 2017: 439).  
Moreover, for Steiner, a past injustice refers to a violation of  one’s moral, but not 
legal, rights (2018: 5). What counts as moral rights differ among theories of  justice, and 
Steiner remains open that a variety of  rights violations could explain why X was unjustly 
undersold to the winner of  the bid (2017: 439). The causal component in Steiner’s account, 
thus, is “the effect of  a rights violation” that reduces the victim’s endowment, which 
Steiner called “an endowment-reduction” (2018: 3-4). Since White obtains a set of  rights, 
 
54 The case is taken from Steiner, but it is slightly different.  
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White’s endowment is defined as “[t]he aggregate economic value of  these rights” (Steiner, 
2017: 439). When one’s endowment is reduced, it means “a reduction of  his set of  feasible 
options” and her ability to purchase declines, even if  her preferences remain stable (ibid.). 
More specifically, two situations should be further distinguished: state-imposed restriction 
and endowment-reduction. Forms of  state-imposed restriction concern the issue of  unfree 
markets; in contrast, one’s endowment-reduction concerns the issue of  free markets. If  
the reason why White refrains from outbidding Allen or attending an auction is due to 
state-imposed restrictions, then Allen exploits Blue. For instance, White might be 
prohibited from attending an auction because of  some reasons for exclusion: her age, 
gender, membership, or religious tendency. In some cases, these exclusive rules could be 
justified, which depends on what X is and the relevance of  reasons. However, for Steiner, 
even if  these rules could be plausibly justified, “the exploitative effect of  these rules is 
plain” in unfree markets (2017: 437). This is because Allen, the exploiter, could have 
obtained more economic values of  X in unfree markets. The effect of  state-imposed 
restriction leads to exploitation. In contrast, concerning endowment-reduction, it is always 
about one’s moral rights that have been infringed without involving a state-imposed 
restriction. Whether or not White’s prohibition of  outbidding Allen’s bid causes 
exploitation depends on whether White’s moral rights have been violated, and thus whether 
White’s endowment has been reduced. So, for instance, if  the reason that makes White 
unable to outbid Allen is because of  her own faults, Allen does not exploit Blue. Hence, a 
violation of  moral rights is necessary for exploitation.  
Now Steiner’s account of  exploitation is historical in two fundamental senses. One is 
that a past injustice－understood as a rights violation－is a necessary causal component 
of  exploitation. That is, Allen obtains more advantages in the asymmetrical relationship 
due to a right violation done to Blue or White. Another is that “exploitations can 
compound” (Steiner, 2017: 440). Since a rights violation results in exploitation, exploitation 
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will generate further endowment reductions in turn and thereby, more exploitation. As a 
result, “These chains of  exploitation, which can extend over generations and centuries, all 
have their origins in rights violations but, thereafter, those exploitations can become self-
reproducing” (ibid.). As such, each exploitation stems from a rights violation, but 
exploitation will generate further endowment reductions, which lead to further exploitation. 
The necessity of  past injustice and the reproduction of  exploitation make Steiner’s account 
historical in character.  
 
4.3.2. A Past Injustice is Not Necessary for Exploitation  
 
My objection to Steiner’s account is that a past injustice－broadly construed－is not a 
necessary condition of  exploitation.55 More precisely, the exploiter’s advantage in the 
asymmetrical relationship need not stem from background injustice done to the exploited. 
Consider Greedy Mountain Rescuer. 
 
Greedy Mountain Rescuer: Bob is a millionaire who enjoys natures and loves to climb 
alone. Allen is a millionaire who loves hunting. One day, Bob is stranded in the 
mountain; luckily, Allen roams the mountain and offers to rescue Bob for an 
exorbitant price, say, ten times than the average cost of  a rescue by National rescue 
team. Bob accepts the deal, and Allen exploits Bob. 
 
Greedy Mountain Rescuer is a paradigmatic case of  exploitation. Allen exploits Bob since 
Allen takes advantage of  Bob’s adverse situation to gain unfair benefits. However, in 
Mountain Rescuer, it is clear that Bob’s being stranded in the mountain is his own fault 
since Bob does not take the risks of  climbing alone seriously. The case, therefore, illustrates 
that it is possible to come with an exploitative case in which no prior injustice involves or 
 
55 For a critique of  Steiner’s account, see Steven Walt (1984) and Christopher Bertram (1988).  
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results in exploitation. Surely, Bob’s adverse circumstance could be caused by a past 
injustice, say, the government unfairly assigns him a house on the hill, and he is not allowed 
to live in elsewhere. Such an unjust allocation constitutes a form of  involuntary 
disadvantage, which results in Bob’s being exploited by Allen. However, as Vrousalis puts 
it, it is possible that Bob finds himself  stranded in the mountain “through just steps, from 
a just starting position” (2013: 149). The crucial point at stake is that exploitation can 
nevertheless occur even if  it starts from a just initial distribution and reaches its exploitative 
contract through just steps. That is to say, A’s advantage against B in their asymmetrical 
relationship may come from just background condition. Hence, a past injustice is not 
necessary for exploitation (Miller, 1990: 182), and exploitation need not be historical in 
that respect.  
If  a past injustice is not necessary for exploitation in the sense that A’s superior 
position than B need not stem from a prior injustice, exploitation is fundamentally 
ahistorical in character. Exploitation is ahistorical in the sense that an exploitative outcome 
results primarily from “the properties of  the present transaction” (Ferguson & Steiner, 2018: 
536), but not that of  background injustice. More significantly, A exploits B only if  A 
presses her advantage upon B in the asymmetrical relationship to extract wrongful benefits, 
regardless of  whether A’s advantage or B’s disadvantage is fair or unfair according to a 
principle of  justice. If  this is correct, it would be misleading to identify exploitation with 
reference to the distinction between fair and unfair advantage-taking behaviour. I will 
return to this point in Chapter 6. The rejection of  Steiner’s historical account, however, 
does not show that background injustice has no relevance at all. Rather, it would be 
productive to inquire about the proper role of  background conditions played in 
exploitation since it connects to the relationship between exploitation and egalitarian 
justice. Without clarifying the proper role of  background conditions, the discussion of  the 
injustice of  exploitation can hardly proceed.  




4.3.3. The Relationship Between Exploitation and Background Injustice 
 
Even if  background injustice is not necessary for exploitation, one might wonder what 
their proper relationship is? As Wertheimer correctly indicates, “agreements are not unjust 
or exploitative simply because they arise out of  unjust background conditions” (1996: 298). 
For him, an agreement cannot be exploitative because of  background injustices, per se; it 
must involve, at least, the unfairness of  a transaction. For instance, it is not exploitation 
when a lawyer takes advantage of  her customers’ unjust situations to gain fair benefits. 
Hence, background injustice is not necessary to identify particular transactions as 
exploitative, nor are they sufficient (Zwolinski, 2012: 171-172; Valdman, 2008).56 But what 
relationship then does background injustice have to exploitation?  
Background injustice, though it is not a conceptual constituent of  exploitation, might 
play an explanatory role of  the exploiter’s advantage, or the exploitee’s disadvantage, in 
practices. In real-world cases, such as sweatshop exploitation or exploitation between social 
groups, structural injustice, broadly construed, forms multiple unequal social relations 
where exploitation may occur. In other words, structural injustice provides a breeding 
ground for exploitation in our world. What then, is the implication of  the perplexing 
connection between exploitation and structural injustice? I would say that one cannot 
eliminate exploitation without correcting structural injustice as well if  the point is to 
change the world as Marx (1969a) points out in Theses on Feuerbach. Then, merely demanding 
a fair transaction would be conservative; rather, a radical solution is to rectify structural 
injustice together. It was like when Marx discussed exploitation in wage labour, he indicates: 
 
 
56 See Valdman (2008) for his argument that injustice is neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor an important 
component, for exploitation.  
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Instead of  the conservative motto: “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work!” they [workers] ought to 
inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword: “Abolition of  the wages system!” (Marx, 1969: 
29, his italic) 
 
Note that Marx does not claim that we ought not to demand a fair wage from the exploiter. 
Rather, his point is that we ought to rectify the wages system－understood as a form of  
structural injustice because of  the maldistribution of  productive assets－that enables 
capitalist exploitation. Yet, although exploitation may occur where there is an asymmetrical 
relationship, and it is undesirable and impossible, to eliminate all kinds of  asymmetrical 
relationship, to correct structural injustice will help to eliminate most exploitation. Hence, 
structural injustice, though it is not necessary for exploitation, is where the action is.  
In sum, exploitation need not stem from past injustice, and exploitation is 
conceptually ahistorical in character. Having denied Steiner’s historical account of  
exploitation, in the rest two sections, I examine two alternatives of  the ahistorical account 
of  exploitation: Non-Comparative and Complex view and argue that both are not necessary 
for exploitation. 
 
4.4. Objection 3: Exploitation Occurs Because of  The Exploitee’s Absolute 
Condition 
 
The Non-Comparative view argues that exploitation occurs when someone A takes 
advantage of  B’s absolute, rather than comparative, condition. Note that the Non-
Comparative view can take a historical form. That is, it might hold that if  the A’s absolute 
feature is self-caused, then someone who takes advantage of  A’s absolute deprivation does 
not exploit A. However, since I have rejected the Historical view, the historical version of  
the Non-Comparative view is implausible for the same reason. Thus, I focus on the 
ahistorical version of  it. My conclusion is that the Non-Comparative view is too narrow 
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to be necessary for exploitation.  
 
4.4.1. Non-Comparative: Vulnerability as Insufficiency of  The Exploitee’s Basic 
Needs 
 
With respect to exploitation, most tend to link exploitation with the notion of  vulnerability 
(Wolff, 1999; Wood, 1995; Goodin, 1987; Liberto, 2014) or of  insufficiency of  basic needs 
(Sample, 2003; Snyder, 2008). The trend is unsurprising since the conventional image of  
the exploited appears to be of  the vulnerable or those below a threshold of  basic needs. 
Here I focus on the non-relational approach, which holds that the exploitee is vulnerable 
because her basic needs are unsatisfied. Call this Basic need-based view of  vulnerability. For this 
view, it is the exploitee’s insufficiency of  basic needs－B’s absolute feature－that makes 
the exploiter advantageous in their asymmetrical relationship. Therefore, the view is non-
comparative in the sense that to identify exploitation, it is the exploitee’s absolute character on 
which we should focus exclusively without reference to the information of  the exploiter.57 
And the view is ahistorical in that A takes advantage of  B’s vulnerability to gain benefits, 
A exploits B, irrespective of  whether B’s vulnerability is caused by her own or by 
uncontrolled factors. Hence, the Non-Comparative view offers an ahistorical account to 
explain why the exploitee is in an inferior position in the asymmetrical relationship.  
Note that theorists may differ in their notion of  basic needs, but this would not affect 
the claim that it is B’s absolute level of  advantage that gives A a superior position in their 
relationship. As I have introduced in Chapter 3, Sample, among others, is one prominent 
advocate of  the view, and she follows Sen’s (2001) and Nussbaum’s (2000) capability 
 
57 Note that I do not mean to suggest that the vulnerability view must adopt a non-comparative form, but 
only take the basic need-based view of  vulnerability as a distinctive case to specify why, in order to identify 
exploitation, an account should not focus exclusively on the absolute character of  the exploitee. For a 
comparative, relational notion of  vulnerability, see Vrousalis (2013).  
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approach in defining her criterion of  exploitation. The capabilities approach emphasises 
that what matters is whether citizens can turn resources into capabilities. Even if  people 
receive an equal amount of  resources, if  the resources cannot guarantee that they can all 
achieve a basic level of  functioning, it is unjust.  
Nonetheless, Sample does not really offer a basic-needs-based account of  
exploitation, but only suggests that, we should take another’s basic needs seriously when 
distributing resources to avoid exploitation. Her view is not an account of  exploitation 
because Sample does not claim that whenever a distribution is equal in terms of  capabilities, 
exploitation ceases. Rather, what she demands is simply to treat another’s basic needs 
seriously when acting. Sample’s view, however, is too vague to advance our understanding 
of  exploitation any further (Snyder, 2008: 394). To take one’s basic needs into 
consideration does not provide any account of  exploitation. Snyder, instead, develops 
Sample’s view further and provides a more accurate account of  the basic-needs-based 
account of  exploitation. 
Snyder holds that A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  “the needs of  a vulnerable 
person” (Snyder, 2013: 348) – that is, A uses B’s worse situation caused by B’s lack of  basic 
needs to gain benefits. Snyder’s view is ahistorical in the sense that whenever B’s 
insufficiency of  basic needs is taken advantage of, it constitutes exploitation, regardless of  
the cause of  one’s insufficiency of  basic needs. Moreover, Snyder’s account is non-
comparative just because one’s basic needs are independent of  another’s, which is the 
absolute character of  the purported exploited. As such, for the Non-Comparative view, we 
can identify exploitation without reference to the character of  the exploiter. Moreover, we 
should note that Snyder holds the process-focused view that taking advantage of  B’s 
inferiority to gain benefits, constitutes disrespectful exploitation, that is, all of  the 
exploiter’s gains are morally unjustified. However, my focus is not on whether taking 
advantage of  B’s insufficiency of  basic needs may or may not constitute exploitation. 
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Rather, I aim to examine the ahistorical account that Snyder implicitly endorses to explain 
why the exploitee is disadvantageous in the asymmetrical relationship, is true or not, and 
whether B’s disadvantage in an exploitative relationship is always caused by B’s absolute 
feature－namely, the basic need-based view of  vulnerability.  
 
4.4.2. The Defect of  The Non-Comparative View 
 
The major defect of  the Non-Comparative view is that B’s disadvantage in an asymmetrical 
relationship need not be caused by B’s absolute condition. Exploitation may occur between 
billionaires, whose basic needs are satisfied. For example, when Warren Buffett desperately 
wants Picasso’s paintings, other billionaires who have the paintings can exploit Buffett. In 
this case, Buffett’s inferior bargaining position in the transactions with potential sellers is 
not caused by his insufficiency of  basic needs but caused by his preferences. The case 
illustrates that exploitation may occur between people whose basic needs are satisfied and 
who are not vulnerable in that sense. Thus, although in some cases, people are exploited 
because their basic needs are not satisfied, this is not always the case. B’s disadvantage in 
the asymmetrical relationship with A may be caused by some other reasons. My rejection 
of  the Non-Comparative view implies that even in a sufficientarian society where people’s 
basic needs are satisfied, exploitation may still occur. Hence, the Non-Comparative view is 
too restrictive to include other significant forms of  exploitation and, for that reason, fails 
to serve as a necessary condition of  exploitation in general.  
As the Relational condition suggests, exploitation is a relational notion in the 
fundamental sense that whether A will obtain advantages in a transaction depends on 
whom she interacts with. One’s (dis)advantage in interaction is always relative to her 
interactor(s), but not in an absolute term. Therefore, we need to specify “who does what 
to whom” (Geuss, 2008: 23-26) to assess who obtains advantages and therefore, who 
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exploits. To focus exclusively on either the exploiter’s absolute advantage or the exploitee’s 
absolute disadvantage, cannot explain the asymmetrical relationship in general. We must 
take the interaction between parties into account. The Non-Comparative view gives the 
incorrect impression that the exploited are those whose basic needs are unsatisfied. Hence, 
the Relational condition is more plausible than the Non-Comparative view in that it can 
identify more exploitation than the Non-Comparative view by employing the comparative, 
rather than absolute, notion of  agency.  
 
4.5. Objection 4: Exploitation as Domination (The Complex View) 
 
Unlike the Non-Comparative view, some theorists propose a comparative, ahistorical 
notion of  the causal component to identify who is an exploiter and who is exploited in an 
asymmetrical relationship. However, their accounts face the same defect as the Non-
Comparative view, that is, they are too restrictive to serve as a necessary condition of  
exploitation in general. In this section, I introduce and criticise Vrousalis’s account in 
particular,58 who proposes exploitation as domination.  
 
4.5.1. Exploitation as Domination 
 
Vrousalis’s account characterises the Complex view, which argues that the asymmetrical 
relationship that makes exploitation possible involves domination between parties. 
Although Roemer has initiated the potential connection between exploitation and 
domination, he rejects the necessary connection between exploitation and domination. 
Nonetheless, Vrousalis develops the idea of  exploitation as domination to a great extent. 
 
58 Risse and Wollner’s exploitation as unfairness through power is another example of  the Complex view. 
The exploiter is able to extract unfair benefits from the exploitee by exercising power (Risse & Wollner, 2019: 
88-93). However, given the limited space, I am not able to discuss their account.  
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His overall sketch could be divided into two parts: first, he proposes a way to formulate 
exploitation and second, explains why his formulation of  exploitation is a form of  
domination. I shall introduce the two parts in sequence and explain why his account 
characterises a form of  the Complex view. His general account of  exploitation is as follows: 
 
A exploits B “if  and only if  A and B are embedded in a systematic relationship in 
which (a) A instrumentalizes (b) B’s vulnerability (c) to extract a net benefit from B” 
(Vrousalis, 2013: 132). 
 
The causal components in his account are (a) and (b), so I shall leave (c) aside.59 Regarding 
(a), for Vrousalis, to instrumentalize S means “S is being used as a means” (2013: 132). 
Rather than adopting the common formulation－taking advantage of－Vrousalis uses the 
term ‘instrumentalize’ as an alternative to interpret exploitation. Now consider (b). 
Vrousalis distinguishes between absolute and relational vulnerability and argues that it is 
the latter that is associated with other agents. Accordingly, “B is relationally vulnerable to 
A only when A has some sort of  power over B” (Vrousalis, 2013: 133). Moreover, Vrousalis 
explicitly limits his notion of  vulnerability to economic spheres, in which “B is 
economically vulnerable to A if  and only if  B is vulnerable in virtue of  B’s position relative 
to A in the relation of  production” (2013: 136). The reason that Vrousalis focuses exclusively 
on economic vulnerability is that “certain (noneconomic) forms of  vulnerability……are 
constitutive of  intrinsically good relationships” (2013: 135). In those cases, it is undesirable 
and impossible to remove them. Economic vulnerability, by contrast, is different and not 
an element of  reciprocal relationships. 
Therefore, one is economically vulnerable only when one is situated in a relatively 
disadvantageous position in a productive relationship. A production relationship concerns 
 
59 Vrousalis gives a very brief  explanation of  (c): “A benefits just when there is an increase in A’s well-being. 
A obtains a net benefit when A’s overall well-being increases” (2013: 135, his italics).  
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property relation in which people’s relative positions represent their systematic relations 
of  power. The instrumentalisation of  one’s economic vulnerability, thus, belongs to a form 
of  power relations. In brief, Vrousalis’s account of  economic exploitation consists of  two 
claims:  
 
A economically exploits B “if  and only if  A and B are embedded in a systematic 
relationship in which (d) A instrumentalizes B’s economic vulnerability (e) to 
appropriate (the fruits of) B’s labor” (2013: 138).60 
 
Nonetheless, Vrousalis can claim that exploitation is a form of  domination only when he 
provides a notion of  domination. Now let us turn to Vrousalis’s account of  domination. 
According to Vrousalis,  
 
A dominates B “if  A and B are embedded in a systematic relationship in which (f) A 
takes advantage of  his power over B, or the power of  a coalition of  agents A belongs 
to, in a way that is (g) disrespectful to B” (2013: 139).61  
 
Now, for Vrousalis, exploitation implies domination just because “(d) and (e) jointly imply 
(f) and (g)” (2013: 140). More specifically, in my view, what actually makes his inference 
plausible is primarily because (d) is a subset of  (f)－that is, A’s instrumentalising B’s 
economic vulnerability is a form of  A’s taking advantage of  his power over B. So, I shall 
leave (e) and (g) aside. Hence, exploitation is a form of  domination because to 
instrumentalise B’s economic vulnerability is to take advantage of  one’s power over B. If  
the inference is plausible, then exploitation implies domination.  
Vrousalis’s account, thus, represents a way to characterise the Complex view. His account 
is ahistorical in that whenever A instrumentalises B’s economic vulnerability to gain 
 
60 Once again, since (e) does not concern the causal component of  exploitation, I leave it aside.  
61 Again, since the element (g) concerns the moral wrongness of  exploitation, which is not my focus here, I 
shall leave it aside.  
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benefits, A exploits B, disregarding how B’s economic vulnerability comes about. His 
account takes a relational form in that whether one obtains economic vulnerability in 
structures depends on one’s relative position to others in systematic relations of  
production. Therefore, for Vrousalis, the asymmetrical relationship where A presses her 
advantage upon B is a form of  social domination. Besides, exploitation as domination 
represents the complex view in that one connects the concept of  exploitation with other 
similar concepts, such as domination and coercion, to define the nature, or the wrongness, 
of  exploitation. Having introduced the Complex view, I then criticise it. 
 
4.5.2. A Critique of  The Complex View 
 
Vrousalis’s account has two major defects. It is either too narrow to include some non-
domination cases of  exploitation, or too broad to distinguish exploitation from other 
permissible conducts. Consider the too-narrow defect first. Domination is not a necessary 
condition of  exploitation in general. For Vrousalis, to regard exploitation as domination, 
it is necessary that A and B must be embedded in a systematic relationship (2013: 132, 
2018: 2). For him, a systematic (or social) relationship is defined as “any relationship 
between two agents representable as a relational predicated in a true and complete social 
science” (Vrousalis, 2018: 2). However, very often, exploitation occurs even if  both A and 
B are not embedded in any systematic relationship. For instance, in my case of  Greedy 
Mountain Rescuer, Allen exploits Bob, but they are not embedded in any relationship that 
would be regarded as systematic by social sciences. To rescue a person in a mountain is an 
occasional event without being embedded in a systematic relationship. Hence, my first 
objection, as regards the too-narrow issue, to Vrousalis’s account is that domination is not 
a necessary condition of  exploitation in general. 
Now consider the too-broad defect. Vrousalis’s general account of  exploitation is too 
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broad to distinguish exploitation from other permissible conducts. The objection is offered 
by Arneson, who invites us to consider a case: 
 
Cancer Treatment: I live in an isolated rural region, in a region in which health care 
insurance is unavailable. There is only one qualified surgeon in the territory. After a routine 
check-up she informs me that I have a cancer that will swiftly kill me unless surgery is done. 
Only she can do the surgery. I’d be willing to give everything I own in exchange for the needed 
surgery, but the actual price she charges is modest, better than fair. This is business as usual 
for the surgeon. She makes her living by striking bargains like this with people in conditions 
like me. She makes a good living. (Arneson, 2016: 10) 
 
Cancer Treatment fits with Vrousalis’s general account of  exploitation. Both the doctor and 
the patient in the case are embedded in a systematic relationship－the doctor-patient 
relationship. The patient is relationally vulnerable to the doctor just because she is the only 
qualified doctor in the region. Moreover, note that since the doctor makes use of  the 
patient’s vulnerability to extract net benefits from the patient,62 Vrousalis’s account of  
exploitation is a form of  disrespectful exploitation in that A’s profits, gained from a 
disrespectful transaction － in Vrousalis’s view, dominant relationship, are morally 
unjustified. Hence, the doctor exploits the patient, regardless of  whether or not the terms 
of  the treatment are fair or unfair.  
One will find the conclusion counter-intuitive since we tend to think that the doctor 
helps her patients and does not exploit them in a disrespectful way. The fundamental defect 
of  Vrousalis’s account is that his account is actually a domination-based account of  disrespectful 
exploitation, but he fails to note the possibility of  a domination-based account of  unfair exploitation. 
In other words, he conflates the permissible and impermissible instrumentalisation of  
another’s relational vulnerability, which leads to two forms of  exploitation. Since his 
domination-based account of  disrespectful exploitation is conflated with unfair 
 
62 By “net” benefits, Vrousalis refers to the increase of  one’s overall well-being (2013: 135).  
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exploitation, Vrousalis’s account is vulnerable to cases, such as Cancer Treatment, where 
the relationship involves social domination but does not violate the Merely Means Principle 
that we ought not to treat people merely as a means. In Cancer Treatment, once the terms 
of  their transaction are fair relative to a fairness baseline, no exploitation occurs. The 
instrumentalisation of  another’s relational vulnerability to extract net benefits is not always 
disrespectful and would not constitute exploitation if  the terms of  such profit-seeking 
behaviour are fair. Hence, Vrousalis’s account of  exploitation as domination is too broad 
to include cases where to seek profits in a dominant relationship does not treat people as 
merely a means.  
 
4.5.3. Exploitation as Domination: A Further Examination 
 
Now I indicate two elements that make Vrousalis’s account too broad in nature. One 
concerns the element (c): to extract a net benefit from B. This makes Vrousalis’s account a 
kind of  disrespectful exploitation, as I have called it, in that any of  A’s gains are morally 
unjustified. His account is vulnerable to the challenge of  Cancer Treatment because this case 
may be a case of  unfair exploitation in which the doctor gains unfairly, rather than 
disrespectful exploitation. When the doctor charges an exorbitant price from her patients 
relative to a fairness baseline, she exploits her patients. However, since Vrousalis insists 
that unfairness is not necessary for exploitation (2016: 529), he rejects the possibility of  a 
domination-based account of  unfair exploitation, in which we replace “net” in (c) with 
“unfairness”, that is, ‘to extract unfair benefits from B’. When so revised, we can assess 
whether the doctor exploits her patients by referring to a fairness baseline. Hence, 
exploitation as domination takes two different forms:63 
 
63 Risse and Wollner’s account is subject to the same critique. Their power-induced account of  exploitation 
could be further distinguished between disrespectful power-induced exploitation that violates the Merely 
Means Principle and their ordinary power-induced exploitation that does not. The disrespectful power-




 The First Form: A exploits B when A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain  
unfairly from the dominant relationship, which does not violate the Merely Means 
Principle, with B. 
 
 The Second Form: A exploits B when A takes advantage of  B’s inferiority to gain  
benefits from the dominant relationship, which violates the Merely Means Principle, 
with B. 
 
Another concerns (d) and (f). Recall that, for Vrousalis, exploitation can be viewed as 
domination primarily because (d)－A instrumentalizes B’s economic vulnerability－
implies (f)－A takes advantage of  his power over B (or the power of  a coalition of  agents 
to which A belongs). In other words, since (d) implies (f)－and (f) is a constituent, and 
perhaps the most crucial component, of  domination, (d) is a form of  domination. 
However, the problem at stake is that (f) does not offer a distinct notion that is irreducible 
to the notion of  exploitation because (f) takes the common formulation of  exploitation－
taking advantage of. Therefore, (f) is, in fact, a notion of  exploitation, rather than 
domination. Therefore, I doubt whether Vrousalis really fill the gap between exploitation 
and domination as two distinct concepts.  
At least, a conceptual discrepancy between exploitation and domination appears 
under Philip Pettit’s republican account of  domination. 64  According to Pettit, any 
relationships of  domination has the following three elements:  
 
(1) “they have the capacity to interfere” 
(2) “on an arbitrary basis” 
(3) “in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.” (Pettit, 1999: 52) 
 
 
induced exploitation is conflated in their account.  
64 Pettit’s account of  domination represents one of  the most important accounts. So, I take his account to 
examine the relationship between exploitation and domination.  
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In my view, exploitation, in general, is incompatible with (1) and (2). Consider (1). For 
Pettit, all interfering behaviours involve worsening, not improving another’s options (1999: 
52-53). However, as I have indicated, an exploitative offer may improve B’s status quo by 
adding an offer better than B’s current opportunity set. Hence, exploitation, in general, 
cannot pass the clause (1). Nor must exploitation in general pass the clause (2). An act is 
arbitrary, Pettit argues, when “it is chosen or not chosen at the agent’s pleasure” (1999: 55). 
Nonetheless, in voluntary exploitation, the would-be exploited may decide whether or not 
she should accept or decline the offer. If  that is correct, exploitation, in general, is not an 
arbitrary act in Pettit’s definition and therefore, does not pass the clause (2). If  exploitation 
in general, cannot pass both (1) and (2), exploitation is not domination according to Pettit’s 
dominant definition of  domination. There is a genuine inconsistency between exploitation 
and domination. 
 
4.5.4. Why the Relational Condition is more Plausible than the Complex View 
 
The Relational condition is more plausible than the Complex view just because it avoids 
the too-narrow and too-broad problem. Since the Relational condition adopts the 
comparative notion of  agency that can identify multiple forms of  social interaction, it can 
widely explain and evaluate the relative position of  each party in an interaction, without 
confining itself  to a specific aspect of  human relationship, e.g., domination. The Relational 
condition, then, defines the nature of  exploitation without connecting to other similar 
concepts, such as domination, coercion, and manipulation. On the other hand, the 
Relational condition avoids the too-broad problem when equipped with two forms of  
wrongful gain － unfairness and disrespectfulness. Taken together, my account of  
exploitation will generate two kinds of  exploitation according to the distinction between 
permissible and impermissible profit-seeking behaviours. Also, my account will regard 
Exploitation as a relational notion 
124 
 
Greedy Mountain Rescuer as exploitation since Allen takes advantage of  Bob’s weaker agency 
to extract unfair benefits. In contrast, it is doubtful whether or not Vrousalis’s account can 
do so. Consider a variant of  Greedy Mountain Rescuer, in which Allen will rescue Bob 
only when Bob gives one pound in return. Since Allen takes advantage of  Bob’s adverse 
situation to gain a net benefit－one pound, Vrousalis will consider it exploitative. This 
judgment is implausible. All these suggest that the Relational condition is more plausible 
than the Complex view.  
 
4.6. Conclusion and A Summary of  my Account of  Exploitation 
 
I have argued that a causal component is necessary to identify exploitation properly. 
Moreover, the causal component of  exploitation should be ahistorical and relational in 
character. This is because exploitation does not need to stem from past injustice and the 
exploitee’s insufficiency of  basic needs cannot always explain why the exploitee is more 
disadvantaged than the exploiter. Moreover, I have criticised two main accounts of  what 
the ahistorical component should look like and pointed out that neither the Non-
Comparative nor the Complex view is successful. The two views are too restrictive to 
include some significant forms of  exploitation. Instead, the Relational condition, I argue, 
is more plausible than the alternatives just because the comparative notion of  agency can 
identify who has more agency than whom and, therefore, who exploits whom. The 
Relational condition is capable of  identifying multiple forms of  exploitation in a variety of  
social relationships, where the exploiter obtains more advantages than the exploitee. The 
Relational condition, then, serves as a necessary condition of  exploitation.  
It may be helpful to provide a full statement here of  the account of  exploitation that 
I have defended in this and the two preceding chapters. My account of  exploitation can be 
summarised as follows:  




A exploits B if  and only if  (a) A gains wrongfully by (b) taking advantage of  B’s weaker agency 
in which (c) B voluntarily engages in a transaction in which with A (or someone, C, who is accountable 
to A). 
 
Let us elaborate on each element in turn. Concerning (c), since our focus is mutually 
beneficial and consensual exploitation, it is important that B has to voluntarily engage in 
an exploitative transaction with B. However, if  our focus is exploitation in general, (c) is 
not a necessary condition. Moreover, I do not discuss the issue of  B’s consent to an 
exploitative transaction because I believe, Wertheimer, among others, has explored the 
issue at great lengths. He discussed multiple ways of  how a defect in B’s consent might 
affect the validity of  their transaction and Wertheimer dismissed these worries (1996: 247-
277; cf. Feinberg, 1989: ch.22-26). I have no better arguments than his. More importantly, 
the main reason that we should not dispute the quality of  B’s consent is that if  we can 
point out the wrongness of  ‘mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation’, then it is 
much easier to condemn the wrongness of  non-consensual exploitation.  
Now consider (a). In my view, exploitation consists of  two forms of  wrongful gains: 
namely, unfair gain, or disrespectful gain, or both.  
 
Unfair Gains: A gains unfairly relative to a norm of  fair distribution  
 
Disrespectful Gains: A gains from a disrespectful transaction with B, one that 
violates the Merely Means Principle.  
 
To elaborate: unfair gains refer to a situation where a distribution of  benefits and burdens 
between parties in a transaction fails to be consistent with a fairness baseline, and the 
resulting outcome is unfair to the exploitee. In contrast, disrespectful gains refer to a 
situation where the exploiter gains from a disrespectful transaction with the exploitee, in 
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which the exploitee is treated merely as a means. Therefore, the further implication is that 
the exploiter is not morally entitled to any profits, gained from such disrespectful 
transactions, because it is morally impermissible to gain benefits by such disrespectful ways. 
Hence, two forms of  wrongful gains－unfairness and disrespectfulness－represent the 
distributive element of  exploitation.  
Note that, although unfair gains and disrespectful gains are two distinct forms of  
wrongful gains, the exploiter may gain unfairly and also disrespectfully. Take child labour as an 
example. In child labour, suppose that the employers treat child labourers as merely a 
means because they did not take the child labourers’ relevant interests seriously and, 
therefore, the employer gains disrespectfully from the disrespectful employment 
relationship. However, the employer may gain unfairly because, for instance, the child 
labourers’ wages are unfair relative to a fairness baseline. Consequently, in the case, the 
employer gains unfairly and disrespectfully by taking advantage of  the children’s desperate 
situation. The exploiter may gain unfairly and disrespectfully.  
Now consider (b). The Relational condition claims that A takes advantage of  B’s 
weaker agency, compared to A’s agency. The Relational condition has three further 
conditions:  
 
(i) The Comparative Condition: there is an asymmetrical relationship in which 
A’s agency is superior to B’s.  
(ii) The Sufficiency Condition: A’s agency has to be strong enough that A is able 
to address an exploitative offer to B.  
(iii) The Unequal Treatment: given (i) and (ii), A has to press their superior 
agency to extract wrongful benefits from their transaction.  
 
The comparative condition states that A’s agency has to be comparatively better than B’s 
in their asymmetrical relationship. The sufficiency condition claims that A’s agency has to 
be strong enough that A is able to address an exploitative offer to B, despite that A’s agency 
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is comparatively stronger than B. Furthermore, the unequal treatment suggests that A has 
to press her comparatively superior, and sufficient, agency upon B to extract wrongful 
benefits. Otherwise, even if  A’s agency is more superior than B, and A’s agency is stronger 
enough to address an exploitative offer to B, no exploitation occurs. The Relational 
condition represents the relational element of  exploitation.  
To conclude, in my view, A exploits B if  and only if  A presses her superior agency 
against B to extract wrongful gains from their transaction. The core idea is that exploitation 
is a distributive and relational notion in the sense that exploitation consists of  (a)－the 
distributive element, and (b)－the relational element. Therefore, (a), (b), and (c), jointly, 
constitute mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation.  
Overall, my general account of  exploitation includes two forms of  wrongful 
exploitation: unfair exploitation and disrespectful exploitation.65 
 
Unfair Exploitation: A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, 
compared to A’s, to extract unfair benefits from the transaction with B, relative to a 
fairness baseline. 
 
Disrespectful Exploitation: A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, 
compared to A’s, to gain benefits from the disrespectful transaction that violates the 
Merely Means Principle, with B. 
 
65 If  we focus on volitional exploitation, (c) should be added.  
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5. Distributive and Social Egalitarianism: A Survey 
 
In Part 2 (Chapter 5 and 6), I aim to explore the question: In what way, if  any, is exploitation 
unjust from an egalitarian point of  view? The core argument in Part 2 is that the luck 
egalitarian understanding of  the injustice of  exploitation is incomplete because 
exploitation may arise even under background conditions that are just from a luck 
egalitarian point of  view. Therefore, luck egalitarianism is incomplete and needs a principle 
of  non-exploitation to fulfil the deficiency. I will propose such a principle at the end of  
Chapter 6. Briefly, the principle is that exploitation is unjust on its own, regardless of  its 
unjust history. Before proceeding to the core argument in Chapter 6, I shall first survey the 
controversy between distributive and social egalitarianism. The survey is necessary because 
exploitation is inherently an inegalitarian notion. As such, a review of  the main controversy 
between distributive and social egalitarianism will help to facilitate our understanding of  
the nature of  luck egalitarianism and, therefore, how luck egalitarians can plausibly respond 
to exploitation. Moreover, I claim that luck and social egalitarians should focus more 
attention on the injustice of  exploitation.  
Contemporary egalitarians disagree over the best way to understand the ideal of  
equality. Over the past three decades, luck egalitarianism, among others, has been the most 
prominent theory of  egalitarian justice. Nonetheless, it has also attracted many critiques, 
particularly those from social and relational egalitarians. 66  Social egalitarians criticise 
distributive egalitarianism in general, and luck egalitarianism in particular, for 
misinterpreting the idea of  equality as a distributive notion.67 Rather, the idea of  equality, 
 
66 Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Samuel Scheffler (2003, 2005) are two prominent social egalitarians. 
67 In the rest of  the chapter, ‘social egalitarians’ refer to both social and relational egalitarians. Although 
social and relational equality are often treated as similar (if  not an identical) notions and people often use 
them interchangeably, I think that social and relational equality are two distinct notions. In my view, 
relational equality is a relatively narrow notion that focuses on how individuals treat and regard one another 
equally; social equality, by contrast, is a broader notion that not only includes the ideal of  relational equality 
but concerns structural inequalities. See Fourie, Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer (2015: fn.1), and 
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social egalitarians contend, should best be construed as a social and relational notion. In 
Chapter 5, I first introduce basic elements of  luck and social egalitarianism and then 
examine three major objections that social egalitarians pose to luck egalitarians, namely, the 
intrusive objection, the disrespectful objection, and the harshness objection. I will present 
the responses to these objections that can be made (and in some cases, have been made) 
by luck egalitarians, demonstrating that these criticisms are not decisive. The social 
egalitarian critique does not show that luck egalitarianism is not a plausible doctrine of  
egalitarian justice. Instead, while these critiques are not compelling, my argument in 
Chapter 6 will show the deficiency of  luck egalitarianism. Chapter 5, thus, is a preliminary 
stage for the core argument in Chapter 6.  
The structure of  this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1. introduces three 
elements of  luck egalitarianism. Section 5.2. discusses the core ideas of  social 
egalitarianism and how prominent social egalitarians understand the ideal of  living as social 
equals. From section 5.3. to 5.5., I examine three objections in sequence and illustrate how 
luck egalitarians can plausibly reply to these objections. Section 5.6. is the conclusion. 
 
5.1. The Three Basic Elements of  Luck Egalitarianism 
 
The standard formulation of  luck egalitarianism states that “It is bad－unfair and unjust
－for some be worse off  than others [through no fault of  choice of  their own] (Temkin, 
1993: 13). According to this formulation, disadvantages that are caused by bad brute luck, 
as contrasted with genuine choice are, pro tanto unjust and self-caused disadvantages are 
not unjust. Luck egalitarianism, thus, is a theory of  egalitarian justice that, with reference 
to the luck/choice distinction, addresses the question: when is inequality justice-upsetting 
 
Schuppert (2015b: 444, fn.9). 
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and when it is not? As such, it consists of  three fundamental elements: its commitment to 
equality, “anti-luck” and “pro-choicist” (Stemplowska, 2012: 398, 2016: 150-151). 
Let us consider ‘anti-luck’ first. Luck egalitarians share an appealing intuition that 
benefits or burdens that result only from luck are “arbitrary from a moral point of  view” 
(Rawls, 1971: 72). Luck egalitarians are worried about cases where brute luck is unequally 
shared. For instance, for luck egalitarians, it is not just or deserved that someone suffers a 
natural disaster while others do not. However, most luck egalitarians would only 
compensate brute luck, not for the bad outcome of  all kinds of  luck. Brute luck, by 
definition, “is a matter of  how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles” 
(Dworkin, 2002: 73). Since the outcome of  bad brute luck cannot be controlled and 
anticipated by people, it is therefore unfair that people are liable for any outcome of  brute 
luck (Dworkin, 2011: 358-360). On the contrary, luck egalitarians accept the outcome, 
either bad or good, of  option luck, which is defined as “a matter of  how deliberate and 
calculated gambles turn out－whether someone gains or loses through accepting an 
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined” (ibid.).68 Unlike 
brute luck, the outcomes of  option luck are risks that people have deliberately accepted 
and could have avoided; thus, people should be held responsible for any results of  the 
deliberated gamble in which they choose to engage. Luck egalitarians differ in their 
definitions of  what luck means and how to draw the distinction between brute and option 
luck (Cohen, 2011: 116-123; Hurley, 2003: 107-109; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2016: 55-76), but 
these differences are orthogonal to my purposes here. The key point to note is that a core 
goal for luck egalitarians is to mitigate or neutralise, the undue influence that bad brute luck 
brings about on distribution.69 
Luck egalitarians are “pro-choicist” in the sense those benefits and burdens of  ours 
 
68 Dworkin, however, refused to recognise himself  as a luck egalitarian. See Dworkin (2003). 
69 For the distinction between neutralisation approach and mitigation approach, see Andrew Mason (2006: 
ch.4 & 6) 
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that are not a matter of  brute luck but are caused by us, are not unjust. In committing to 
“choicism,” luck egalitarians believe that to some extent human beings are “responsible 
agents, capable of  acting freely in a sense that renders our conduct subject to moral 
appraisal as blameworthy or commendable” (Williams, 2008: 498). The view seems 
intuitively appealing to the extent that we think that agents should be treated as liable for 
what they do, and that part of  this involves permitting them both to benefit and to lose 
out from the choices that they freely pursue. It does appear unfair when a prudent person, 
who works so hard and make every choice deliberately, has to compensate for the 
imprudent choices of  another. As Arneson indicates,  
 
Distributive justice does not recommend any intervention by society to correct inequalities 
that arise through the voluntary choice or fault of  those who end up with less, so long as it 
is proper to hold the individuals responsible for the voluntary choice or faulty behaviour that 
gives rise to the inequalities. (1990: 176) 
 
Hence, another name of  luck egalitarianism is “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism,”70 
which illustrates that the idea of  equality demands that people are held responsible for 
their genuine choice. What’s important here is that to accommodate the idea of  individual 
responsibility into the core of  egalitarianism, and this justifies resulting inequalities 
between people that reflect their choices. This is what Cohen said: “the most powerful idea 
in the arsenal of  the antiegalitarian Right: the idea of  choice and responsibility” (2011: 32). 
When equipped with the idea of  individual responsibility, luck egalitarians are capable of  
justifying inequality between people. Consequently, though objecting to luck-generated 
inequalities, luck egalitarianism permits inequality that reflects from people’s responsible 
self-affecting choices.71  
 
70 For a discussion of  the relationship between responsibility and luck egalitarianism, see Carl Knight (2009: 
169-196) 
71 David Miller (2014) has argued that luck egalitarians tend to assume the choices that people made are self-
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The last component of  luck egalitarianism is its commitment to equality. To be a 
theory of  egalitarian justice, it must tell when some forms of  inequality would be permitted, 
when they are unjustified, and for what reason. What luck egalitarians affirm is “an equality 
of  (differently interpreted) opportunity or access, as such: it does not recommend it merely 
in the light of  claims about the consequences of  adherence to the recommended egalitarian 
principle” (Cohen, 2011: 120). Accordingly, luck egalitarians endorse a principle of  initial 
distribution that egalitarian justice requires that people have an equal amount of  certain 
“currency,” such as resources, welfare, capabilities, or some hybrid approaches (Clayton & 
Williams, 1999). They also provide a doctrine of  just steps in that, after the initial equal 
distribution people cannot ask for compensation in the name of  justice only when their 
disadvantages do not reflect their choices. Luck egalitarians recommend that an unequal 
outcome that stemmed from a just initial distribution, and was arrived by just steps, as 
understood above, was not unjust. The luck/choice distinction, then, is employed to tell us 
when disadvantages are justice-upsetting and when they are not.  
Consequently, a preliminary understanding of  luck egalitarianism can be summarised 
as the following three statements: 
 
(1) Inequalities that do not reflect people’s own responsible choice are unfair. 
(2) Inequalities that reflect people’s own responsible choice are not unfair. 
(3) Moreover, some hold that equalities that do not reflect people’s own responsible choice 
are unfair (Elford, 2018: 1207). 
 
One of  the disagreements among luck egalitarians is that whether or not justice not only 
permits but also requires inequality that arises from people’s different choices (Miller, 2014: 
 
affecting, but, in reality, most of  their choices are other-affecting. As a result, there would be an internal 
incoherence within the luck/choice distinction that one’s own choice is in itself  another’s brute luck. In 
response, see Gideon Elford (2017a). 
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136-137; Elford, 2017a: 619). If  the core idea of  luck egalitarianism is the choice/luck 
distinction, then there could be “unjust equality” when A and B are equally well off, but 
B’s advantages are due to brute luck while A’s are her own making (Cohen, 2011: 121). One 
might wonder whether luck egalitarians should correct such an unjust equality. Cohen 
seems to endorse explicitly (1), reject (2), and regard (3) as a less urgent injustice (2011: 
121, 131-143). Moreover, Cohen has argued that the proper name of  inequalities that 
reflect people’s responsible choice is legitimate, but not fair, because legitimacy refers to a 
final situation in which “no one has a right to complain against its character” (Cohen, 2011: 
128). Still the unequal outcome, Cohen insists, is unfair, and therefore unjust, in opposition 
to Dworkin’s argument that option luck preserves justice.  
On the other hand, Shlomi Segall explicitly rejects (3) because, for him, “luck 
egalitarian justice is properly concerned only with inequalities” (2009: 13).72 However, 
contra Segall, others hold that since the luck/choice distinction is so essential to luck 
egalitarianism, and since the core and uncontroversial idea of  luck egalitarianism is to 
eliminate the effect of  brute luck, then, it would be inconsistent for luck egalitarians not 
to object to equalities that result from brute luck. 73  Luck egalitarians, thus, differ in 
whether justice requires, or simply permits, (in)equalities that stem from people’s choices. 
The controversy is just one of  many disagreements among luck egalitarians.  
In committing to the luck/choice distinction, luck egalitarianism is a broad church, 
and within the family of  views, there are different variations on luck egalitarianism, such 
as how to draw a proper line between option and brute luck, or when people ought to be 
liable for their genuine choices, or what kind of  distributive pattern that luck egalitarians 
should employ. I will return to these issues when examining the objections that social 
egalitarians pose to luck egalitarianism. Now, let us introduce social egalitarianism.  
 
72 This view is also supported by Susan Hurley (2003) and Larry Temkin (1993).  
73 For an objection to Segall’s view, see Knight (2011) and Albertsen & Midtgaard (2014).  




5.2. Social Egalitarianism  
 
In this section, I introduce the core ideas of  social egalitarianism in general, contrasting it 
with distributive egalitarianism. I explain what social egalitarians mean by an emphasis on 
social equality, and their ideals of  a society of  equals. 
 
5.2.1. The Social and Relational Notion of  Equality 
 
Social egalitarians have accused distributive egalitarians of  misconstruing the point of  
equality as distributive: distributive egalitarians, it is alleged, unduly conceive of  the idea of  
equality as a way to guide our allocation of  benefits and burdens between parties. 74 
Roughly, distributive egalitarians regard two individuals as equal where there is some equal 
feature of  the goods that they enjoy – for example, an equal net amount of  certain goods, 
equal opportunities to obtain certain goods, and so on. The distributive understanding of  
equality, however, has been perceived by social egalitarians as a mistake. Unlike distributive 
egalitarians, the ideal of  equality, social-relational egalitarians contest, is best understood 
as social and relational (cp. Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003, 2005; Forst, 2014: 17-31; 
Young, 2011: 15-38). Social egalitarians have claimed that distributive egalitarians have 
overemphasised the issue of  what an equal distribution should involve, neglecting another 
more important aspect of  the ideal of  equality: namely, the issue of  how we regard and treat 
one another as social equals (Mason, 2012: ch.1, 2015; Miller, 1997: 232; Wolff, 1998: 107-110). 
Where distributive equality is about equality of  certain metrics, social equality is about 
 
74 Amartya Sen addressed the question of  “Equality of  What” in his Tanner Lecture, which enquires what 
metric egalitarians should adopt to establish an equal distribution for social equals. See Sen (1980). Besides, 
Derek Parfit addressed another important issue which asks to distinguish between strict egalitarianism and 
so-called “Prioritarianism,” see Parfit (1997).  
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equality in status. It is important to note that status need not be understood as just another 
good that we might distribute among people; rather, the value of  equal status depends on 
relationships between them. What social egalitarians really care about is whether “the social 
relations have a suitable (egalitarian) character” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018b: 6). To see this, 
imagine a slave-owning society which consists of  two classes: masters and slaves. Suppose 
that society distributes pertinent goods according to the principle of  equality to every social 
member because the dominant class is very generous. Though this would meet some 
requirement of  distributive equality in that each person in that society enjoys an equal 
amount of  certain goods, social egalitarians would condemn that society as deeply 
inegalitarian. Despite the equal distribution among citizens, members of  the society do not 
enjoy equal status in the sense that the dominant class is superior to the dominated class, 
either in that the dominated class is excluded from participating political procedure, or in 
that the dominant class does not treat and regard the dominated class as social equals. 
Consequently, the case illustrates that distributive equality does not exhaust the meaning 
of  a society of  equals. The equality of  status is another important aspect of  living as social 
equals.  
Central to the idea of  social equality I mentioned, is that people treat and regard each 
other equally. Thus, social egalitarians must explain what counts as treating and regarding 
one another as equals. Cohen has suggested that treating and regarding are two distinct 
kinds of  terms (2013: 197). One can regard another as an equal but fail to treat them as an 
equal. This is either because she does not know how to treat others as equals, or because 
she is unable to do so, or just because she misunderstands the way to treat others as equals. 
Vice versa, one can treat another as an equal without truly regarding another as an equal. 
For example, a hypocritical person, who wants to win the reputation from the public, might 
act politely to a homeless person, while, within his mind, thinking that the homeless person 
is inferior. In this case, although the hypocritical person treats the homeless person equally, 
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he does not really regard others as equals. This suggests that treating as equals and 
regarding as equals are two distinct notions. However, what exactly is it to treat and regard 
one another as equals? 
In general, treating others as equals has “a behaviour component” while regarding 
others as equals is “an attitudinal component” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018b: 71). With 
respect to the behaviour of  treating as equals, social egalitarians aim to eliminate 
inegalitarian social relations, such as domination, oppression, alienation, and social 
hierarchy (Anderson, 1999: 313; Scheffler, 2003: 22; Wolff, 2015b: 24; Fourie, 2012: 110-
117; Young, 2011: ch.2). One fails to treat others as social equals when one dominates, 
oppresses, or exploits one’s social fellows. Social egalitarians, then, object not only to 
asymmetrical relations where people are divided into superiors and inferiors but also, the 
behaviour that one uses the asymmetry to gain advantages. Treating one another as equals could 
be divided into the equality of  social status and acting equally. Concerning the equality of  social 
status, social egalitarians will object to unequal social relations where some obtain unfair 
advantages while others do not. For instance, in a democratic society where some have one 
vote, and others have two votes, the society, though democratic, is not a society of  equals 
since some have more political power than others. Although people do not act unequally 
toward each other, the society upsets egalitarians. Then, social egalitarians may object to 
unequal social relations even if  no one acts unequally to others.  
On the other hand, the focus of  treating one another as equals is more than the 
equality of  social status in the above sense. For social egalitarians, it is important that one 
ought not to act unequally toward each other by, for example, seeking advantages in 
asymmetrical social relations. When one dominates, exploits, or oppresses another, one 
fails to treat another equally. Our ordinary interactions, then, is the site of  treating one 
another as social equals (Mason, 2015: 129). Furthermore, what many social egalitarians 
have in mind is how both individuals and basic institutions express certain attitudes properly 
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to other members (Schemmel, 2011: 133-137). In a society of  equals, one ought to treat 
and regard her fellows as social equals. Let us take same-sex marriage, for example. In many 
countries, even though same-sex marriage has been legalised, it could happen that most 
citizens and the ruling party do not really support same-sex marriage. We will think that it 
is important for egalitarians that citizens and the ruling party express a non-forbidding 
attitude to the public. Otherwise, society fails to be egalitarian in the sense that same-sex 
couples are not recognised by the majority. Hence, one way to construe treating and regarding 
one another as equals is to focus on how governmental institutions or citizens express correct 
attitudes to social members. 
Now consider the attitudinal issue further – what it means to regard others as equals. 
One simple view is this: X regards Y as an equal if  X consciously believes that Y is her equal. 
However, as Lippert-Rasmussen (2018b: 85-86) points out, people’s cognitive and non-
cognitive attitudes, and their explicit and implicit beliefs, could be divided. This means that, 
for instance, although some might welcome and respect the minority cognitively and 
explicitly, they may nevertheless implicitly harbour disdain for the minority. Social 
egalitarians thus ought to consider whether we have reason to regulate people’s non-
cognitive attitudes and implicit beliefs. The social egalitarian slogan: to treat and regard one 
another as equals, therefore, signifies another dimension of  the ideal of  equality, which is 
distinguished from the distributive notion of  equality. 
Having introduced the social relational notion of  egalitarianism, one might think that 
what a society of  equals is remains unclear. While distributive egalitarians have specified 
couples of  ways to distribute goods in an egalitarian manner, it seems that social 
egalitarians do not have a clear picture of  what a society of  equals is. And if  we do not 
have a clear picture of  it, we do not know whether or not we have achieved it. In what 
follows, I examine three prominent social egalitarians－Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel 
Scheffler, and Jo Wolff－of  their ideal of  what a society of  equals is.  




5.2.2. Elizabeth Anderson’s Democratic Equality  
 
Concerning the idea of  social equals, Anderson has proposed what she terms “the 
democratic conception of  equality”. In her view, at the core of  democratic equality is that 
it is “a relational theory of  equality”. Anderson summarises the relevant equal relation as 
follows: two people are “equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by 
principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, 
reciprocation, and recognition for granted” (1999: 313). To elaborate, in Anderson’s view, 
a society of  equals is the one in which members take each other’s interests and perspectives 
into consideration when determining the rules that govern them. In this way, social 
members recognise others as independent and responsible agents; no one is superior to 
another, and members of  society respect each other.  
Anderson listed five more detailed principles of  democratic equality: 
 
(1) Democratic equality “identif[ies] certain goods to which all citizens must have effective 
access over the course of  their whole lives.” 
(2) Democratic egalitarians “should be able to justify such guarantees of  lifetime 
accessibility without resorting to paternalism.” 
(3) Democratic egalitarian principles “should offer remedies that match the type of  
injustice being corrected.” 
(4) Democratic egalitarian principles “should uphold the responsibility of  individuals for 
their own lives without passing demeaning and intrusive judgments on their capacities 
for exercising responsibility or on how well they have used their freedoms.” 
(5) Democratic egalitarian principles “should be possible objects of  collective freedoms” 
(Anderson, 1999: 314). 




Almost all these five points of  democratic equality derive from an opposition to luck 
egalitarianism. According to Anderson, (1) contrasts with luck egalitarianism because she 
believes it will not guarantee citizens a lifelong supply of  certain goods. It is important for 
the democratic conception of  equality that citizens have the capabilities necessary to 
participate in a democratic regime; yet, Anderson objects, luck egalitarianism permits 
people to be deprived of  some of  these capabilities where these deprivations result from 
a voluntary choice.75 Meanwhile, (2) rejects the interference of  people’s imprudent choices 
by appealing to paternalistic reason, which would be proposed by some luck egalitarians. 
Next, unlike distributive (including luck) egalitarians who start from ideal theories, (3) 
suggests that social egalitarians believe that to identify social injustice, rather than ideal 
principles of  justice, is the primary concern of  political philosophy. Consider (4). While 
social egalitarians preserve an ideal of  treating people as responsible, they want to avoid 
the demeaning and intrusive judgments that Anderson worries that luck egalitarian policies 
would express. Then, (5) indicates the reason why Anderson sees her theory as democratic: 
since principles are determined by all, but not few. For Anderson, while luck egalitarians 
justify their principles from a third-person perspective, social egalitarians adopt “a second-
person or interpersonal conception of  justification” (Anderson, 2015: 22-30). (5), thus, 
guarantees that citizens are acting collectively in determining rules that govern themselves.  
Based on her critiques of  luck egalitarianism, Anderson’s democratic notion of  
equality, then, provides an ideal of  social equality.76 However, one might wonder how far 
her notion of  democratic equality is different from some version of  luck egalitarianism. I 
will examine Anderson’s objections to luck egalitarianism later on. Let us turn to Samuel 
Scheffler’s ideal of  a society of  equals.  
 
75  It is unclear whether Anderson adopts a complete lives kind, a continuous segments kind, or 
corresponding segments kind, of  egalitarianism (McKerlie, 2013: ch.2 & 4, 1989).  
76 For another account of  democratic equality, see Niko Kolodny (2014: 303-310).  




5.2.3. Samuel Scheffler’s Egalitarian Deliberative Constraint 
 
Scheffler proposes the egalitarian deliberative constraint (EDC) as a way to understand what a 
society of  equals is. EDC is defined as follows: 
 
If  you and I have an egalitarian relationship, then I have a standing disposition to treat your 
strong interests as playing just as significant a role as mine in constraining our decisions and 
influencing what we will do. And you have a reciprocal disposition with regard to my interests. 
In addition, both of  us normally act on these dispositions. This means that each of  our 
equally important interests constrains our joint decisions to the same extent. (Scheffler, 2015: 
25) 
 
EDC is very similar to Anderson’s democratic conception of  equal relationships, but he 
explains some aspects in some more detail. He provides six additional points. First, it is 
important that “each person’s interests should play an equally significant role in 
determining [certain] decisions” (Scheffler, 2015: 26). Second, those who endorse EDC 
must consider the standpoints of  others. Third, for Scheffler, a joint decision is not always 
achievable, either because of  the conflicts of  interests or because there are some reasons 
that make a joint deliberation unavailable. Then, EDC acknowledges that “participatory 
requirement[s] can be modified” case by case, but “only in ways that are acceptable to the 
parties themselves” (Scheffler, 2015: 27). To recognise each participant and their relevant 
interests remains crucial of  EDC.  
Fourth, and more importantly, EDC does not guarantee that the ultimate decision 
ought to make all relevant parties equally well-off  in terms of  their interests; rather, EDC 
emphasises that “the comparably important interests of  each party should play a 
comparably significant role in influencing decisions made within the context of  their 
relationship” (Scheffler, 2015: 28). This means that, where the interests of  various parties 
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are similarly important, these should have a comparable priority in the deliberative agenda; 
and that may not be true where certain parties’ interests are more important than others.  
Scheffler’s fifth idea concerns how to understand the “importance” of  each party’s 
interests. Interests can be important, he argues, simply because one believes it is important. 
True, people’s judgments on what counts as an important interest could sometimes be 
mistaken, but it seems inevitable to rely on one’s own judgement in defining what counts 
as important. However, the advantage of  EDC is this: since EDC requires that parties 
“treat (what are in fact) the equally important interests of  each of  them as having equal 
significance for their decisions”, it serves as an independent standard of  importance that 
diverges from one’s own judgment (Scheffler, 2015: 30). 
Last, Scheffler stresses that it is more appropriate to treat the egalitarian deliberative 
constraint as guiding “a complex interpersonal practice” (2015: 30), rather than as a rule 
to regulate egalitarian relationships. This means EDC is a practice that people should bear 
in mind and implement in pursuit of  an equal relationship with others. When so claiming, 
EDC serves as a guide in ordinary interactions, rather than a principle regulating basic 
institution.  
In sum, Scheffler’s EDC identifies a deliberative procedure through which we can 
enable and pursue egalitarian relationships, and less of  a description of  an ideal society of  
equals. Still, perhaps, armed with his view, a society of  equals is the one in which each 
social member takes other citizens’ comparably important interests into account when 
deliberating about what to do. When EDC is well-applied in every dimension of  society, 
no one would be excluded from a decision-making procedure and, therefore, the ideal of  
social equality would be partially, if  not fully, achieved. However, like Anderson’s 
democratic equality, one might wonder whether pluralist luck egalitarians who, weighting 
between different and conflicting values, would deny Scheffler’s EDC. Especially, EDC 
seems to be able to supplement the deficiency of  luck egalitarianism, that is, they are less 
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concerned with regulating ordinary interactions. And it seems to me that EDC does not 
pose any objection to luck egalitarians. So, I would not pursue the issue any further. Now, 
let us turn to Jo Wolff ’s account.  
 
5.2.4. Jonathan Wolff: Should We Need A Positive Account of  Social Equality? 
 
Unlike social egalitarians－such as Anderson and Scheffler－who feel a pressing need to 
develop a positive account of  social equality, Wolff  denies the urgency to do this. He does 
so for two reasons. One is the Disagreement thesis – that people disagree about what counts 
as a society of  equals. Another is the Manifest Injustice thesis – the methodological position 
that it is unnecessary to have an idea of  justice in order to identify manifest injustice. I 
reject part of  Disagreement but accept Manifest Injustice.  
 
5.2.4.1. The Disagreement Thesis 
 
In Wolff ’s view, Anderson’s democratic conception of  equality, or Scheffler’s egalitarian 
deliberative constraint, attractive as they might be, do not provide either a sufficient or 
even a necessary, condition of  a society of  equals (Wolff, 2015b: 23, 2019: 2-3). This is 
because “[t]here are probably many different ways in which a society could count as a 
‘society of  equals’, and they may well be very different from each other” (Wolff, 2015b: 
23). For instance, the Paris commune in 1871, a hippy community of  1960s America, and 
some self-organised worker associations in South America may all be regarded as examples 
of  a society of  equals. However, for Wolff, since these societies vary greatly from one to 
another, it seems that no common features could be identified among them. Hence, the 
Disagreement thesis holds that because people differ in the substance of  a society of  equals, 
and such divergence makes identifying necessary/sufficient features of  a society of  equals 
Distributive and social egalitarianism: a survey 
143 
 
fruitless, “any particular specification is likely to seem narrow, dogmatic or unconvincing” 
(Wolff, 2015b: 23). This explains why, for Wolff, there is no need to pursue a positive 
account of  social equality.  
Indeed, many have tried to identify both necessary and sufficient conditions of  social 
equality; however, few really succeed. Rather, most social egalitarians explore the notion 
of  social equality by negating social inequalities first. For instance, some have argued that 
a society of  equals is the one without domination (Garrau & Laborde, 2015), asymmetry 
of  decision power (Schuppert, 2015a: 115-117), and inequality of  esteem (Fourie, 2015). 
For Wolff, although these accounts are correct in that objectionable social relations should 
be exempted from a society of  equals, it is doubtful whether or not they offer a necessary 
condition, or jointly sufficient condition, of  social equality. For instance, in a democratic 
society where each citizen obtains equal political power, this society could fail to achieve 
the ideal of  social equality because, for example, populist leaders use voting to suppress 
and discriminate another social group. Kolodny, on the other hand, has rejected that 
neither the asymmetry of  cooperatively produced means, nor “a failure of  equal concern 
for people’s independent claims to means”, are sufficient, and necessary for the notion of  
social equality (2014: 292-294). Besides, it seems unconvincing that a society of  equals with 
“love and care solidarity” would suffice to for social equality (Baker, 2015), because for 
some, a society of  equals does not need to be that intimate. These considerations suggest 
that to pursue a society of  equal is likely to be incomplete: the substance of  social equality 
is so rich, divergent, and open that cannot be fully achieved by negating social inequalities 
or by providing positive contents.  
Nonetheless, although it is hard to define a society of  equals, in my view, it is possible 
to approach it by listing the necessary conditions of  it. With Wolff, I think that to seek for 
a full account of  social equality is easy to fail; however, it is meaningful that we ask whether 
or not we are closer to a society of  equals. This is where I disagree with Wolff: while he 
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denies the possibility of  providing both necessary and sufficient conditions of  social 
equality, it is possible and meaningful for me to list necessary conditions of  a society of  
equals, even if  a jointly sufficient condition is never achievable. For example, the principle 
of  non-exploitation is necessary, though insufficient, for a society of  equals. A society of  
equals cannot be the one in which individuals exploit others, or where the whole system is 
exploitative. Marx held this view. Marx has indicated how capitalist exploitation stems from 
and generates social injustice. Even if  Marx’s society of  equals does not fully achieve a 
society of  equals, still it is meaningful to claim that we are approaching a society of  equals. 
Even though a complete account of  social equality seems impossible, and the list of  
necessary conditions of  social equality can be continuously expanded, this does not follow 
that we ought not to seek for a more equal society.  
 
5.2.4.2. Manifest Injustice Thesis 
 
For Wolff, the pursuit of  a positive account of  social equality is not only impossible due 
to the disagreement thesis, but also undesirable. The question of  what counts as a society 
of  equals, he suggests, makes some social egalitarians embarrassed. Social egalitarians 
assume implicitly that a theory of  egalitarian justice is incomplete if  it fails to provide an 
ideal theory of  social equality. However, following Sen’s methodology of  political 
philosophy, Wolff, by contrast, does not think that a theory of  social equality needs an 
ideal form. Rather, the Manifest Injustice thesis claims that “manifest injustice can be 
identified without reference to a positive theory of  justice” (Wolff, 2015a: 215). Granting 
that the core goal of  political philosophy is to identify manifest injustice, both Sen and 
Wolff  deny that we must formulate an ideal theory of  justice in order to succeed in 
achieving this goal. Rather, it is enough for social egalitarianism to identify manifest 
injustice by referring to our world as it is now.  
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To assess this argument, let us explore Sen’s methodology. The core idea in Sen’s view 
is that the transcendental approach－an approach that aims at identifying perfectly just 
institutions－is neither sufficient nor necessary for the comparative assessment of  justice; 
we can instead adopt the comparative approach, which aims to make evaluative comparisons 
between the choices and policies available to us presently (Sen, 2018: 15-17). What’s more, 
the comparative approach can do its own work without any need of  appealing to a 
transcendental theory of  justice. Sen’s analogy: people can compare the height of  two 
mountains without knowing what the highest mountain is; the latter issue does not 
determine the former (Sen, 2009: 102). Thus, the transcendental approach is not necessary 
for theoretical success. As he puts it,  
 
[T]he diagnosis of  injustice does not demand a unique identification of  ‘the just society’, 
since a univocal diagnosis of  the deficiency of  a society with, say, large-scale hunger, or 
widespread illiteracy, or rampant medical neglect, can go with very different identifications 
of  perfectly just social arrangements in other respects. (Sen, 2009: 100) 
 
For Sen, the identification of  manifest injustice is so clear that it does not need any 
prerequired knowledge on what just institutions would look like. Where this is true, the 
transcendental approach is redundant to the pursuit of  identifying manifest injustice. In 
following Sen’s position, Wolff  holds that the identification of  manifest social inequalities 
does not require the formulation of  a positive account of  social equality. 77 And this 
position is especially important when it comes to the ideal of  social equality: If  the manifest 
injustice－manifest social inequality－ is clear and plausible, then the limit of  social 
egalitarianism that we have been discussing－i.e. the difficulty in giving a positive account 
 
77  The fundamental difference between Sen’s and Wolff ’s position on the methodology of  political 
philosophy is on the role of  ideal theory. While Sen may attempt to abandon any pursuit of  an ideal theory 
of  justice, Wolff, by contrast, does acknowledge the need for ideal theories for some sound reasons. See 
Wolff  (2015: 215).  
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of  social equality－is not particularly troubling. Hence, for Wolff, in characterising social 
egalitarian theory, a positive ideal is not particularly required.78 
 
5.2.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
While Anderson and Scheffler have provided their ideal account of  what a society of  
equals is, Wolff  insists that to identify social inequalities is enough for social egalitarianism. 
Note that I do not mean to suggest that social egalitarianism must take a non-ideal form 
while luck egalitarianism must take an ideal form. Anderson’s democratic equality and 
Scheffler’s egalitarian deliberative constraint are ideal forms of  social egalitarianism. 
Wolff ’s non-ideal form of  social egalitarianism is only a specific way of  understanding the 
notion of  social equality. On the other hand, we have seen that for social egalitarians, 
distributive equality is not sufficient for a society of  equals. Rather, to achieve social equality, 
people ought to treat and regard one another as equals by acting equally and expressing 
correct attitudes toward their social fellows. Having introduced luck and social 
egalitarianism, in what follows I examine three objections that social egalitarians pose to 
luck egalitarians, namely, the intrusive objection, the disrespectful objection and the 
harshness objection. By reviewing the three objections and how luck egalitarians may reply 
to them, this will facilitate our understanding of  the disagreement between distributive and 
social egalitarianism, and the nature of  egalitarian justice.  
 
5.3. The Intrusion Objection 
 
Some might worry that the implementation of  luck egalitarian policies requires “a great 
 
78 This view echoes Sen’s claim (2006) and is controversial. See Ronald Dworkin (2011: 476-477) for his 
reply to Sen’s view. 
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deal of  knowledge of  individual circumstances” (Wolff, 1998: 106-107). For example, since 
the measurement of  welfarist egalitarianism is people’s relative welfare, the government 
has to invade people’s everyday life so as to collect their welfare data. Then, one objection 
to luck egalitarian policy is that the doctrine, when implemented by the government, 
“might be intolerably intrusive” (Wolff, 1998: 102). Anderson, similarly, worries about the 
intrusion of  government. Her worry is that, in order to conduct the choice/luck distinction, 
proposed by luck egalitarianism, the government might need to make judgments on 
people’s behaviours so as to know whether some of  their behaviours are liable for 
themselves and whether some of  them are a matter of  bad brute luck (1999: 310). When 
implementing such policies, it is inevitable that the government has to invade people’s 
personal life to collect data and then make a judgment. As a result, the implementation of  
doctrines of  luck egalitarianism in general, welfarist egalitarianism in specific, may invite 
gross intrusion of  state intervention. Such an intrusion might undermine our liberty and 
thus should be prohibited. The intrusive objection, then, questions the implementation of  luck 
egalitarian policy, rather than an objection to the principle of  luck egalitarianism.  
The Intrusion objection, however, applies to social egalitarians as well. Since the 
doctrine of  social equality is to treat and regard others as equals, the implementation of  
the social egalitarian doctrine may invade people’s liberty in the same manner. The 
government will need to surveil individuals’ life and how they interact with others, so as to 
know whether they do treat others equally or unequally. More severely, with respect to 
ensuring equal regard, the government might need to ask individuals to confess their real 
thoughts and attitudes so that the government could know whether the ideal of  social 
equality is really realized. Such a world is not entirely different from the one in George 
Orwell’s famous book, 1984, in which citizens are under strict supervision. Although the 
motivation is different – one aims to articulate an egalitarian society, while 1984 describes 
a totalitarian world – the effects, however, seem similar: the intolerable intrusion of  states 
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into personal life.79 The implementation of  social egalitarian policies faces the intrusive 
objection as well.  
The intrusion objection does not really object to luck egalitarianism in principle. It does 
not question whether the idea of  equality demands the luck/choice distinction, or/and 
whether option luck preserves egalitarian justice. Rather, the intrusion objection only 
indicates that the implementation of  the luck egalitarian doctrine by the government might 
sabotage personal liberty. Hence, luck egalitarians may respond: “Yes, I agree that the 
implementation of  the luck egalitarian doctrine might undermine personal liberty. So, 
granted that we also cherish the value of  liberty and the value of  equality is not always 
more important than it of  liberty, we had better implement the luck egalitarian doctrines 
in ways that would not invade personal liberty.” Here, luck egalitarians could adopt a “weak 
equalisandum claim” which acknowledges that people “should be as equal as possible in 
some dimension but subject to whatever limitations need to be imposed in deference to 
other values” (Cohen, 2011: 5). In other words, “any reasonable egalitarian will be a 
pluralist. Equality is not the only thing that matters to the egalitarian” (Temkin, 2003: 63). 
The pluralist position is consistent with the core luck egalitarian idea that egalitarian justice 
should be sensitive to the choice/luck distinction.  
Consequently, the intrusion objection is, I believe, unsuccessful, either because it 
applies to social egalitarian policies as well, or because it does not really threaten the 
doctrines of  luck egalitarianism.  
 
5.4. The Disrespectfulness Objection 
 
The disrespectfulness objection, related to the intrusive objection, claims that even if  the 
 
79 To be clear: the intrusion objection applies only to those social egalitarians whose accounts demand equal 
regard among citizens. Hence, Anderson’s democratic equality and Scheffler’s EDC refrain from the intrusion 
objection.  
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implementation of  the luck egalitarian policies is fair, it could make some fellow citizens 
humiliated. The doctrine of  luck egalitarianism also expresses disrespectfulness to them. Then, 
tension exists between fairness and respect－two egalitarian ideas (Wolff, 2010: 343). More 
precisely, the disrespectful objection argues not only that in effect luck egalitarian policies 
might make some citizens feel humiliated, but also that the luck/choice distinction that 
luck egalitarianism endorses expresses a disrespectful attitude to fellow citizens. The 
disrespectful objection, then, challenges both the implementation and the principle, of  
luck egalitarianism.  
This objection has two dimensions. The first concerns the instrumental problem of  
revelation. As Wolff  argues (1998: 113-115, 2010: 343-346), no matter whether one’s 
disadvantages are caused by one’s choice or bad brute luck, revealing these facts about us 
is humiliating, either for ourselves or for others. The argument concerns the actual effect of  
the implementation of  luck egalitarian policies. The collection of  one’s data, required by 
luck egalitarian policies, leads to “shameful revelation” in some cases. For instance, some 
of  the unemployed through no fault of  their own have to suffer a revelation of  the fact 
that they are untalented, or that they are unattractive by labour market due to some kinds 
of  features they have, and that is humiliating. The humiliating effect may apply to those 
whose unemployment is caused by their choices as well. Revealing one’s unemployment 
could be humiliating in that one has to suffer a revelation of  the fact that one is so 
incapable of  organising her plan well, which results in her plight. To reveal one’s 
incapability is in itself  humiliating. Note that Wolff  does not deny luck egalitarianism as a 
plausible doctrine of  fairness, but only to point out that fairness and respect can conflict 
(2010: 346-347). Hence, if  the actual effect of  the implementation of  luck egalitarian 
policies threatens one’s esteem, a society in which one’s esteem is undermined is, in that 
respect, inegalitarian.  
With respect to the disrespectful objection, there are two responses. The first 
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response acknowledges that the implementation of  the luck egalitarian policies may 
generate humiliating effects on people, and, therefore, we ought to design the policies in a 
careful way that would not make people feel humiliated. Indeed, what Wolff  asks is “a 
dynamic balance” between fairness and respect that institutions are “generally fair, but 
avoid various causes of  disrespect” (1998: 120). Besides, the second response questions 
whether the implementation of  luck egalitarian policies is necessarily humiliating, or a 
contingent fact about our societies that ought to be corrected. Wolff  did acknowledge that 
the fact that some feel humiliated under the luck egalitarian policies is a contingent factor, 
but a “stubborn fact” that egalitarians cannot leave it aside (2010: 343, 1998: 114-115). 
However, whether or not it is shameful to reveal X depends on social attitudes, and people 
should not feel shameful because of  the stigmatising attitudes that society imposes. For 
example, in a society with fixed gender roles, males are not encouraged to express their 
emotions and males who cry in public might feel shameful due to the conventional social 
attitude. Such inappropriate social attitudes, nonetheless, should be corrected, and no one 
should feel shameful to express their emotions that do not meet inappropriate social 
attitudes. Now, the second response insists that the unemployed should not feel shameful 
when revealing their unchosen disadvantages because society imposes inappropriate social 
attitudes on those who suffer bad brute luck, which should be corrected. The two 
responses, then, can reply to the disrespectful objection as regards the implementation of  
the luck egalitarian policies. Now we turn to the second dimension of  the disrespectfulness 
objection.  
The second dimension of  the disrespectful objection concerns the theoretical 
distinction incorporated into the very essence of  luck egalitarianism. Since luck egalitarians 
set up a standard－the luck/choice distinction－which allows discrimination between 
people, the standard, in principle, divides people at least into two categories: the prudent 
and talented, and the imprudent and untalented. The division is problematic for social 
Distributive and social egalitarianism: a survey 
151 
 
egalitarians because, as mentioned previously, one interpretation of  the ideal of  social 
equality demands that we express proper attitudes to fellow members. However, the doctrine of  
luck egalitarianism seems to express implicitly the belief  that one should aim to be a 
prudent person, and an imprudent person would be disdained. More precisely, to divided 
people according to the luck/choice distinction, it seems, amounts to make an appraisal of  
their behaviour relative to the distinction. Hence, granted that luck egalitarianism is a 
plausible doctrine of  fairness, it remains questionable whether the implicit belief  expresses 
proper attitudes to all citizens. For social egalitarians at least, it is not.  
Moreover, the luck egalitarian policies may allow the government to express 
disrespectful attitudes toward citizens (Anderson, 1999: 305-306, fn.61). In order to 
perform luck egalitarian policies, the government has to collect and define the relevant 
features of  each individual, e.g. the imprudent, the untalented, and the irresponsible, so 
forth. As a result, the government has to “pass [evaluative] judgement on how much people 
are responsible for their expensive tastes or their imprudent choices” (Anderson, 1999: 
310). Social egalitarians would not think that this is a proper attitude for the government 
to express to citizens. Hence, the second dimension of  the disrespectfulness objection 
attacks not only on the effect of  luck egalitarian policies that some citizens might feel 
shameful when revealing their incapacity but, more importantly, the disrespectful attitude 
expressed by the doctrine of  luck egalitarianism to their fellows.  
Note that luck egalitarians cannot respond to the objection by reference to a pluralist 
position this time. The doctrines of  luck egalitarianism are under attack as well. Now it 
would be better to distinguish two kinds of  respect, proposed by Stephen Darwall (1977), 
namely, recognition respect and appraisal respect. To have recognition respect for a person is to 
treat the fact that she is a person as restricting how we ought to act in a permissible way 
(Darwall, 1977: 39-41); in contrast, to have appraisal respect for a person is to give positive 
appraisal to some features of  a person excellence (1977: 44-45). For example, when we 
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give positive appraisal to Roger Federer, one of  the best tennis players, for his excellent 
performance, we respect him in an appraisal-respect manner. When we treat a person in 
morally appropriate ways because of  the fact that she is a person, we respect her in a 
recognition-respect manner. The disrespectful objection to the principle of  luck 
egalitarianism, then, could take both forms of  respect. Regarding recognition respect, the 
disrespectful objection states that it is disrespectful for luck egalitarianism to abandon the 
imprudent because to have recognition respect for a person is to guarantee their life-time 
access to a threshold of  capacities (Anderson, 1999: 318-319). This is the harshness 
objection, which I will examine later. Regarding appraisal respect, the disrespectful 
objection states that the luck/choice distinction, proposed by luck egalitarianism, expresses 
disrespectful attitudes to their fellows because to divide people into prudent/imprudent is 
an inappropriate standard of  an appraisal. Thus, the disrespectful objection at stake 
concerns appraisal respect, rather than recognition respect.  
Luck egalitarians could respond to the disrespectful objection that treating individuals 
as responsible for their choices is treating them with respect; not to treat them as 
responsible for their choices, they argue, is disrespectful, because it treats them like they 
are children who lack the capacity to lead a life that is authentically theirs. The response, 
however, does not reply to the disrespectful objection as regards appraisal respect, because 
it contests with social egalitarians that to have recognition respect for a person is to let people 
bear responsibility for their chosen disadvantages, rather than that the prudent/imprudent 
distinction is appropriate for a standard of  appraisal respect. The point of  the disrespectful 
objection, then, concerns primarily whether the imprudent/prudent distinction is an 
appropriate standard for a society of  equals, even though the distinction works perfectly 
as a principle of  fairness.  
Clearly, no one likes to be judged as imprudent even if  he is! Given this fact, the 
prudent/imprudent distinction inevitably makes an appraisal that some people are more 
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competent than others in making a decision (Voigt, 2015: 97-98), which, it seems, will make 
some feel inferior. Moreover, even if  it is a social fact that some are less capable than others 
in making a decision, some might feel disrespected when being judged as imprudent. We 
then have to consider whether or not the imprudent/prudent distinction is an appropriate 
standard of  appraisal respect. Note that the argument here is not that we ought not to 
make any appraisal, since some kind of  inequality of  esteem could be justified by social 
egalitarians (Wolff, 2019: 9).80 Rather, the objection maintains that it seems disrespectful 
to make an appraisal to people according to the prudent/imprudent distinction, even 
though it is fair that people should be liable for their chosen disadvantages.  
Luck egalitarians, however, may have two further responses. First, luck egalitarians 
might dispute that they do not need to divide people into two categories. In most cases, 
people are a mix－sometimes prudent and sometimes not. The luck egalitarian principles 
do not carve out two different groups of  people so much as specify when we have a 
(stronger) case for compensation and when we have a (weaker) case. Second, luck 
egalitarians might contend that people should not feel disrespected when judged as 
imprudent because that is an accurate description of  their choices without attempting to 
disdain a person. To judge a person as imprudent needs not involve passing any evaluation 
to that person. It could be a misunderstanding that the imprudent feel not respected by 
the doctrine of  luck egalitarianism to that respect.  
Now whether or not the second response is successful depends on whether it is a 
constant or contingent social fact that people will feel disrespected when being judged as 
imprudent. If  the fact is a constant fact of  human society, then the disrespectful objection 
as regards appraisal respect is not specific to luck egalitarians. Social egalitarians who 
incorporate the notion of  personal responsibility into their theories of  egalitarian justice 
 
80 Some social egalitarians might insist that any kind of  inequality of  esteem is inegalitarian.  
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(Anderson, 1999, 326-331), are subject to the same objection as well. As Anderson says, 
we “should uphold the responsibility of  individuals for their own lives without passing 
demeaning and intrusive judgments on their capacities for exercising responsibility or on 
how well they have used their freedoms” (1999: 314). In Anderson’s democratic egalitarian 
society, some people would be more competent than others in making prudent political 
decisions, even if  she will guarantee that no one is below a threshold of  sufficiency. 
However, if  the fact is a contingent factor, luck egalitarians, then, could argue that people 
mistakenly feel disrespected when being judged as imprudent, which they should not. The 
imprudent/prudent distinction does not, in fact, express disrespectful attitudes to citizens. 
This reply, in my view, is successful. I shall not pursue the objection any further.  
In sum, although luck egalitarians can adopt a pluralist position that takes the idea of  
respect into account and avoids the humiliating issue by designing a respect-sensitive 
administrative process, the luck/choice distinction that luck egalitarians endorse seems 
problematic for social egalitarians, because the distinction seems to be an inappropriate 
standard of  appraisal respect and, therefore, expresses an improper attitude toward some 
fellow citizens. However, whether the doctrine of  luck egalitarianism is disrespectful 
depends on whether or not the fact that people feel not respected when judged as 
imprudent, is a constant, or contingent, fact. I have argued that if  the fact is a constant 
factor of  human society, then both luck and social egalitarians are subject to the same 
objection. If  the fact is contingent, then the principle of  luck egalitarians does not, in fact, 
disrespect the imprudent. The implication of  the disrespectful objection to luck 
egalitarians, then, is that, whether the fact is a constant or contingent feature of  human 
society, we ought to make a balance between fairness and respect. Sometimes, to achieve a 
society of  equals, the consideration of  respect will overweight the principle of  fairness.  
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5.5. The Harshness Objection 
 
The Harshness Objection criticises luck egalitarians for abandoning imprudent people who 
suffer chosen disadvantages. In order to reveal the real force of  the objection, we need to 
clarify three points beforehand. First, the question at stake is about how luck egalitarians 
should treat victims of  bad option luck. For some luck egalitarians, people should be fully 
responsible for her disadvantage if  and only if  it reflects their genuine choice. As Cohen 
specifies, “The amount of  genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of  degree” (2011: 
32). In other words, one’s choice is, to some extent, influenced by uncontrollable factors. 
Therefore, in real-world cases, if  one’s choices have been reduced, more or less, by bad 
brute luck, luck egalitarians would have good reason to intervene and offer compensation 
in proportion to the effect of  bad brute luck that one suffers (Voigt, 2007: 395).  
Second, it is mistaken to interpret luck egalitarians as if  they will leave an uninsured 
and negligent driver, who makes poor choices and should be held responsible for her 
imprudence, to die on the road. Instead, luck egalitarians claim that disadvantages that 
reflect one’s choice are not unfair, but not that people should pay the full cost of  their 
imprudent choice. Most luck egalitarians adopt the notion of  “reasonableness” to evaluate 
what kinds of  responsibility should the imprudent agent bear (Segall, 2009; Stemplowska, 
2013, 2016; Vallentyne, 2002; Eyal, 2006). The notion of  reasonable avoidability strengths 
Dworkin’s distinction between brute/option luck distinction.81 According to Segall, brute 
luck should be construed as “the outcome of  actions (including omissions) that it would 
 
81 To be fair, Dworkin does not hold a sharp distinction between brute and option luck. For instance, he 
said that “the difference between these two forms of  luck can be represented as a matter of  degree” (2002: 
73). Or, in another place, he wrote: “So if  the condition just stated were met－if  everyone had an equal risk 
of  suffering some catastrophe that would leave him or her handicapped, and everyone knew roughly what 
the odds were and had ample opportunity to insure” (2002: 77, my italics). The two citations suggest that 
sufficient options to insure would be an important indicator to inform the degree of  responsibility for which 
a person should be liable. For critiques of  Dworkin’s brute/option luck distinction, see Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen (2001), Nir Eyal (2006: 3-4), Peter Vallentyne (2002; 2008) and Martin Sandbu (2004). 
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have been unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid (or not to avoid, in the case of  
omission)” (2009: 20). In other words, it is society that should compensate for one’s 
disadvantage when it would be unreasonable to expect the person to avoid a bad situation. 
Note that the criterion of  reasonableness depends on what society could reasonably expect 
people to act and the substantive requirement of  the ‘reasonable avoidability’ criterion 
differs whenever the circumstance changes (Segall, 2009: 20-22; Voigt, 2007: 397). For 
some, the availability of  full insurance represents a significant factor in assessing whether 
it would be unreasonable to expect the agent to take all the responsibility (Otsuka, 2002: 
44-45; Sandbu, 2004: 294-304; Lazenby, 2014: 670; Stemplowska, 2016: 158; Knight, 2011: 
77-81).82 If  the full insurance of  specifically risky behaviours is unavailable, brute luck 
cannot convert fully into option luck and, therefore, people who cannot access full 
insurance and then have a bad outcome should be compensated for parts of  their bad 
brute luck.  
Another interpretation of  reasonable avoidability asserts that if  the cost of  making a 
specific choice is so great that one has to risk one’s other functionings, then it would be 
unreasonable to expect an agent to make this choice (De-Shalit & Wolff, 2011: 227). Note 
that the point of  the second interpretation is not that one has insufficient choices but that 
the cost of  her option-set is too high for her not to sacrifice other important functionings. 
Consequently, in either interpretation, what is at stake is that the option set they face is 
problematic that their choices would not fully convert brute luck into option luck and 
therefore, we cannot demand them to take the full responsibility (Hyams, 2019: 23).  
Hence, the negligent driver should be partially compensated, if  the full insurance is 
not available in the market, either because no insurance company can ever offer, or because 
the insurance is so expensive that the driver cannot afford it. In a nutshell, luck egalitarians, 
 
82 See Williams & Otsuka (2004), for their further discussion. 
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equipped with the notion of  reasonable avoidability, are able to treat some negligent drivers, 
which will be regarded as victims of  purely option luck, as partial victims of  bad brute luck 
because it is unreasonable that society holds them for the full responsibility of  their 
disadvantage. This suggests how much of  a burden an imprudent person should bear will 
depend on “what we can reasonably expect from agents” (Voigt, 2007: 397). Hence, luck 
egalitarians, as Scheffler (2005: 15) indicates, would not ask the imprudent to pay the full 
costs of  their choices.83 
Third, very often, the cases that the proponents of  the harshness objection offer are 
related to the rescue case. However, the rescue cases tend to distort the plausibility of  luck 
egalitarianism because “the rule of  rescue” is so intuitive and imperative that it triumphs 
our consideration of  cost and responsibility (Eyal, 2016: 165-167). Eyal warrants that the 
rescue case may distort our judgment of  the implication of  personal responsibility in a 
theory of  justice because other moral considerations are jointly played in the rescue case. 
To bear these points in mind, now a more sophisticated version of  luck egalitarianism 
is as follows:  
 
It is unjust for individuals to be worse off  than others due to outcomes that it would have been unreasonable 
to expect them to avoid. (Segall, 2009: 13, my italic). 
 
The sophisticated version indeed strengthens the power of  luck egalitarianism that it 
refrains from the accusation that luck egalitarians will render the imprudent liable for the 
full costs of  their choices. However, Voigt offers a stronger version of  the harshness 
objection to challenge luck egalitarianism, which is as follows: 
 
When an agent, as a matter of  pure option luck－i.e., when unequal brute luck did not affect 
 
83 See Section 5.5.3. 
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the choice the agent faced (for example by limiting the range of  options available or by 
increasing the cost of  particular options), and when the agent failed to act in accordance with 
a standard of  reasonableness that was appropriately individuated to take account of  the 
effects of  unequal brute luck－ends up in desolate circumstances, then luck egalitarianism 
requires that we do not provide assistance to this agent, even if  there are no opportunity 
costs associated with the provision of  such assistance. (Voigt, 2007: 402) 
 
In Voigt’s version of  the harshness objection, it targets victims of  purely bad option luck 
who fail to meet a standard of  reasonableness. What’s important in her version is that, 
even if  the opportunity costs to rescue the imprudent are none, luck egalitarians will not 
provide assistance to the imprudent, not to mention the case in which the cost of  rescuing 
the imprudent will leave us fewer resources to compensate victims of  bad brute luck. Surely, 
it is controversial whether or not luck egalitarians should rescue the imprudent whenever 
the cost is zero. The point is that Voigt’s version of  the harshness objection helps to 
indicate the disagreement among luck egalitarians. Having presented the harshness 
objection, now I shall consider how luck egalitarians can respond to the objection in, at 
least, three ways.  
In general, in facing Voigt’s version of  the harshness objection, luck egalitarians can 
adopt three approaches: All-luck egalitarianism, the Pluralist approach and the principle of  
stakes. I shall assess each approach to see whether they are plausible or not.  
 
5.5.1. All-Luck Egalitarianism 
 
All-luck egalitarianism claims that “justice requires neutralizing all differential luck, whether 
brute or option” (Segall, 2009: 47). 84  Therefore, the unequal effect that each person 
receives as a matter of  option luck is unfair and should be compensated. Consider a gamble 
 
84 Henceforth, “ALE” refers to All-luck egalitarianism.  
Distributive and social egalitarianism: a survey 
159 
 
in which one has an 87% opportunity of  winning a house but a 13% opportunity of  losing 
one’s house. Suppose both Allen and Bob accept the gamble deliberately, and Allen wins 
while Bob loses his house. For ALE, the unequal outcome between Allen and Bob is unfair 
because both make the same choice but receive the unequal outcome. The outcome is 
unfair just because even in the realm of  option luck, inequalities that do not reflect their 
choices are unfair. In other words, justice requires that “there ought not to be a shortfall 
in well-being between individuals who exercise an identical level of  prudence (or 
imprudence)” (Segall, 2009: 51-52). 
Note that the distinction between brute and option luck remain intact under ALE. 
What ALE requires is that people who make the same choice should share their risks 
together. For instance, if  a twin chooses to smoke but receives an unequal effect, the 
unhealthy one should receive compensation from the healthy one. Therefore, ALE seems 
to encourage public insurance for those who make the same kind of  gambles. More 
importantly, in so doing, ALE avoids the harshness objection because the victims of  bad 
option luck will be compensated from public insurance. Also, ALE avoids the accusation 
of  exploitation that non-smokers subsidize smokers (Segall, 2009: 48), because the prudent 
need not be compensated for the risky behaviour, conducted by the imprudent. Hence, 
ALE offers a plausible response to the harshness objection.85 
 
5.5.2. The Pluralist Approach 
 
The second way to respond to the harshness objection is to combine luck egalitarianism 
with Sufficientarianism or Prioritarianism (Voigt, 2007: 403-405; Segall, 2009: ch.5). As noted 
previously, egalitarians can admit that the ideal of  equality is only one important dimension 
 
85 Given the limited space and the purpose, I shall not pursue ALE any further. For a detailed critique of  
ALE, see (Segall, 2009: ch.3).  
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of  justice and justice requires a balance between other moral considerations. Consequently, 
pluralist egalitarians can combine other considerations of  distributive justice together to 
explain why the victims of  bad option luck should be compensated. One way is to combine 
luck egalitarianism with Sufficientarianism (Segall, 2009; Barry, 2006; Casal, 2007). 
Sufficientarianism guarantees that each person has a minimum threshold of  certain goods 
and that each person should not fall below certain basic thresholds. Therefore, luck 
egalitarianism combined with Sufficientarianism offers a robust response to the harshness 
objection in that whenever the victims of  bad option luck are below a minimum threshold 
of  certain goods, they have justice-based reason to ask for compensation.  
Another way is to combine luck egalitarianism with Prioritarianism (Arneson, 2000). 
Prioritarianism claims that “one ought as a matter of  justice to aid the unfortunate, and 
the more badly off  someone is, the more urgent is the moral imperative to aid” (Arneson, 
2000: 343). When so combined, luck egalitarianism can offer another robust response to 
the harshness objection by claiming that we have justice-based reason to rescue the victims 
of  bad option luck as long as they are badly off.  
However, the pluralist approach faces an objection. Some doubt that luck 
egalitarianism, when combining with Sufficientarianism or Prioritarianism, runs the risk of  
yielding the doctrine of  luck egalitarianism under Sufficientarianism or Prioritarianism. 
Sufficientarianism (and Prioritarianism) “receives lexical priority over luck egalitarianism” 
(Knight, 2015: 123). For Knight, this might be an unpleasant concession for some luck 
egalitarians since the combination, either with Sufficientarianism or Prioritarianism, 
actually offers a replacement but not a complement for luck egalitarianism and, thus, luck 
egalitarianism remains “in a diminished, tie-breaking capacity” (ibid.). Knight’s view, 
however, is misleading. As Tan suggests, the core ideal of  luck egalitarianism is best 
understood as “a grounding principle for distributive equality” but not as “a substantive 
principle of  distributive equality itself ” (2012: 106). While the luck/choice principle offers 
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a justificatory ground for distributive equality, it does not necessarily endorse any substantive 
distributive principle, that is, how and what to distribute among individuals. Luck 
egalitarianism leaves it open to the question of  what the appropriate pattern and the 
metrics of  distributive justice are. Hence, to adopt a hybrid approach－ combining 
egalitarianism with Sufficientarianism or Prioritarianism－would not affect the core idea 
of  luck egalitarianism (Arneson, 2000; Segall, 2007: 192-198, 2011: 262-264).86 
 
5.5.3. The Principle of  Stakes 
 
While the notion of  reasonable avoidability helps to extend the notion of  personal 
responsibility in luck egalitarianism, some indicate that luck egalitarians must offer a clear 
principle of  stakes to specify the relation between one’s responsibility and the cost for 
which one is liable. As Serena Olsaretti (2009: 170) has indicated, “the question of  the 
grounds of  responsibility” should be distinguished from “the question of  stakes.” The 
former concerns of  what we can hold people responsible for; the latter, by contrast, 
concerns what costs should follow from responsible choices. Therefore, luck egalitarians 
may assert that although it is clear that the victim of  purely bad brute luck should be liable 
for her imprudent choice, it is undetermined how much cost the victim should pay.  
Olsaretti considers three principles of  stakes that luck egalitarians might endorse: “the 
contextual approach,” “the consequentialist view” and “the desert view” (Olsaretti, 2009: 
173-186). Olsaretti rejects the contextual view, preferring the consequentialist and the 
desert-based views.  
The contextual approach assumes that “the context of  choice is one in which 
individuals should enjoy as large as possible an area of  freedom, provided the demands of  
 
86 For Tan (2012: 125-126), Segall’s approach (2007) might make the luck/choice principle redundant when 
defending luck egalitarianism by appealing to the notion of  solidarity. Thus, Tan rejects Segall’s view.  
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(responsibility-constrained) equality are met” (Olsaretti, 2009: 180). In other words, the 
contextual approach respects people’s negative freedom to a maximum degree and accepts 
whatever results from their exercising of  freedom. The contextual approach seems to 
accept any consequence of  people’s choice that they happen to encounter. However, the 
contextual approach is implausible for two reasons. First, “it does not seem true that any 
and all actual consequence of  choices are justified” (Olsaretti, 2009: 176). Indeed, if  what 
the contextual approach says is that any actual consequence of  people’s choices should be 
accepted, then it says nothing more than the luck egalitarian doctrine that people should 
be held responsible for the outcomes of  their choices. Second, for Olsaretti (2009:181-
182), the contextual approach seems to import too many anti-egalitarian rights at the cost 
of  luck egalitarian commitment to equality.  
Instead, there are two alternatives: the consequentialist and the desert approach to 
stakes. The consequentialist approach claims that “the stakes of  people’s choices should 
be just whatever stakes are required in order to promote independently desirable outcomes” 
(Olsaretti, 2009: 183).87 The consequentialist approach seems to hold that the outcome of  
one’s imprudent choice is justified when it brings about desirable consequences. For 
instance, if  the imprudent driver’s death makes more people aware of  their driving, it seems 
that her death could be justified. The consequentialist approach, however, is problematic 
where the connection between one’s choice and the outcomes is irrelevant, or pro tanto 
unjustified. In the driver case, we do not think that the driver deserves his death even where 
the outcome is desirable, e.g. where many become more aware of  their driving. The death 
is not the stake for which he should be liable. Moreover, the deserved consequence of  
one’s imprudent choices is simply irrelevant to the desirable outcomes it brings about. 
Hence, the consequentialist approach to stakes is implausible as well.  
 
87 Peter Vallentyne proposes a similar view, see Vallentyne (2002).  
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On the other hand, the desert approach suggests that “the consequence of  one’s 
choice are those that are ‘fitting’, or deserved, for the choice in question” (Olsaretti, 2009: 
183-184). Thus, the desert approach might imply that, even if  the driver’s choices are 
imprudent, he does not deserve all outcomes of  his choices (Moriarty, 2018: 167). The 
desert approach to stakes, Olsaretti contends, places a constraint on the outcome of  
personal choices and is able to avoid the harshness objection in a way that it would not 
impose unduly harsh judgments about personal responsibility. For example, suppose a 
negligent driver crashed a tree and passed out by the road. Then, even if  the driver should 
be fully responsible for his imprudent behaviour, he does not deserve to die on the road. 
However, the disadvantage of  the desert approach is that it can only import “a 
proportionality constraint” on the consequence of  one’s choice but is incapable of  
providing a full principle of  stakes (Olsaretti, 2009: 184-185). What exactly one deserves 
is always determined by “the institutional context in which desert claims are made” 
(Olsaretti, 2009: 185). We need the institutional context so as to know what one deserves. 
Hence, the desert approach can serve as a constraint on our consideration of  the 
consequence of  choice but cannot answer what the exact costs that one should pay are. 
Although the three approaches do not provide satisfying answers to the relation 
between responsibility and stakes, it is clear that even if  the negligent driver is fully 
responsible for her imprudent choice, this does not necessarily follow that she should pay 
the full cost of  her choice. The principle of  stakes is the third way to respond to the 
harshness objection.  
In sum, the harshness objection that social egalitarians arise has facilitated the content 
of  luck egalitarianism. As we have seen, it is misleading to assert that luck egalitarians will 
leave the negligent driver, who is liable for his imprudent behaviour according to a standard 
of  reasonable avoidability, dying on the road. Luck egalitarians can reply to the harshness 
objection in the above three ways.  






I have introduced the core ideas of  luck and social egalitarianism, examined three 
objections that social egalitarians pose to luck egalitarians, and illustrated how luck 
egalitarians could respond to each objection. As we have seen, when luck egalitarians affirm 
a sufficientarian, or a prioritarian, threshold, the distinction between luck and social 
egalitarianism has been largely lessened. Rather, as many have proposed, the two 
approaches to the ideal of  equality could be reconciled (Stemplowska, 2011; Tomlin, 2014; 
Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018a; Mole & Parr, 2019; Mulkeen, 2020). By reviewing the social 
egalitarian critique and how luck egalitarians can reply to these criticisms, we have a better 
understanding of  the nature of  egalitarian justice.  
Besides, the survey is necessary for my core argument in Chapter 6, because 
exploitation is inherently an inegalitarian notion. Given this, when identifying the injustice 
of  exploitation, we need to have a clear sense of  what egalitarianism is and the best 
conception of  equality. The survey, then, provides an understanding of  egalitarian justice 
and, therefore, how egalitarians could perceive the injustice of  exploitation. In Chapter 6, 
I first introduce two distinct ways to perceive the injustice of  exploitation, namely, the 
Free-standing approach and the Derivative approach. The Derivative approach, endorsed 
by Cohen and Roemer, claims that exploitation is unjust so long as it stems from 
background injustice. In contrast, the Free-standing approach states that exploitation is 
unjust on its own, regardless of  its history. Based on the distinction, I shall argue that, 
because exploitation may arise under the luck egalitarian agenda, the luck egalitarian 
treatment of  the injustice of  exploitation－the Derivative approach－is incomplete; and 
the Free-standing approach is a better alternative than the Derivative approach to perceive 
the injustice of  exploitation. 
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6. What Makes Exploitation Unjust:  
Against the Luck Egalitarian Understanding 
 
The aim of  Chapter 6 is to answer why exploitation is unjust for egalitarians. Although it 
is clear that exploitation is morally wrongful, it remains vague how to identify the injustice-
making feature of  exploitation and why exploitation is unjust according to egalitarianism. 
For contemporary egalitarians, exploitation represents a specific category worthy of  their 
attention because a society of  equals cannot be an exploitative one. Thus, it is important 
that contemporary egalitarians should be able to deal properly with exploitation; otherwise, 
their egalitarian proposal is incomplete. To be complete, any theory of  egalitarian justice 
has to pass what I shall call the exploitation objection, which asserts that an account of  
egalitarian justice that fails to include a plausible account of  the injustice of  exploitation is 
inadequate. I then scrutinise whether or not luck egalitarians can respond to exploitation 
successfully.88 The core argument of  Chapter 6 and the whole thesis is to contend that 
luck egalitarians fail to deal properly with exploitation because certain forms of  
exploitation could arise in a society that honours luck egalitarian criteria of  justice, that is, 
no one suffers unchosen disadvantages. The luck egalitarian treatment of  exploitation, thus, 
is incomplete and luck egalitarians need another principle of  non-exploitation to respond to 
exploitation. My aim is moderate in that, by posing the exploitation objection to luck 
egalitarianism, it will deepen our understanding of  egalitarian justice. How we perceive the 
injustice of  exploitation, then, will influence our understanding of  egalitarian justice in 
general.  
Chapter 6 starts by proposing two distinct ways to perceive the injustice of  
exploitation, namely, the Derivative approach and the Free-standing approach. Roughly 
 
88 I focus on luck egalitarianism because it remains an important, influential account of  distributive justice. 
Even if  other accounts of  distributive justice may respond to exploitation perfectly, it is beyond my concern 
here.  
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stated, the former holds that exploitation is unjust so long as it stems from a prior 
background injustice; the latter holds that exploitation is unjust on its own, regardless of  
its history. Leading luck egalitarians, such as Cohen (1995), Roemer (1982b, 1998), Arneson 
(2013) and Steiner (1984, 1987, 1994), endorse the Derivative approach. I then illustrate 
how exploitation can arise even under just background conditions, via just steps, and, 
therefore, why the luck egalitarian treatment of  exploitation is incomplete. Having argued 
the incompleteness of  the Derivative approach, at the end of  this chapter, I specify the 
content of  the Free-standing approach pertinent to my account of  exploitation.  
The structure of  Chapter 6 proceeds as follows. Section 1 contrasts the Derivative 
approach with the Free-standing approach. In section 6.2., I indicate that luck egalitarians 
endorse the Derivative approach and how exploitation may arise under the luck egalitarian 
agenda, via just steps. Consequently, the Derivative approach, endorsed by some luck 
egalitarians, is incomplete. Section 6.3. proposes and explains the Free-standing approach 
in terms of  my account of  exploitation. Section 6.4. is the conclusion.  
 
6.1. The Injustice of  Exploitation: Derivative or Free-standing 
 
In general, there are three ways in which exploitation and inequality may be related to each 
other, namely: exploitation generates inequalities,89 inequalities generate exploitation, and 
exploitation is, in itself, a form of inequality. Exploitation could be unjust in the above three 
senses. With respect to the case that exploitation generates inequalities, as Andrew Mason 
indicated, “an act can be unjust in terms of its [unjust] effects even if it is not intrinsically 
unjust” (2015: 136). Even if exploitation is not in itself unjust in the sense that the exploitee 
suffers no unfair disadvantage, exploitation could be unjust in that it generates other kinds 
 
89 For a discussion of  how exploitation generates inequalities. See Hillel Steiner (2010).  
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of social injustice. However, in this chapter, I shall focus on the last two connections and 
leave the first one to Chapter 7. The last two connections then provide distinct ways to 
formulate the injustice of exploitation: free-standing and derivative.  
Both the free-standing view and the derivative view consist of a causal claim of 
exploitation, a normative claim of the injustice of exploitation, and an egalitarian claim of when 
exploitation is unfair.90 Roughly speaking, the derivative view, proposed by Cohen (1995) 
and Roemer (1998), holds that it is unjust for A to take advantage of B’s unchosen 
disadvantage to gain benefits. In contrast, I hold the free-standing view, which claims that 
it is unjust for A to take advantage of B’s chosen or unchosen disadvantage to extract 
wrongful benefits. This distinction represents the significant difference between the luck 
egalitarian understanding, and my understanding, of the injustice of exploitation. As we 
shall see, the fundamental disagreement between the two views lies in whether or not the 
source of B’s disadvantage is relevant for assessing whether A’s advantage-taking 
behaviour is unjust (the egalitarian claim). 
 
6.1.1. Exploitative as Derivative Injustice 
 
Exploitation as derivative injustice consists of three claims: a causal claim, a normative claim, 
and an egalitarian claim. First, regarding the causal claim, the Derivative approach holds 
that the presence of exploitation depends on background injustices, which implies that 
whenever these background injustices have been eliminated, exploitation fades away as 
well. The Derivative approach, therefore, endorses the historical account of exploitation, that is, 
a prior injustice is necessary for the occurrence of exploitation. Moreover, since the 
Derivative approach adopts the historical account of exploitation, it is a form of the 
 
90 See Cohen (1995: ch.8), for his brilliant distinction between a causal claim and a normative claim, which 
I shall discuss later.  
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process-focused view, claiming that exploitation occurs if and only if A takes advantage of 
B’s suffering from an injustice. 
Second, the normative claim concerns whether or not exploitation is a distinct 
injustice that cannot be reducible to another kind of injustice, and whether the injustice of 
exploitation must reflect background injustice. As I shall discuss later, Roemer and Cohen 
differ in the normative claim of exploitation. Roemer holds that although exploitation is 
an injustice, it is a secondary injustice that derives from a primary unjust background 
inequality. For Roemer, the injustice of exploitation is reducible to another injustice. In 
explaining why exploitation is unjust, the unjust character of exploitation stems from 
another injustice. In a word, for Roemer, exploitation is not an independent source of 
injustice. In contrast, Cohen insists that exploitation is a distinct injustice, which cannot be 
reducible to another injustice. The injustice of exploitation is normatively distinct from 
background injustice, even if exploitation stems from background injustice. In a word, for 
Cohen, exploitation is a distinct form of injustice. What they have in common is that 
exploitation is unjust when and because it reflects the injustice of background conditions.  
Third, the distinctive feature of the Derivative approach concerns its account of when 
exploitation is unjust. According to the Derivative approach, if A extracts more benefits 
from B by taking advantage of B’s chosen disadvantage, then her advantage-taking behaviour 
is not unjust. However, it would be unjust if A extracted more benefits from B by taking 
advantage of B’s unchosen disadvantage. The Derivative approach thus adopts a historical 
account of distributive fairness: that is, the cause of B’s disadvantage is relevant for 
assessing whether A’s advantage-taking behaviour is just or unjust (Ferguson & Steiner, 
2018: 535-536). The Derivative approach, then, represents the luck egalitarian 
understanding of the injustice of exploitation in the sense that the luck/choice distinction 
is employed to assess whether A’s taking advantage of B’s disadvantage is just or unjust, 
exploitative or non-exploitative.  




6.1.2. Exploitation as Free-standing Injustice 
 
Likewise, exploitation as free-standing injustice consists of three claims. First, regarding the 
causal claim, the Free-standing approach employs an ahistorical account of exploitation. 
That is, the presence of exploitation could but need not depend on a prior background 
injustice. 91  Although in real-world cases, exploitation often stems from background 
injustice, it need not do so. In other words, the Free-standing approach acknowledges that 
exploitation may occur under just background conditions, via just steps.  
Second, concerning the normative claim, the Free-standing approach rejects the view 
that the injustice of exploitation can be subsumed into another social injustice. Rather, with 
Cohen, the Free-standing approach insists that exploitation is a distinct injustice in that the 
injustice of exploitation is not reducible to another kind of injustice. Moreover, for the 
Free-standing approach, exploitation is unjust, even if it does not reflect the injustice of 
background conditions. The normative claim is one of the fundamental differences 
between the Derivative and the Free-standing approach.  
Third, and more importantly, the Free-standing approach claims that it is unjust for 
A to take advantage of B’s disadvantage to extract wrongful benefits, regardless of the 
cause of B’s disadvantage. Contra the Derivative approach, the Free-standing approach 
holds that the source of B’s disadvantage is irrelevant for assessing whether or not A’s 
advantage-taking behaviour is just or unjust. The Free-standing approach, then, contends 
that A’s using her superior advantage over B to extract wrongful benefits from B is unjust 
and inegalitarian. Exploitation is, in itself, unjust, regardless of its history. While the 
Derivative approach maintains that exploitation that does not reflect background injustice 
 
91 For a detailed explanation, see Chapter 4.  
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is not unjust,92 the Free-standing view will treat any form of exploitation as injustice, even 
if they stem from just background conditions via just steps. To put it differently, the 
fundamental difference between the two approaches is whether or not the source of B’s 
disadvantage is relevant for determining the injustice of exploitation. The core argument 
in this chapter, then, is to reject that the source of B’s disadvantage matters in determining 
the injustice of exploitation. Exploitation, thus, is a free-standing injustice in the sense that 
A’s taking advantage of B’s chosen or unchosen disadvantage to extract wrongful benefits 
constitutes exploitation and is unjust. 
So far, I have contrasted exploitation as free-standing injustice with exploitation as 
derivative injustice. While prominent luck egalitarians employ the Derivative approach, I 
adopt the Free-standing approach. I believe that Cohen (1995), Roemer (1982, 1998), 
Arneson (2013, 2016) and Steiner (1984, 1987, 1994, 2010, 2018) hold the Derivative 
approach, while Marx (1875, 1990) and Mark Reiff (2013) adopt the Free-standing 
approach.93 The contrast I made will highlight the difference between the luck egalitarian 
understanding, and my understanding, of the injustice of exploitation. To bear the contrast 
in mind, now I shall turn to the luck egalitarian understanding and examine how luck 
egalitarians can plausibly respond to exploitation.  
 
6.2. Luck Egalitarianism and Exploitation 
 
This section examines how luck egalitarians, especially Cohen and Roemer, deal with the 
injustice of  exploitation. As Levine points out, “any revival of  socialist and Marxist theory 
 
92 Such exploitation may be unjust for other reasons.  
93 Whether Marx regards exploitation as unjust has been a controversial issue. Although I believe Marx is 
opposed to moralism, most maintain that Marx has a theory of  justice, of  which he was not aware. I would 
not engage the controversy here. Even if  Marx regards exploitation as injustice, he will hold the Free-standing 
approach. See Marshall Cohen (2014), G. A. Cohen (1983b, 1995: 11, fn.14), Allen Wood (2004: ch.9) and 
John Rawls (2008: 317-372).  
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in the years ahead will have to resume where analytical Marxism left off ” (2012: 170). My 
aim, then, is to indicate how exploitation may occur under the luck egalitarian agenda and, 
therefore, the luck egalitarian understanding is incomplete. I first introduce Roemer’s and 
Cohen’s luck-egalitarian accounts of  exploitation and explain in what sense they adopt the 
Derivative approach. Then I distinguish between brute-luck, and option-luck, exploitation. 
Brute-luck exploitation stems from unjust background conditions, while option-luck 
exploitation stems from just background conditions. More importantly, I argue that the 
luck egalitarian understanding can only deal with brute-luck exploitation but fails to notice 
the possibility of  option-luck exploitation. Moreover, I shall examine how luck egalitarians 
can plausibly respond to option-luck exploitation and why these responses do not succeed. 
Hence, the luck egalitarian understanding of  the injustice of  exploitation is incomplete, 
and a principle of  non-exploitation is needed.  
 
6.2.1. Analytical Marxism: A Sophisticated Response to Exploitation 
 
Luck egalitarians have been accused by social egalitarians of  missing the point of  equality 
because they focus on how to distribute goods fairly among individuals. “The injustice of  
exploitation”, as Young indicates, “cannot be eliminated by redistribution of  goods, for as 
long as institutionalized practices and structural relations remain unaltered, the process of  
transfer will re-create an unequal distribution of  benefits” (2011: 53). What Young suggests 
is that structural exploitation would not be eliminated solely by allocating consumption goods 
among the exploitees; therefore, luck egalitarians fail to deal with oppression and 
exploitation properly. However, Young’s view is problematic because even if  the 
redistribution of  consumption goods among individuals cannot eliminate exploitation, an 
equal distribution of  productive assets seems to work. Cohen and Roemer－two leading 
Analytical Marxists－did offer a substantive account of  capitalist exploitation and aim at 
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eliminating exploitation by redistributing productive assets and resources among 
individuals. More importantly, for them, since the maldistribution of  productive assets is a 
matter of  bad brute luck, it is unfair and should be eliminated. Therefore, contra the 
common impression that luck egalitarians are not good at dealing with relational inequality, 
Cohen’s and Roemer’s treatment to exploitation show that they can.  
In what follows, we could distinguish three Marxian accounts of  capitalist 
exploitation: the traditional view, the Roemerian turn and Cohen’s mutually constructed thesis. Both 
Cohen and Roemer attempt to revise the Traditional view. The Traditional view holds that 
capitalist exploitation refers specifically to the unequal exchange of  labour-power from 
labourers to capitalists, which is formulated as the Unequal Exchange Objection. 94  The 
objection is held by some Marxists as the core idea of  capitalist exploitation. For them, 
capitalist exploitation is unjust, just because the exchange between capitalists and labourers 
is unequal. Given the prevailing rule in an ideally competitive market is equal exchanges, the 
exchange between labourers and capitalists is unjust in that it violates the prevailing rule 
of  equal exchanges.  
The Unequal Exchange Objection, however, is problematic for Cohen and Roemer. 
For them, capitalist exploitation is conceptually associated with the maldistribution of  
productive assets. What makes the unequal flow from labourers to capitalists possible is 
the initial maldistribution of  means of  production and external resources. Hence, Roemer 
contends that capitalist exploitation－the unequal flow－is only morally meaningful insofar 
it reflects a more basic concern: namely, a concern about the initial maldistribution of  
means of  production within a society (1997: 147). Note that there are two distinct claims 
here. First, he regards the unequal exchanges between capitalists and labourers and the 
initial inequality of  productive assets as analytically distinct. So, there could be unequal 
 
94 We should be careful that whenever Cohen and Roemer talk about capitalist exploitation, it refers to the 
unequal flow from labourers to capitalists. 
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exchanges occurring between parties without any background inequality of  resources, and, 
vice-versa, inequalities in resources need not causally generate any unequal exchanges 
between parties. Second, and more importantly, he believes that the initial inequality of  
ownership of  productive assets that generate class relationships is morally more 
fundamental to Marxism than the worry about exploitation－the unequal labour exchange. 
Thus, Marxists, Roemer concludes, should shift emphasis from the Unequal Exchange 
objection to the inequality of  productive assets.  
The Roemerian turn, thus, is an attempt to subsume the concept of  exploitation into 
the concept of  distributive justice (Callinicos, 2000: 66). This is best illustrated by Roemer’s 
words: “when exploitation is an injustice, it is not because it is exploitation as such, but 
because the distribution of  labor expended and income received in an exploitative situation 
are consequences of  an initial distribution of  asset that is unjust” (Roemer, 1998: 57, my 
italics). For Roemer, exploitation－the unequal flow－is unjust, not because it has any 
normative implication in its own right; instead, exploitation obtains its unjust character 
only when and because it stems from a prior injustice, that is, the injustice of  the 
maldistribution of  productive assets and resources. Roemer, then, makes a causal claim 
that exploitation stems causally from background injustice and a normative claim that the 
injustice of  exploitation is reducible to background injustice. 
Moreover, since not every kind of  unequal flow of  goods between parties, in itself, 
constitutes exploitation, Roemer proposes the conceptual connection that the unequal 
flow only amounts to exploitation if  it stems from the maldistribution. For instance, gifting 
between friends involves an unequal exchange of  value, but gifting is not exploitation so 
long as it does not reflect any background injustice. However, exploitation only arises if  it 
stems from background injustice. Therefore, the presence of  exploitation－the unequal 
flow－depends on a prior background injustice. So understood, Roemer employs the 
Derivative approach. 
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Let us turn now to Cohen’s version. Contra Roemer, Cohen endeavours to rescue the 
significance of  exploitation, either as an important social phenomenon or as a distinct 
source of  injustice, though he would agree with Roemer’s emphasis of  the role of  
background injustice played in capitalist exploitation. Now, for Marxists, there are three 
answers to the question of  the injustice of  exploitation: 
 
(1) The Traditional view: the injustice of  exploitation lies in “the forced extraction 
of  product itself ” (Cohen, 1995: 197). 
(2) The Roemerian view: the injustice of  exploitation lies in “the fact that workers  
lack access to physical productive resources” (ibid.). 
(3) Mutually Constructed Thesis: then, Cohen suggests the third answer: “The flow 
is unjust because it reflects an unjust division of  resources which is unjust because it tends to 
produce precisely such a flow” (Cohen, 1995: 199, his italics). 
 
As specified above, the Traditional view ignores the importance of  the initial 
maldistribution, while the Roemerian view holds the Derivative approach. Cohen, 
therefore, proposes the Mutually Constructed thesis to distinguish himself  from (1) and 
(2). Now the Mutually Constructed thesis appears to be a combination of  (1) and (2), but 
it is actually a reconciliation. For Cohen, the unequal flow between capitalists and workers 
is unjust if  and only if  “it occurs for the wrong reason” (1995: 199). Hence, if  an unequal 
exchange between parties reflects only people’s different preferences, then the flow is not 
unjust. Thus, gifting is not exploitation because it does not reflect the wrong reason but 
people’s different preferences. On the other hand, an unequal transfer from labourers to 
capitalists is unjust, when and because it stems from an unjust maldistribution of  external 
resources. It is the injustice of  the maldistribution that the unequal flow reflects makes 
exploitation unjust.  
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So far, Cohen’s view is no different from Roemer’s. What really distinguishes Cohen’s 
view from Roemer’s rests on Cohen’s interpretation of  the normative role of  the 
maldistribution of  productive assets in the context of  exploitation. While Roemer regards 
the maldistribution as an independent issue and has its own normative implication, Cohen 
argues that, in order to make sense of  the maldistribution in the context of  exploitation, 
we should distinguish between the issue of  “an unequal asset distribution” as such and “its 
[the maldistribution] tendency to induce a forced product flow” (1995: 200, my italics). For 
Cohen, the maldistribution is unjust in two distinct senses. On the one hand, as Roemer 
insists, the inequality of  productive assets, itself, constitutes a form of  distributive injustice; 
on the other hand, the fact that the maldistribution tends to generate exploitation constitutes 
another form of  injustice. The second meaning of  injustice of  the maldistribution, 
however, has been ignored by Roemer. Regarding the relationship between exploitation 
and the maldistribution, what matters is its tendency to generate the forced extraction, 
rather than the inequality as such. To be sure, Cohen does not deny that the maldistribution of  
productive assets, in itself, is unjust; rather, its salient relevance as regards exploitation is 
its tendency to generate the unequal flow.  
Cohen proposes the case of  gun inequality to clarify why it is the tendency to generate 
exploitation, rather than the inequality of  productive assets as such, that matters (1995: 
198). Suppose in a region where people can possess guns legally and, as time goes, the 
inequality of  guns arises and has caused death. Now people call for an equal distribution 
of  guns because supposedly the equal distribution of  guns brings about fewer or no killings 
due to the balance of  power. The gun case suggests that what matters at stake is not that 
guns are not equally allocated among citizens, but that the injustice of  the gun inequality 
lies in its tendency to pose a threat and cause death. Hence, in the gun case, we demand 
the equal distribution of  guns not because of  the inequality as such is wrong, but because 
the equal distribution leads to fewer or no killings. It is then clear that in the gun case, what 
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really matters is that the maldistribution of  guns tends to do harm and cause many deaths. 
By the same token, with respect to the maldistribution in the context of  exploitation, what 
matters is not primarily that productive assets are not equally distributed among individuals, 
though the inequality as such is a form of  distributive injustice. Rather, it is the unequal 
flow－exploitation－that the maldistribution facilitates makes it unjust.  
Now, in Cohen’s view, maldistribution and exploitation are two distinct forms of  
injustice and have different normative orders. Since what makes the maldistribution unjust 
in a relevant way is its tendency to generate exploitation, it is the unequal flow that remains 
the “normatively fundamental injustice” (Cohen, 1995: 200). On the other hand, the 
inequality of  productive assets is a secondary injustice from a normative point of  view. As 
Cohen indicates, although the maldistribution is “causally fundamental in the explanation 
of  the possibility and the occurrence of  unjust transfers”, it “would remain a normatively 
secondary (though causally primary) wrong” (1995: 199). In a nutshell, although the 
maldistribution and exploitation are both fundamentally unjust, exploitation is the primary 
injustice while the maldistribution remains the secondary injustice because what we care 
most is the unjust effect－that is, exploitation－that the maldistribution tends to generate. 
So understood, the injustice of  exploitation, for Cohen, is more primary than that of  the 
maldistribution.  
Besides, the inequality of  productive assets remains the secondary injustice because 
the effect of  the allocation of  productive assets is very different from that of  consumption 
goods. While consumption goods are designed to satisfy a specific need or want, the 
purpose of  productive assets is to generate consumption goods. If  consumption goods 
must be generated before being consumed by a being, then those who possess productive 
assets will have the power against those have-nots to decide to how to organise economic 
activities and how to allocate consumption goods. Therefore, the distribution of  means of  
production and the productive structures are logically prior to the issue of  the allocation 
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of  consumption goods (Marx, 2000: 610-616; Forst, 2014: ch.1, 2013: 42-45). On the other 
hand, the unequal distribution of  productive assets would not directly affect one’s well-
being as that of  consumption goods. While an individual’s well-being is reduced when she 
has fewer consumption goods to meet her needs, the inequality of  productive assets has 
no such direct effects. For instance, workers, by definition, do not possess means of  
production, but skilled workers could have a high level of  well-being due to their abundant 
salary. If  that is the case, to be excluded from accessing productive assets is objectionable 
only when it generates domination, exploitation, and other wrongs among individuals. 
Their different functions, and the bad effects they tend to generate, explain why the 
allocation of  productive assets should be differentiated from that of  consumption goods. 
Now Cohen offers a sophisticated version of  the luck egalitarian understanding of  
the injustice of  exploitation. First, for Cohen, exploitation stems only from background 
injustice (Otsuka, 2010: 222). This is the causal claim. Second, and more specifically, 
exploitation is unjust if  and only if  it reflects the unjust maldistribution of  means of  production. As 
Cohen wrote, “the crucial question for exploitation concerns the justice of  the distribution 
of  the means of  production” (1988: 234). Hence, exploitation is a form of  historical 
injustice in that we can be traced to a prior background injustice. For him, exploitation and 
the maldistribution are two distinct forms of  injustice and, therefore, exploitation is not 
reducible to background injustice. This is the normative claim. As we shall see, Cohen 
states that “A person is exploited when unfair advantage is taken of  him, and he suffers from 
(bad) brute luck” (1989: 908, his italics; 1995: 151). This represents the egalitarian claim, 
endorsed by the Derivative approach, that the source of  B’s disadvantage matters in 
determining whether A’s advantage-taking behaviour is just or unjust. Hence, Cohen’s 
Mutually Constructed thesis employs the Derivative approach.  
Thus far, I have introduced how Cohen and Roemer perceive the injustice of  
exploitation. For them, exploitation is historical in that it must stem from background 
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injustice; more importantly, the unequal flow－exploitation－is unjust if  and only if  it 
reflects the injustice of  background conditions. Moreover, their difference lies in the 
normative priority between the injustice of  exploitation and background conditions. On 
Roemer’s version, exploitation is a secondary injustice, whose injustice derivates from the 
maldistribution of  productive assets. On Cohen’s version,95  exploitation is a primary 
injustice, and it is unjust because exploitation reflects the maldistribution of  productive 
assets (Vrousalis, 2014: 156). The maldistribution is a secondary injustice in the context of  
exploitation because what matters is its tendency to generate exploitation. As a result, for 
Cohen, the injustice-making features lie both in exploitation－the unequal flow－and the 
maldistribution. Therefore, I term his view mutually constructed. Moreover, since to be 
exploited and excluded from access to productive assets is beyond one’s control and thus 
a matter of  bad brute luck, luck egalitarians will condemn the injustice of  exploitation and 
the maldistribution (Barry, 2006: 94). Cohen will demand an equal distribution of  means 
of  production and external resources among citizens as well.  
 
6.2.2. The Force of  Cleanly Generated Capitalist Relationships 
 
The above discussion has dealt with the causal claim, and the normative claim, of  the 
Derivative approach. In this section, I explicate the egalitarian claim of  the Derivative 
approach by presenting a revised version of  Cohen’s cleanly generated capitalist 
relationships. Let us consider Cohen’s cleanly generated capitalist relationship. 
 
In a cleanly generated capitalist relationship, there is a capital-lacking worker on one side and 
a capital-endowed capitalist on the other, but the relationship is cleanly generated in that here 
the differential endowment is the upshot of  a history which begins with equal capital 
 
95 It is important to note that what I have concluded is Cohen’s early position on the relationship between 
exploitation and background injustice. His view might change over time given his shift from a focus on 
Marxism to his later luck egalitarian phase.  
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endowment in a context of  self-ownership and which reaches its capitalist stage as a result 
of  no force or fraud but of  the greater frugality and/or talent of  those who come to have all 
the capital. (Cohen, 1995: 161) 
 
In Cohen’s Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Cohen aimed to clarify Marxist political 
philosophy in relation to the notion of  self-ownership, rather than offering a thorough 
luck egalitarian view. Therefore, the original case of  cleanly generated capitalist relationship 
has to be revised for it to be relevant to the issue between luck and social egalitarianism. 
Now consider a revised version of  Cohen’s cleanly generated capitalist relationship: 
 
In a cleanly generated capitalist relationship, there is a capital-lacking worker on one 
side and a capital-endowed capitalist on the other, but the relationship is cleanly 
generated in the luck-egalitarian sense that the ultimate differential endowment is the 
upshot of  a history which begins with equal capital endowment and identical talents 
between them in a context of  self-ownership and which reaches its capitalist stage as 
a result of  no force or fraud but of  the choice and/or good option luck of  those who 
come to have all the capital.96  
 
The revised version of  Cohen’s cleanly generated capitalist relationship can be further 
explicated by the luck/choice principle. As Dworkin specifies, “[i]t is a ruling principle of  
equality, we have decided, that it is unjust when some people lead their lives with less wealth 
available to them, or in otherwise less favourable circumstances, than others, not through 
some choice or gamble of  their own but through brute bad luck” (2002: 347). The 
Derivative approach, then, holds that the maldistribution of  productive assets and 
exploitation is a matter of  bad brute luck because the victims of  exploitation and the 
maldistribution are not liable for their being exploited and excluded from access to 
 
96 This is a revised version of  Cohen’s cleanly generated capitalist relationship in that I suppose that the 
capital-lacking worker and the capital-endowed capitalist have identical talents. Their ultimate difference can 
only come from their differential choice and option luck. In so revising, I suppose the role of  brute luck has 
no influence on their ultimate difference, and therefore the revised capitalist relationship fits the luck 
egalitarian principle. 
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productive assets. Given that luck egalitarianism aims to neutralise the effect of  brute luck 
whenever possible, luck egalitarians will not only compensate for the exploited but, more 
importantly, seek an initially equal distribution of  means of  production and resources 
among individuals to eliminate exploitation.  
Luck egalitarians attempt to eliminate inequalities by an equal distribution of  certain 
metrics, such as Cohen’s equal access to advantage (1989), Dworkin’s resourcism (1981), 
and Arneson’s equal opportunity for welfare (1989). As Dworkin explicitly indicates, “[i]f  
the central features of  equality of  resources were realized, then class would disappear, at 
least over time” (2002: 345, his italics). Likewise, Cohen notes that “A person is exploited 
when unfair advantage is taken of  him, and he suffers from (bad) brute luck when his bad 
luck is not the result of  a gamble or risk which he could have avoided” (1989: 908, his 
italics). If  exploitation involves one’s unfair advantage to be taken by another, this suggests 
that given an initially equal distribution of  ‘equal access to advantage’, exploitation would 
be eliminated. More importantly, luck egalitarians seek to extinguish relational inequalities, 
such as exploitation and class, by correcting background injustice. For Cohen and Roemer, 
since they hold that exploitation stems from background injustice, the neutralisation of  
background injustice follows the correction of  relational inequality. Hence, Cohen will not 
take the unequal flow in cleanly generated capitalist relationships as exploitation. 
Consequently, given an initially equal distribution of  certain metrics among 
individuals, irrespective of  whether these metrics are resources, welfare, capacities, or a 
hybrid approach, the ultimate inequalities or the capitalist relationships are cleanly 
generated in the sense that they are a result of  people’s differential effects and (good or 
bad) option luck, for which they should be liable. After the initial equal distribution of  
certain metrics, the resulting inequalities between individuals, luck egalitarians presume, 
reflect only people’s differential outcomes of  option luck, either because some are willing 
to spend more time to work than leisure (people’s differential preferences), and/or because 
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some are willing to invest in high-risk, high-paying projects (their different ambitions). 
Hence, for Dworkin, given an initially equal distribution of  resources and the envy test, 
the following unequal outcomes, when they are generated by voluntary choices, are not 
unfair (Anderson, 2008: 243-246).  
The force of  the cleanly generated capitalist relationships, then, rests on the fact that, 
since any inequality generated between individuals results only from their voluntary choices 
and differential preferences, and since, both for luck and social egalitarians, people should 
be substantively responsible for the cost of  their genuine choice, no one can complain 
justifiably that the upshot is unfair on egalitarian reason. 97  The ultimate capitalist 
relationships, even if  they are unequal and dreadful for some Marxists, are not unfair for 
luck egalitarians. The cleanly generated capitalist relationships illustrate the egalitarian claim 
of  the Derivative approach.  
 
6.2.3. Brute-Luck and Option-Luck Exploitation 
 
Having clarified the egalitarian claim, endorsed by the Derivative approach, I then 
distinguish between brute-luck and option-luck exploitation, which is meant to distinguish 
between exploitation occurring before, and after, an initially equal distribution of  
productive assets and resources. Once the distinction has been established, I pose two 
objections to the Derivative approach. First, although luck egalitarians can effectively 
eliminate brute-luck exploitation, they cannot deal with the presence of  option-luck 
exploitation. Second, and more importantly, I object to the egalitarian claim, endorsed by 
the Derivative approach, that the cause of  B’s disadvantage matters in determining whether 
A’s advantage-taking behaviour is just or unjust, exploitative or non-exploitative. In other 
 
97 Note that the later Cohen will think that the outcome of  the cleanly generated capitalist relationships is 
unfair and problematic. See Cohen (2011: ch.6). 
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words, I maintain the Free-standing view that A’s taking advantage of  B’s, fair or unfair, 
disadvantage to extract wrongful benefits, is unjust and inegalitarian. Hence, the Derivative 
approach is incomplete, and luck egalitarians need a free-standing principle of  non-
exploitation. Let us explore how option-luck exploitation arises in a just society.  
Exploitation may stem from just background conditions, via just steps. More 
specifically, exploitation can be cleanly generated as a result of  differential outcomes of  
option luck. Even if  the initial distribution of  resources is equal, and the subsequent 
inequalities are not unfair because they reflect people’s differential choices, exploitation 
may nevertheless occur. Now exploitation can be divided into two types relative to the 
brute/option luck distinction, namely, brute-luck exploitation and option-luck exploitation. 
Brute-luck exploitation refers to a situation in which A presses her unfair advantage against 
B’s unfair disadvantage to extract more benefits. In contrast, option-luck exploitation refers 
to a situation in which A presses her fair advantage against B’s fair disadvantage to extract 
wrongful benefits. The core difference between brute-luck and option-luck exploitation 
lies in whether A’s advantage and B’s disadvantage are generated from just or unjust 
background conditions, via just or unjust steps, according to the luck egalitarian agenda.98 
The distinction is meant to specify the site where exploitation takes place and will help to 
clarify the object of  our discussion. In my view, while luck egalitarians can effectively 
eliminate brute-luck exploitation by an initially equal distribution of  certain metrics, they 
fail to notice the possibility of  option-luck exploitation, not to mention how to cope with 
it effectively. Let us examine how option-luck exploitation arises.  
In general, exploitation occurs when and because A possesses relatively superior, and 
sufficient, agency than B’s that A can take advantage of  B’s inferiority to extract wrongful 
benefits. That is, the Relational condition has to be satisfied for the occurrence of  
 
98 To be sure, luck egalitarians differ slightly in what counts as fairness, but most, if  not all, endorse an 
interpretation of  the brute/option luck distinction to construct their fairness view. Their different 
interpretations of  the brute/option luck distinction would not affect my argument here.  
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exploitation, brute-luck or option-luck. The Relational condition could be met in either a 
just, or unjust, world, as determined the luck egalitarian agenda. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the asymmetry of  advantage between parties may occur even under the luck 
egalitarian agenda. Consider the following two cases that happen after an initially equal 
distribution of  certain metrics and endowments. 
 
Greedy Mountain Rescuer. Bob enjoys wildlife and loves to climb alone; Allen loves 
hunting. One day, Bob is stranded in the mountain because he ignores the weather 
forecast; but somehow, Allen roams the mountain and offers to rescue Bob for an 
exorbitant price, say, ten times the cost of  one rescue by the national rescue team. 
Bob accepts the deal, and Allen exploits Bob.   
 
The Priceless Painting. Suppose Alex and Betty are in a just world where people have a 
just share of  resources. One day, Betty is driving with a priceless painting in her open-
top car; she has worked hard and saved for many years to buy the painting. Suppose 
it then looks like it is going to rain. Fortunately, Betty sees Alex. He has a solution to 
protect the painting. Suppose he has a completely reliable waterproof  cover bought 
from a store for 1 pound. Alex offers to help, but only if  Betty gives him 80% of  the 
worth of  the painting. Betty accepts, and Alex exploits Betty.  
 
The two cases are clearly exploitative and cleanly generated. If  so, option-luck exploitation 
may occur even under a just society. Exploitation can easily arise whenever one obtains 
superior advantage than another. For instance, as Dworkin notes, “So as time passes some 
citizens will grow richer than others” as a result of  option luck and differential preferences 
(2002: 346). Greedy Mountain Rescuer and The Priceless Painting illustrate how option-luck 
exploitation may occur in a just society. In Greedy Mountain Rescuer, the point is that there 
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are just too many contingent occasions in which people, even with an initially equal 
distribution of  resources and endowments, can easily find opportunities to exploit others. 
In The Priceless Painting, A’s superior advantage compared to B has nothing to do with brute 
luck and, therefore, the case is cleanly generated for luck egalitarians. In either case, option-
luck exploitation appears even when material inequality has been corrected. The Derivative 
approach is incomplete.  
 
6.2.4. The Incompleteness of  The Derivative Approach 
 
The presence of  option-luck exploitation rejects the three claims－ the causal, the 
normative, and the egalitarian claim－of  the Derivative approach and, therefore, illustrates 
the incompleteness of  it. Let us consider the causal and the normative claim of  the 
Derivative approach first. For the Derivative approach, exploitation must stem causally 
from background injustice (the causal claim), and exploitation is unjust because it reflects 
background injustice (the normative claim). The presence of  option-luck exploitation, 
however, has rejected both claims. The fact that exploitation can arise from just 
background conditions, via just steps, illustrates that exploitation needs not to stem from 
background injustice (the rejection of  the causal claim) and, therefore, as I will explain 
later, exploitation can be unjust even if  it does not reflect the injustice of  background 
conditions (the rejection of  the normative claim). Thus, the neutralisation of  background 
injustice is not always sufficient to eliminate exploitation. The Derivative approach then is 
incomplete in the senses that it mistakenly adopts the historical account of  exploitation 
and fails to note that exploitation can be unjust even if  it does not reflect background 
injustice.99  
 
99 Note that since Cohen holds that exploitation is unjust if  and only if  it reflects the wrong reason (1995: 
199), he may maintain that option-luck exploitation is unjust because it reflects the unjust treatment that A 
imposes superior advantage upon B to extract more benefits.  
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Now let us consider the egalitarian claim of  the Derivative approach. The egalitarian 
claim could be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Cleanly generated capitalist relationships are not unfair. 
(2) Therefore, the inequality of  agency between A and B is not unfair. 
(3) Therefore, A’s taking advantage of  B’s fair disadvantage to extract more benefits is 
just and not exploitative.100 
 
Here comes my objection to the egalitarian claim of the Derivative approach. I reject (3) 
because the cause of B’s disadvantage is irrelevant for determining whether A’s advantage-
taking behaviour is just or unjust, exploitative or non-exploitative. Notice that the 
egalitarian claim is actually combined with the causal claim in the Derivative approach. 
First, consider the causal claim. As I have mentioned in section 6.1.1., since the Derivative 
approach is a form of the process-focused view－holding that exploitation occurs when 
A takes advantage of B’s unchosen disadvantage to extract benefits－the luck/choice 
distinction is employed to determine when A’s advantage-taking behaviour constitutes 
exploitation. However, the presence of option-luck exploitation has illustrated that to be 
exploitation, the fairness of B’s disadvantage and A’s advantage is irrelevant. Exploitation 
may take place between individuals, whose (dis)advantages are fair according to a principle 
of luck egalitarianism.  
On the other hand, the egalitarian claim, held by the Derivative approach, insists that 
it is not unjust for A to take advantage of B’s chosen disadvantage, and the source of B’s 
disadvantage is relevant for the injustice of A’s advantage-taking behaviour. The Derivative 
approach, however, is misleading as well. A acts unjustly even when A takes advantage of 
 
100 See Wolff  (2018: 183-185), for his discussion of  a cleanly generated capitalism.  
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B’s chosen disadvantage to gain benefits. In (3), the fundamental injustice rests on the 
unequal treatment that A presses her superior advantage against B to extract wrongful 
benefits. A fails to treat B equally in (3), even if A’s advantage and B’s disadvantage are fair 
according to a doctrine of luck egalitarianism. It is one thing to say that the resulting 
inequality from purely option luck is fair, another to say that A’s taking advantage of B’s 
chosen disadvantage to extract wrongful benefits, is not unjust. Even if the resulting 
inequality is fair according to luck egalitarianism, this does not follow that A’s exploitative 
treatment to B is not inegalitarian. Another egalitarian consideration, rather than the luck 
egalitarian one, involves here.  
The Free-standing view, thus, insists that the distributive fairness of A’s advantage 
and B’s disadvantage is irrelevant for assessing whether A exploits B, and whether it is 
unjust for A to take advantage of B’s disadvantage to extract more benefits. Hence, the 
egalitarian claim, endorsed by the Derivative approach, is incomplete.  
My critique of the Derivative approach, then, applies to the cleanly generated 
capitalist relationships as well. Even if the capitalist relationships are cleanly generated, this 
does not follow that exploitation would not occur anymore. The asymmetry of  productive 
assets may generate option-luck exploitation easily. Even though the capitalist relationships 
are not unfair relative to the luck/choice principle, as Cohen points out, the asymmetry of  
means of  production is very likely to generate exploitation. If  what matters is the tendency 
that the asymmetry of  means of  production will generate exploitation, rather than the 
inequality as such, then the worry of  its tendency remains even in a just world. The worry 
is not about the possibility but a real threat. Just as in the gun-inequality case where the 
unequal distribution of  guns is very likely to result in many killings, it is no exaggeration 
that the asymmetry of  productive assets may lead to option-luck exploitation. The cleanly 
generated capitalist relationship, then, is objectionable just because option-luck 
exploitation may occur between workers and capitalists anyway. Hence, the presence of  
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option-luck exploitation in cleanly generated capitalist relationships suggests that the 
Derivative approach holds an implausible account of  exploitation.  
If  that is the case, we then have a reason, other than the luck egalitarian one, to 
constrain the asymmetry of  advantages, even if  it stems purely from option luck. We have 
reason to object to the cleanly generated capitalist relationship, not because the outcome 
of  the relationship is unfair according to a distributive egalitarian reason, but because the 
relationships may generate further exploitation if  a free-standing principle of  non-
exploitation is not provided.101 Hence, luck egalitarianism is vulnerable to the exploitation 
objection, and luck egalitarians need a free-standing principle of  non-exploitation.  
 
6.2.5. Objections and Replies 
 
Now I shall consider two ways that luck egalitarians can reply to option-luck exploitation 
for egalitarian reasons. I would not discuss how luck egalitarians can condemn the injustice 
of  exploitation by adopting a pluralistic position. As Lippert-Rasmussen (2016: 3) indicates, 
luck egalitarians can regard exploitation as an injustice for non-egalitarian reasons. For 
instance, Wood (2016) has argued that since exploitation constrains the exploitees’ freedom, 
it is unjust for the freedom-based reason.102 Luck egalitarians can deal effectively with 
option-luck exploitation by appealing to non-egalitarian considerations. I shall leave the 
pluralistic position aside. Moreover, since the victims of  option-luck exploitation suffer 
purely option luck, it is possible for luck egalitarians to adopt the all-luck-egalitarianism 
approach and a principle of  stakes, that I discussed in Chapter 5, to cope with option-luck 
exploitation. Thus, I shall not discuss the responses anymore and focus instead on two 
major ways, namely, Sufficientarianism and genuine choice.  
 
101 At the end of  this chapter, I will explain why non-exploitation could be construed as an egalitarian reason 
and, therefore, we have an egalitarian reason to constrain option-luck inequality.  
102 See also Cohen (1983c) for his explanation of  the unfreedom of  proletarians.  




6.2.5.1. Sufficientarian Luck Egalitarianism  
 
One way to respond to option-luck exploitation is to argue that some are exploited just 
because they are below a threshold of  sufficiency. 103  Once their basic needs meet a 
sufficiency threshold, at least some forms of  option-luck exploitation cease to occur. 
Sufficientarianism concerns the pattern of  distribution. Proponents of  Sufficientarianism 
claim that “justice requires that everyone gets an adequate (or sufficient) amount of  
specified goods” (Brock, 2018: 87). The core idea of  Sufficientarianism then requires that 
“a certain requirement or standard has been met”, rather than everyone should be equally well-
off  (Frankfurt, 1987: 37, his italics). For sufficientarians, the satisfaction of  one’s basic 
needs is more important than equal distribution. While egalitarianism aims to make an 
interpersonal comparison between individuals, Sufficientarianism requires the fulfilment 
of  a non-comparative standard. It thus offers an alternative of  patterns of  distributive 
justice to egalitarianism. When complementing with Sufficientarianism, luck egalitarianism 
secures the satisfaction of  everyone’s basic needs, when and because one’s insufficiency of  
basic needs is a matter of  bad brute luck.  
Sufficientarian luck egalitarianism, therefore, guarantees that no one will fall below a 
sufficiency baseline, even if  their destitution is caused by their bad option luck. Therefore, 
in cleanly generated capitalist relationships, labourers are capable of  refuting an 
exploitative offer because they are not afraid of  unemployment, provided that their basic 
needs are secured. Moreover, one major way that option-luck exploitation takes place is 
when and because people’s basic needs are unmet due to their bad option luck. Luck 
egalitarianism, when complemented with Sufficientarianism, can prevent those forms of  
 
103 For a similar discussion, see section 4.2.2. 
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option-luck exploitation from happening. More importantly, the incorporation of  
Sufficientarianism is still based on an egalitarian reason, because Sufficientarianism belongs 
to the family of  distributive equality. It aims to guarantee a sufficiency threshold. Hence, 
luck egalitarians can eliminate, at least, some forms of  option-luck exploitation without 
reference to non-egalitarian reasons.  
Sufficientarian luck egalitarianism, however, faces an objection. For Mulkeen, since 
Sufficientarian luck egalitarianism, endorsed by Tan (2012), is unconditional in that it 
disregards how people’s disadvantages come about, it might expose members of  society to 
opportunists, who use the unconditional sufficiency threshold to gain benefits and impose 
the cost of  their risky behaviours on others (2020: 10-13). For example, a hiker may use 
the sufficiency threshold to continue her risky behaviours, while imposing the burdens on 
other members of  society. Thus, Sufficientarian luck egalitarianism, if  unconditional, 
invites opportunistic exploitation, where the opportunists take advantage of  the 
unconditional sufficiency threshold to obtain unfair benefits.  
In response, Andrew Williams’s distinction between externalising and internalising 
Sufficientarians is illuminating here. While both variants uphold sufficiency, internalisers 
will ask the opportunists to bear the cost of  their risky behaviour, and externalizers will 
demand the public to take the cost of  other’s risky behaviour (Williams, 2008: 501-502). 
For example, in Greedy Mountain Rescuer, internalisers might demand compulsory insurance 
and charge a special tax on Bob’s risky behaviour without imposing the cost of  rescuing 
Bob to others, externalizers might use the public tax to cover the cost (Williams, 2008: 502). 
Thus, Mulkeen’s objection fails to notice that Sufficientarian luck egalitarians can be an 
internaliser to avoid opportunist exploitation. Consequently, Sufficientarian luck 
egalitarianism with proper constrains on opportunistic exploitation can respond to option-
luck exploitation without appealing to a free-standing principle of  non-exploitation.  
Nonetheless, even if  Sufficientarian luck egalitarians with proper constrains on 
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opportunist exploitation are capable of  dealing with some forms of  option-luck exploitation, 
where people are exploited because of  their insufficiency, Sufficientarian luck egalitarians 
just would not remove all forms of  option-luck exploitation. Option-luck exploitation may 
occur even between two persons whose basic needs are satisfied. For instance, in The 
Priceless Painting, Betty is exploited by Alex, not because her basic needs are unmet, but for 
some other reason. Betty is clearly above a sufficiency threshold, and her exchange with 
Alex is cleanly exploitative. Luck egalitarians, then, cannot invoke a sufficiency principle to 
fully prevent option-luck exploitation.  
 
6.2.5.2. Genuine Choice 
 
Another way to respond to option-luck exploitation is to argue that the victim of  option-
luck exploitation should be partially compensated because their disadvantage does not 
reflect their genuine choice. For some luck egalitarians, people should be fully responsible 
for her disadvantage if  and only if  it reflects their genuine choice. As Cohen specifies, 
“The amount of  genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of  degree” (2011: 32). In 
other words, one’s choice is to some extent influenced by uncontrollable factors and, 
therefore, luck egalitarians would partially compensate for the victim of  bad luck if  one’s 
disadvantage is not a result of  purely option luck.  
There are several ways that one needs not hold full responsibility for their choice. 
First, if  one’s choices are inadequate, her choice would not be a genuine one. For instance, 
if  one has only two desperate options between being shot by a robber and killing the robber, 
he hardly has any genuine choice, though he does have two choices on the table. Adequate 
choices then are a necessary condition of  genuine choice (Navin, 2011: 539). Second, the 
expected outcome of  a choice will reduce one’s responsibility for a choice (Navin, 2011: 
541). It is likely that, although one is confident about the expected outcome of  a risk, 
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something unexpected happens and leads to a catastrophic consequence that one cannot 
bear. For instance, someone encounters an air crash because of  a systematic design error 
of  the aircraft company. Or, people in a just world would not expect that people’s 
exercising their rights and trading freely will generate exploitation as a result of  purely 
option luck. In either case, we will think that people should not be fully responsible for 
such an unexpected and disastrous outcome. The choice’s genuineness may be undermined 
by some other factors than the above two. The point, however, is that luck egalitarians will 
partially compensate for the victim of  option-luck exploitation if  being exploited does not 
reflect their genuine choice.  
In reply, to compensate for the victim of  option-luck exploitation is not to eliminate 
option-luck exploitation. In Greedy Mountain Rescuer and The Priceless Painting, even if  Bob 
and Betty are partially compensated, it is totally missing the point since what matters is to 
prevent exploitation. Luck egalitarians, however, can frame a principle to prevent harms 
arising from people’s lack of  genuine choice, rather compensating the harms that arise. I 
can think of  two ways to question the luck egalitarian principle of  preventing harms. First, 
since the effect of  the principle should be proportionate to the choice’s genuineness, it is 
unclear how to measure the genuineness of  one’s choice in practice. Second, there are cases 
where to be exploited reflects people’s genuine choice in the sense that their choices are 
adequate, and the outcome of  their choices is not unexpected. In such cases, the principle, 
it seems, cannot do anything to option-luck exploitation that reflects people’s genuine 
choice. 
In sum, I have demonstrated that although luck egalitarians can deal effectively with 
brute-luck exploitation, option-luck exploitation remains a perplexing question for them. 
This is because luck egalitarians hold mistakenly that the source of  B’s disadvantage is 
relevant for determining whether or not A exploits B and whether A’s advantage-taking 
behaviour is unjust. However, the fact that option-luck exploitation arises under luck 
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egalitarian agenda illustrates that the Derivative approach is incomplete, and we shall 
endorse exploitation as free-standing injustice, instead. When we adopt the Free-standing 
approach, option-luck exploitation will be considered unjust for luck egalitarians and urges 
the elimination of  it.104 My conclusion, thus, is that luck egalitarians need a principle of  
non-exploitation that I develop in the next section, and perhaps some other similar 
principles, to be complete. Having criticised the luck egalitarian understanding of  the 
injustice of  exploitation, in the rest of  the chapter, I explicate exploitation as free-standing 
injustice.  
 
6.3. Exploitation as Free-standing Injustice 
 
Exploitation as free-standing injustice claims that exploitation is a free-standing injustice 
in the fundamental sense that the anti-egalitarian behaviour－the exploiter’s pressing her 
superior advantage upon the exploitee to extract wrongful gains－violates the core ideal 
of  egalitarianism that we should treat one another as social equals, regardless of  how B’s 
disadvantage comes about. More specifically, since the exploiter fails to treat the exploitee’s 
interests and claims as containing the important moral weight, she violates the principle of  
egalitarian justice that we treat each other as self-originating sources of  justificatory claims. 
Conversely, when A takes B’s claims and genuine interests as containing equally moral 
weight as hers, A would not press her advantage upon B to extract wrongful benefits in 
their asymmetrical relationship. Hence, exploitation is inegalitarian, not mainly because of  
the unfairness of  B’s disadvantage, nor because A and B’s relationship is asymmetrical, but 
 
104  But, in order to eliminate option-luck exploitation effectively, luck egalitarians have to analyse the 
substance of  option-luck exploitation and how it arises under an ideally just circumstance. In my view, the 
question is related to “other-affecting choice”, which refers to a situation where one’s choice is another’s bad 
brute luck (Lazenby, 2010: 285-286; Elford, 2013: 145-146; Miller, 2015: 137-140). Consequently, luck 
egalitarianism has to think about how to regulate people’s free choices, which may result in others’ bad brute 
luck. See also Matthew Seligman (2007: 271-274). However, given the space limitation, I shall not explore the 
issue any further.  
What makes exploitation unjust 
193 
 
primarily because A presses her superior advantage upon B to extract wrongful gains.  
 
6.3.1. What Exploitation is 
 
A exploits B if  and only if  (a) A gains wrongfully by (b) taking advantage of  B’s weaker agency 
in which (c) B voluntarily engages in a transaction in which with A (or someone, C, who is accountable 
to A). 
 
In my formulation, exploitation consists of  two forms of  wrongful gains: namely, unfair 
gain, or disrespectful gain, or both. The exploiter can gain unfairly relative to a norm of  
fair distribution, or she gains from a disrespectful transaction, one that violates the Merely 
Means Principle, with B. Meaning, unfair gains refer to a situation where a distribution of  
benefits and burdens between parties in a transaction fails to be consistent with a fairness 
baseline, and the resulting outcome is unfair to the exploitee. In contrast, disrespectful 
gains refer to a situation where the exploiter gains from a disrespectful transaction with 
the exploitee, in which the exploitee is treated merely as a means.  
On the other hand, the Relational condition is the crucial element to perceive 
exploitation as an inegalitarian treatment. Even if  A’s agency is superior to B, and A is 
capable of  addressing an exploitative offer to B, if  A does not press her superiority upon 
B to extract wrongful benefits, no exploitation occurs. Hence, exploitation, in my view, is 
fundamentally about A’s pressing her superiority against B to extract wrongful gains from 
their transaction.  
Overall, my general account of  exploitation includes two forms of  wrongful 
exploitation: unfair exploitation and disrespectful exploitation.105 
 
 
105 If  we focus on volitional exploitation, (c) should be added.  
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Unfair Exploitation: A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, 
compared to A’s, to extract unfair benefits from the transaction with B, relative to a 
fairness baseline. 
 
Disrespectful Exploitation: A exploits B if  A takes advantage of  B’s weaker agency, 
compared to A’s, to gain benefits from the disrespectful transaction that violates the 
Merely Means Principle, with B. 
 
Given this, let me identify the injustice-making feature in my account of  exploitation. 
 
6.3.2. Where the Injustice-Making Feature of  Exploitation lies 
 
If  a photographer attempts to present a critical photo of  the injustice of  exploitation to 
the public, what would it be? A prima facie answer would be the unfairness of  the resulting 
distribution in a transaction. Mark Reiff  (2013) offers an account of  exploitation as free-
standing injustice. For him, exploitation is “the unjust extraction of  value from another as 
part of  a voluntary exchange transaction not otherwise prohibited by law” (Reiff, 2013: 
27). Exploitation, on Reiff ’s account, is by definition unjust in that extraction of  value 
violates “the doctrine of  the just price” (2013: 44). The principle of  the just price refers to 
the cost of  production of  a commodity, which has a very long history (Reiff, 2013, ch.2; 
Wilson, 1975; De Roover, 1968; Baldwin, 1958).106 Accordingly, whenever an exchange 
fails to obey the principle of  the just price, this means the party, who “receives less than 
the just price contributes more value to the transaction than he receives in return” (Reiff, 
2013: 73), is exploited. On this view, exploitation is unjust because it violates the principle 
 
106 See also section 2.3.3. 
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of  reciprocity, which requires that what one contributes should be equivalent to what one 
receives (Warren, 1995: 51). In a nutshell, for Reiff, exploitation is unjust because it violates 
the principle of  reciprocity.  
In my view, Reiff ’s account is correct, but incomplete because it fails to take 
disrespectful exploitation into account. In disrespectful exploitation, it does not matter if  
the exploited receives a just price from the exploiter; the exchange violates the Mere Means 
Principle and, therefore, it is morally impermissible. Thus, though it is sufficient, the 
violation of  the principle of  the just price is not necessary for exploitation. Rather, Reiff ’s 
account is a form of  unfair exploitation in that the principle of  the just price is a fairness 
baseline that signifies when a distribution of  benefits and burdens is fair or unfair. Since 
unfair exploitation is only a major form of  exploitation, Reiff ’s account is incomplete and 
explains only part of  the story. If  the photographer presents the resulting unfairness as a 
critical moment of  the injustice of  exploitation to the public, people might think that “well, 
exploitation is all about the resulting outcome.” That picture, for me, is misleading.  
Now turn to disrespectfulness. Disrespectful exploitation is clearly inegalitarian, for 
instance, in the Scanlon’s sense that it is humiliating (Scanlon, 2018: 100). The exploiter’s 
gaining benefits from a disrespectful transaction humiliates the exploitee. However, even 
if  disrespectful exploitation is inegalitarian, as it is only another major form of  exploitation, 
it cannot represent the fundamental injustice-making feature of  exploitation. To perceive 
disrespectfulness in exploitation as the fundamental injustice-making feature is to convey 
an impression that exploitation is all about prohibited exchanges, such as commercial 
surrogacy, child labour and organ selling. This picture, too, is misleading and dangerous 
because it runs the risk of  normalising the incomplete image of  exploitation (Balibar, 2017: 
135-136). That is, the impression will make us get accustomed to everyday exploitative 
relationships.  
In my view, it is the moment－when the exploiter presses her superior advantage 
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against the exploitee to extract wrongful gains－that conveys the complete image of  the 
injustice of  exploitation. I agree with Christopher Bertram that “Exploitation essentially 
involves a charge of  injustice in process: it involves not just a judgment about the relative 
benefits and burdens endured by persons, but also about how the pattern of  differential 
benefit arose from the interaction of  producers and beneficiaries” (2009: 149). Neither the 
unfair outcome nor the disrespectfulness in exploitation solely represents the critical 
moment of  the injustice of  exploitation. Rather, the focal point of  exploitation lies in the 
anti-egalitarian conduct that the exploiter presses her superior advantage upon the exploitee 
to secure wrongful benefits. The anti-egalitarian conduct consists of  distributive and 
relational aspects of  exploitation, which is the whole picture of  exploitation.  
Moreover, the anti-egalitarian conduct－the exploiter uses her greater advantage against 
the exploitee’s relative inferiority to gain wrongfully－has drawn our attention from the 
historical focus－that is, the pedigree of  the exploiter’s and the exploitee’s (dis)advantages
－to the ahistorical character of  exploitation. Contrary to the luck egalitarian understanding, 
the anti-egalitarian conduct highlights the ahistorical nature of  the injustice of  exploitation. 
Exploitation as free-standing injustice, thus, holds that exploitation is primarily an 
ahistorical injustice in that we need not trace the history of  one’s (dis)advantage to assess 
whether exploitation is just or unjust. Instead, exploitation is unjust whenever it takes place. 
It seems implausible if  someone claims that when A presses her fair advantage upon B’s 
fair disadvantage to extract unfair benefits, no exploitation involves between them. Even 
if  ants worked so hard in summer that their great advantages in winner are fair and 
grasshoppers were so lazy in summer that their disadvantages in winter are not unfair, the 
respective fairness of  their (dis)advantages would not make any difference on the claim 
that ants exploit grasshoppers when ants offer a sweatshop contract to grasshoppers by 
virtue of  the grasshoppers’ destitution. The anti-egalitarian conduct, therefore, captures 
the critical, complete picture of  the injustice of  exploitation.  




6.3.3. Why Exploitation is Unjust for Egalitarians? 
 
The conduct－A’s pressing her superior advantage upon B to extract wrongful gains－is 
inegalitarian in the sense that it violates the core egalitarian principle that we ought to treat 
and regard one another as social equals. The relational dimension of  equality explains the 
injustice of  the conduct. “The relational ideal of  equality”, as Anderson specifies, “focuses 
on the terms of  our interactions, rather than on comparisons of  the amount of  some good 
that different individuals enjoy” (2008: 263).  
Nonetheless, we can further distinguish two aspects of  relational equality, namely, 
equality of  status and equality of  interactions. Exploitation is fundamentally associated with 
equality of  interactions, rather than equality of  status. Equality of  status objects to 
hierarchical social relations, such as hierarchies of  esteem, power, and standing. One aspect 
of  relational equality, thus, demands equal respect, power and standing (Anderson, 2008: 
263-264). However, equality of  status does not amount to equality of  interactions. 
Objectionable inequalities, such as domination, oppression and social exclusion, are 
associated more with equality of  interactions than with equality of  status in that individual 
actions cause these objectionable inequalities. Even if  each enjoys equal power, status and 
esteem, this will not necessarily guarantee that each will treat and regard one another as 
social equals. So understood, forms of  social oppression concern more about equality of  
interactions than equality of  status. In exploitation, what matters is not that the exploiter 
enjoys more agency than the exploitee, but that the exploiter presses her superior advantage 
upon the exploitee to extract wrongful gains. Exploitation, thus, constitutes an 
objectionable form of  unequal interactions and is, pro tanto, unjust. 
The ideal of  ‘equality of  interactions’ needs further clarification and explanation. The 
core ideal of  equality, I believe, lies in that each person should be “regarded as self-originating 
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sources of  claims” (Anderson, 2008: 264). To elaborate, in a society of  equals, each should 
enjoy equal status to make justificatory claims on others and considers others’ interest 
seriously (Anderson, 1999: 313). No one would be excluded from engaging in the process 
that determines their relevant interests. Being a self-originating source of  claims is to be 
included in the democratic procedure and to have a justificatory claim on other members. 
The ideal of  treating each person as a self-originating source of  justificatory claims, I 
believe, is shared among contemporary egalitarians. The ideal, therefore, is not meant to 
distinguish between distributive and social egalitarianism, but it can explain properly why 
forms of  social oppression are anti-egalitarian.  
So understood, for egalitarians, injustice is “about people being deprived of  
something they have reciprocally and generally non-rejectable reasons to claim” (Forst, 
2014: 114). Victims of  social oppression are, in general, excluded from the process of  
justificatory claims, and their interests are treated as secondary. Exploitation, thus, is unjust 
to the extent that to press one’s superior advantage upon another to extract wrongful 
benefits, is to exclude the exploitees from the process that determine their interests and to 
take their interests as secondary. The fact that the exploiter could and should have offered 
a fair contract to the exploitee illustrates that the exploiter takes the exploitee’s interests as 
secondary; and, by pressing her advantage upon the exploitee to extract wrongful gains, 
the exploitee’s justificatory claim is neglected. Hence, exploitation is inegalitarian in the 
sense that the exploiter treats the exploitee as inferior that her justificatory claims are 
deprived by the exploiter. As a result, exploitation is, in itself, an independent source of  
injustice, whose injustice lies in the anti-egalitarian conduct that the exploiter presses 
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I have formulated two distinct ways to perceive the injustice of  exploitation, namely, the 
Derivative approach and the Free-standing approach. Based on the distinction, I have 
argued that the Derivative approach, endorsed by luck egalitarians, is incomplete because 
option-luck exploitation occurs under the luck egalitarian agenda. Therefore, the luck 
egalitarian treatment to exploitation is incomplete, and luck egalitarians need to adopt the 
Free-standing approach instead. On the other hand, based on my account of  exploitation, 
I specify how to perceive the injustice of  exploitation as a free-standing injustice. The 
injustice-making feature of  exploitation lies fundamentally in the anti-egalitarian conduct 
that the exploiter presses her superior advantage upon the exploitee to extract wrongful 
gains. The conduct is anti-egalitarian, and thus unjust, in the general sense that it violates 
the egalitarian principle that we ought to treat one another as equals. More specifically, the 
fact that the exploiter takes the exploitee’s interests as secondary and deprive the exploitee 
of  her justificatory claims makes exploitation inegalitarian. Hence, exploitation is unjust 
for egalitarians in the above sense. Having answered the question: why exploitation is 
unjust for egalitarians, in Part 3, I deal with the practical issue, namely, sweatshop 
exploitation. I will assess whether or not sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, 
and whether or not the third-party interference with sweatshop exploitation is morally 
permissibility, all things considered.  
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7. The Morality and Political Morality of Sweatshop Labour 
 
Capitalism, as Marx famously indicated, has created unprecedented wealth in human 
history, and poverty of  the exploited as well. The powerful productivity of  capitalism 
enables some people to enjoy a decent life at the expense of  accelerating social and global 
inequalities. How, then, should we assess and respond to capitalism that creates great 
wealth and, global and social, inequalities at the same time? The difficulty we face is how 
to weigh different moral considerations, pros and cons, and give an all-things-considered 
judgment on capitalism. The focus of  Chapter 6 is on sweatshop exploitation, where 
workers in developing countries are exploited by offshore companies, and it is undeniable 
that they benefit from sweatshop labour.107  
Many condemn sweatshop exploitation. However, some, most notably Matt 
Zwolinski (2007), have defended sweatshops by appealing to what has been called the non-
worseness claim. Roughly stated, this holds that exploitation, all things considered, is morally 
permissible if  it is mutually beneficial and consensual. They infer from this that the state 
and other third parties should not interfere with sweatshop exploitation. Contra Zwolinski, 
I contend that sweatshop exploitation, even if  it benefits the poor in developing countries, 
is morally impermissible, all things considered. I further argue that third-party interference 
with sweatshop exploitation, all things considered, is morally required if the exploited will be 
better off  after the interference. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. In Part I, I introduce the basic elements of  the 
non-worseness claim. Then I distinguish between three dimensions related to sweatshop 
exploitation: whether or not exploitation is pro tanto morally wrongful (the first question), 
whether or not sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered (the 
 
107 Sweatshop exploitation is a paradigmatic case of  global exploitation. However, exploitation of  a similar 
kind is not uncommon in developed countries, such that guest workers and immigrants could be exploited. 
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second question) and whether or not it is morally permissible for the third parties to 
interfere with sweatshop exploitation (the third question). In Part II, I argue that once we 
distinguish between the moral assessment of  the state of  affairs of  sweatshop exploitation 
and of  the exploiter’s action, it becomes clear that the moral permissibility of  sweatshop 
exploitation depends, not on the fact that it benefits the poor in developing countries, but 
on what kind of  sweatshop exploiters we refer to. When we distinguish between 
discretionary exploiters (who can pay non-exploitative wages) and structural exploiters 
(who cannot), it is clear that sweatshop exploitation is morally impermissible, all things 
considered, when and because sweatshop exploiters are capable of  paying non-exploitative 
wages. In Part III, contra Zwolinski who argues that it is morally impermissible for the 
third parties to interfere with sweatshop exploitation because the removal of  it will leave 
the poor in poverty, I contend that it is always morally required for the third parties to 
interfere with sweatshop exploitation when and because they can ensure that the exploited 
will be better off  than being exploited. In Part IV, I examine and reply to an objection to 
the moral impermissibility of  sweatshop exploitation and an objection to the moral 
permissibility of  the third-party interference with sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.1. The Non-Worseness Claim 
 
The non-worseness claim (NWC): exploitation is morally better than non-interaction if:  
 
(1) both A and B agree to the transaction. 
(2) the transaction is mutually beneficial for A and B. 
(3) there are no negative external effects on any third party (Wertheimer, 1996: 289; 
Zwolinski, 2007: 707-708).  
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Given that; A has a right not to interact with B; both agree to the transaction; and the 
transaction is mutually beneficial in the sense that they gain from it, as compared to non-
interaction, the NWC asserts that mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation cannot 
be morally worse than non-interaction.108 What follows from the NWC, defenders of  
sweatshops argue, is the claim that third parties ought not to interfere with sweatshop 
exploitation. Hence, the NWC justifies that sweatshop exploitation is not morally wrong 
and should not be legally prohibited.  
 
7.1.1. Some Clarifications of  the NWC and Three Dimensions 
 
Most discussions of  the NWC are in the context of  sweatshops in developing countries 
where sweatshop labourers are in poverty and choose to work in exploitative sweatshops.109 
Moreover, as empirical research shows, wages in sweatshops are usually better than other 
local works (Powell, 2014: 48-62); thus, sweatshop work “represents the best alternative 
available to workers” (Powell & Zwolinski, 2012: 453). This is true only if  the owners of  
sweatshops pay wages better than wages in local works and no one (including the owners 
of  sweatshops) is willing to pay wages better than exploitative sweatshops. In other words, 
whenever someone (including the owners of  sweatshops) is willing to pay wages better 
than the sweatshop wages, sweatshops labour would not be the best option for workers in 
developing countries. Besides, like many critics of  sweatshops, I do not question the 
validity of  labourers’ consent to sweatshop jobs and the fact that sweatshop work is the 
 
108 In the chapter, I focus exclusively on mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. Harmful and/or 
involuntary exploitation is excluded from my discussion since it is widely acknowledged by most theorists of  
exploitation that it is morally wrongful and ought to be prohibited. Besides, sweatshop exploitation in my 
discussion refers to mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation, though in practice sweatshop 
exploitation could be harmful and/or involuntary. Thus, I use ‘sweatshop exploitation’ and ‘mutually 
beneficial and consensual exploitation’ interchangeably. 
109 Sweatshop labour refers to the situation where the working conditions are poor and unsafe, the wages 
are below the living standards, and workers suffer long working hours and arbitrary disciplines (Radin & 
Calkin, 2006: 262). See also Mezzadri (2017).  
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best option available to workers in developing countries when the above condition is met. 
I do not dispute (1) and (2) as factual claims.  
Sweatshop labour is exploitative in the sense that sweatshop wages are unfair relative 
to a fairness baseline (Meyer, 2004: 320-322; Valdman, 2008: 3-9; Wertheimer, 1996). 
Exploitation in sweatshops, thus, refers to unfairness in the outcome of  a transaction (Faraci, 
2019: 174). Hence, we can add (4) to the NWC: 
 
(4) sweatshops are exploitative in the sense that their wages are unfair to B according 
to a fairness baseline; therefore, exploitation is pro tanto morally wrongful because of  
its unfairness in the outcome.  
 
The NWC then can be reformulated as mutually beneficial and consensual, though unfair, 
transactions that are not morally worse than non-interaction. Acknowledging that sweatshops are 
exploitative is not vital for defenders of  sweatshops. They may argue either that 
exploitation as unfairness is trumped by moral considerations of  (1) and (2) and (3) or that, 
third parties still ought not to interfere with sweatshop exploitation even if  it is, all things 
considered, is morally wrongful. 
Now, to clarify the issues raised by the NWC, three questions should be distinguished. 
The first question asks whether or not exploitation is pro tanto wrong. “A pro tanto reason”, 
as Shelly Kagan suggests, “has genuine weight, but nonetheless may be outweighed by 
other considerations” (1991: 17). To my knowledge, even defenders of  sweatshops 
acknowledge that exploitation is pro tanto wrong, though they differ in what constitutes 
the wrong-making feature of  exploitation. For this reason, we can leave the first question 
aside and focus on the second and the third questions, the answers to which are disputed.  
Granting that exploitation is pro tanto wrong, the second question concerns whether 
or not exploitation alone is sufficient to make sweatshop labour all-things-considered wrong. 
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To make an all-things-considered moral judgment of  an act, one has to consider and weigh 
the relevant moral principles applicable to the act (Waldron, 1981: 25). If  so, we need to 
take the relevant moral factors of  sweatshops into account, and some of  these factors 
might jointly offer a decisive reason to permit sweatshop exploitation. When weighing 
between (1), (2), (3) and (4), people might have different all-things-considered judgments 
on sweatshop labour. Next, even if  sweatshop exploitation is all-things-considered wrong, 
some might hold that third parties should still not interfere with it because the interference 
of  sweatshops will leave people in poverty. The third question, thus, concerns whether or 
not it is morally permissible for third parties to interfere with exploitative sweatshops.  
My responses to both questions are based on my critiques of  Matt Zwolinski’s 
positions on the NWC. Before examining Zwolinski’s positions, it is worth introducing the 
evaluative claim of  the NWC, which asserts that the state of  affairs of  sweatshop exploitation 
is morally better than its absence. The evaluative claim is important because defenders of  
sweatshops refer to the claim to answer both questions. 
 
7.1.2. The Evaluative Claim of  the NWC 
 
It is important to note that the NWC can serve as a moral assessment of  “the state of  
affairs” or of  “actions” (Wertheimer, 2012: 299). Concerning the state of  affairs, the NWC 
asserts that the state of  affairs of  sweatshop exploitation is morally better than its absence 
by weighing different relevant moral factors. Call this the evaluative claim. On the other hand, 
when assessing the action of  sweatshop exploitation, the NWC generates a first-party deontic 
claim: it is morally permissible for sweatshop owners to exploit employees because non-
transaction is worse for sweatshop labourers than being exploited by sweatshop owners 
(Faraci, 2019: 174). Distinguishing the two claims will help us to examine whether or not 
sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered, and how third parties 
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ought to respond to it. Let us begin with the evaluative claim and introduce each element 
in the NWC. 
The element (1)－A and B agree to the transaction－represents the deontological 
component of  the NWC. (1) ensures that sweatshop labour does not impose non-
consensual harms on B, which sets a moral constraint on the consequence of  sweatshop 
labour (Wertheimer, 2012: 297). Given that A and B agree to the transaction, (1) is a good-
making feature of  sweatshop labour. Next, (2) ensures that A and B gain compared to the 
non-transaction baseline; (2) is another good-making feature in the NWC. Next, (3) 
presumes that sweatshop labour generates no net negative effects on any third party. Then, 
(3) remains morally neutral in our assessment of  the state of  affairs in sweatshops. Next, 
(4) is the only bad-making feature in the NWC because unfairness in the outcome makes 
sweatshop labour wrongfully exploitative.110 
To put together, the NWC offers an evaluative claim: the state of  affairs of  sweatshop 
exploitation is morally better than its absence for workers in developing countries because 
(1) and (2) together trump (4). 111  (1) is a moral constraint on the consequence of  
sweatshop exploitation. Provided that sweatshop labourers agree to work in sweatshops, 
(1) would not affect our moral evaluation on the state of  affairs of  sweatshop exploitation. 
Now, the core statement in the evaluative claim is that the state of  affairs in which B 
benefits unfairly “seems more good than” the state of  affairs in which there is no unfairness 
but B gains nothing and lives in destitution (Faraci, 2019: 174). The core idea in the 
evaluative claim is that the net individual welfare gains override unfairness in the outcome 
 
110 It is possible to treat the unfairness as a deontological principle that unfair distribution is morally 
impermissible. However, whether or not the unfairness is treated as a deontological and a consequentialist 
principle, would not affect my argument here. When discussing the wrongness of  sweatshop exploitation, 
most treat the wrongness as unfairness in the outcome. I thus follow the line.  
111 (3) is problematic because, in practice, sweatshop labour generates net negative effects on third parties. 
For example, sweatshop factories might cause environmental pollution, and, in some cases, they plunder 
agricultural lands to build factories. However, for the sake of  argument, I shall leave (3) aside for a moment 
and discuss (3) in the last section.  
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in the context of  sweatshop labour. Hence, even though the unfairness in the outcome is 
a bad making feature in sweatshop labour, to be exploited is morally better than non-
transaction for the poor. Call this: the Betterness-of-Welfare claim. 
 
(5) The Betterness-of-Welfare claim (BWC): gains in welfare can (if  sufficiently  
great) morally outweigh the wrongness of  unfairness. 
 
Of  course, the BWC is controversial. For instance, some consequentialists may argue that 
when it is possible for A to transact fairly with B, which produces the best outcome, they 
will require A to transact fairly with B (Bailey, 2011: 242-243).112 The truth of  the BWC, 
thus, depends partly on whether or not A is able to offer a fair contract to B.113 Besides, 
the truth of  the BWC also depends partly on whether the benefits that B obtains from 
sweatshop labour are sufficient to outweigh the concern of  unfairness in the transaction. 
For instance, suppose B gains £100 from her transaction with A, and the fair wage is, say, 
£1000. In the case, although B benefits compared to the no-transaction baseline, some 
egalitarians will contest that the unfairness in the case is so critical that the concern of  the 
unfairness outweighs the net welfare gains. In some cases, since the benefits that B gain 
from a transaction are trivial (e.g. £1) and the unfairness is great, B’s gains cannot outweigh 
the concern of  the unfairness in distribution. Hence, (5) is not always true. 
The defenders of  sweatshop labour, however, need not claim that (5) is always true, 
but (5) only needs to be true in the context of  sweatshop labour. Still, they need to establish 
the truth of  (5) in sweatshops. I can think of  a way to justify (5). The defenders may resort 
to the exploitee’s consent to exploitative sweatshop work to justify (5). Because labourers 
agree to sweatshop contracts, they tacitly accept that gains in welfare are morally more 
 
112 See also Benjamin Ferguson (2016: 957-965). 
113 I will discuss this point when criticising Zwolinski’s view.  
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important than the unfairness; otherwise, they will decline the contract. The fact that 
labourers accept sweatshop contracts seems to endorse the BWC. By resorting to labourers’ 
consent, defenders of  sweatshops may prove that (5) is true in sweatshops.114 
Hence, the evaluative claim asserts that, in effect, mutually beneficial and consensual, 
though unfair, transactions are morally better than non-transaction for sweatshop 
labourers. Nonetheless, it would be more precise to restate that, in effect, sweatshop 
exploitation is morally better than being left in poverty for labourers. What makes a sweatshop offer 
particularly attractive for the poor is because the offer is compared with poverty, but not 
with nothing. Although sweatshop jobs might or might not take people in developing 
countries out of  poverty, it is certain that the jobs will make them somewhat better off. 
The non-interaction baseline is actually poverty, rather than a decent life. For sweatshop 
labourers, non-transaction means being left in poverty, and their destitution makes the 
BWC particularly true for them. The evaluative claim, therefore, serves as the basis for 
further judgments on the second－sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things 
considered－and the third question－the state and other third parties should not interfere 
with sweatshop exploitation. Now we turn to Zwolinski’s positions on both questions.  
 
7.2. Zwolinski on the Moral Permissibility of  Sweatshop Exploitation 
 
In the section, I introduce and criticise Zwolinski’s all-things-considered view on the moral 
permissibility of  sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.2.1. Zwolinski’s Position on Sweatshop Exploitation 
 
 
114 This view is controversial, however. Some might argue that B’s consent is irrelevant to, or not the only 
basis for judging, whether or not the unfairness is outweighed by the welfare gain to B.  
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Regarding the second question, Zwolinski holds that sweatshop exploitation is morally 
permissible, all things considered, even though he acknowledges that exploitation is pro tanto 
morally wrongful. Moreover, he also insists on the gulf  between the moral assessment, and 
the legal prohibition, of  sweatshop exploitation. As Zwolinski maintains: 
 
My position is that there is a large gulf  between concluding that the activities of  sweatshops 
are morally evil and concluding that sweatshop labor ought to be legally prohibited, boycotted, 
regulated, or prohibited by moral norms. To the extent that sweatshops do evil to their 
workers, they do so in the context of  providing their workers with a financial benefit, and 
workers’ eager readiness to consent to the conditions of  sweatshop labor shows that they 
view this benefit as considerable. This fact leads to the ultimate practical conclusion of  this 
paper, which is that there is a strong moral reason for third parties such as consumers and 
host and home country governments to refrain from acting in ways which are likely to deprive 
sweatshop workers of  their jobs. (Zwolinski, 2007: 690) 
 
The quotation, though it appears to emphasise the legal prohibition of  sweatshop 
exploitation, actually offers an all-things-considered claim of  the moral permissibility of  
sweatshop exploitation as well. Zwolinski offers two arguments to justify sweatshop 
exploitation: the transformative argument and the inconsistency argument, and an 
argument for the moral impermissibility of  third-party interference, such as the legal ban 
and consumer boycotts. Let us consider his arguments for the second question concerning 
the moral permissibility of  sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.2.1.1. The Transformative Argument 
 
The transformative argument explains the moral implication of  (1): both A and B agree to 
the transaction. For Zwolinski, the exploitee’s consent to the sweatshop contract is 
“morally transformative” in that her consent expresses B’s “autonomy-exercising” and 
“preference-evincing” choice (2007: 691-695). One’s consent is morally transformative in 
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the sense that that “it makes things morally permissible that would not be permissible 
without the consent” (Dänzer, 2014: 273). In other words, if  we view sweatshop 
exploitation as prima facie morally impermissible, the exploitee’s consent to it will make 
sweatshop contracts morally permissible. Moreover, for him, even if  B has a relatively small 
choice set such as a choice between sweatshop labouring and destitution, still B’s choice, 
to a minimum extent, expresses B’s autonomy. The removal of  B’s exploitative choice, thus, 
will infringe her autonomy and disrespect the exploitee (Zwolinski, 2007: 694, 2010: 348). 
However, we shall note that, for Zwolinski, infringing B’s autonomy is only a pro tanto 
wrong that could be overridden by other moral considerations (2007: fn.13). The 
exploitee’s consent to sweatshops, for Zwolinski, does not suffice to justify sweatshop 
exploitation. Hence, the transformative argument only serves as a moral reason to justify 
sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.2.1.2. The Inconsistency Argument 
 
Rather than argue that sweatshop exploitation is pro tanto morally permissible, the 
consistency argument, proposed by Zwolinski, argues that sweatshop exploitation is 
morally permissible, all things considered. It contends that granting that sweatshop 
exploitation is pro tanto wrong, it seems inconsistent that we condemn sweatshop 
exploiters who help the poor in developing countries by benefiting them unfairly, but we 
do not condemn people and firms that do nothing to help the poor (Zwolinski, 2008: 356-
357, 2010: 348-349, 2012: 167-168). By comparison with those who do nothing to help the 
poor in developing countries, sweatshop exploiters seem to be much better because they 
benefit the poor, though unfairly. We should note that the inconsistency argument 
implicitly endorses a variant of  the BWC by claiming that to benefit the poor unfairly is 
morally better than to offer no help. Zwolinski justifies the BWC from the perspective of  
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rescues. Whether or not sweatshop exploitation amounts to rescuing the poor is 
controversial, and I will return to the point later on. Zwolinski’s point is that if  no help is 
morally permissible, why should we think that sweatshop exploitation that helps the poor 
is morally impermissible? Hence, the inconsistency argument questions the inconsistent 
evaluation between sweatshop exploitation and no help. As Zwolinski contends: 
 
Consistency seems to require that we revise our moral beliefs: either by holding that neglect 
[no help] is worse than we previously thought, or by holding that exploitation is less bad than 
we previously thought. Either way of  resolving the inconsistency, however, leads us to 
abandon the belief  that sweatshops who exploit their workers are doing anything especially 
wrong. (2012: 168, his italic) 
 
On the same page, Zwolinski continues: 
 
[I]f  it is permissible for the employer not to hire prospective workers, and if  hiring 
prospective workers at benefit level X is better for both the employer and the worker than 
not hiring the prospective workers at all, then how could doing so be wrong? (2012: 168) 
 
In the above two paragraphs, Zwolinski argues that sweatshop exploitation is all things 
considered morally permissible. For him, even if  exploitation in sweatshops is pro tanto 
wrong, given that (1) the exploitee’s consent to sweatshop labour expresses her autonomy 
and that (2) unfairly benefiting is morally better than being left in poverty (the evaluative 
claim), sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered. More 
importantly, Zwolinski evaluates not merely the state of  affairs, but also actions, of  sweatshop 
exploitation, the distinction that he has conflated in the above two paragraphs. If  so, he is 
not only presenting an all-things-considered claim of  the state of  affairs of  sweatshop 
exploitation, but also that of  the exploiter’s action of  sweatshop exploitation. That is, it is 
morally permissible for sweatshop owners to exploit employees because, for sweatshop 
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labourers, being left in poverty is morally worse than being exploited by sweatshop owners, 
all things considered. Call this the first-party deontological claim (Faraci, 2019: 174). Note that 
the first-party deontological claim could be that it is morally impermissible or permissible 
for sweatshop owners to exploit employees. The first-party deontological claim will affect our 
evaluation of  the question of  whether or not sweatshop exploitation is all things 
considered morally permissible.  
When the first-party deontological claim is separated from the evaluative claim, and 
when the sweatshop owner’s action is distinguished from the state of  affairs of  sweatshop 
labour, it will be doubtful whether or not sweatshop owners act in a morally permissible 
manner. In what follows, I criticise the transformative argument and the inconsistency 
argument and examine the first-party deontological claim.  
 
7.2.2. An Objection to the Transformative Argument  
 
The transformative argument has two problems in the context of  sweatshop exploitation: 
the labourer’s consent to sweatshop exploitation is not morally transformative, and their 
consent would not cancel or diminish the wrongness of  exploitation. 
First, it is doubtful whether or not sweatshop labourers’ consent to sweatshop 
exploitation is morally transformative. Some defenders of  sweatshops tend to argue that 
labourers’ consent to sweatshops is morally transformative. Their view is misleading 
because their decision to accept sweatshop contracts only means that the contract is the 
best option in the status quo. The contract is their rational choice (Preiss, 2014: 65; Dänzer, 
2014: 281). For one’s consent to be morally transformative, she must have a minimum 
number of  choices available to her (quantity of  options) and “one or more acceptable 
options in absolute terms available” (quality of  options) (Dänzer, 2014: 281). Even though 
theorists differ in what the minimum number of choices is and in what makes an option 
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morally acceptable, an individual’s consent suffices to be morally transformative only if she 
has an acceptable quantity and quality of options. It is doubtful that sweatshop labour 
meets the two conditions.  
Now suppose that the quantity of sweatshop labourers’ choices meets a minimum 
number; however, it is doubtful that any of their options is morally acceptable in absolute 
terms. Of course, this depends on what counts as a morally acceptable option in absolute 
terms. Zwolinski, however, does not explain why sweatshop exploitation is morally 
acceptable in absolute terms. The fact that sweatshop exploitation is morally better than 
non-transaction, nonetheless, would not make sweatshops a morally acceptable job in 
absolute terms. Particularly, if we take a well-paid job as the absolute standard that makes 
a job morally acceptable, then Zwolinski owes us an explanation why exploitative 
sweatshop that fails to meet the absolute standard, will still count as a morally acceptable 
option. Hence, if none of the sweatshop labourers’ options are morally acceptable in 
absolute terms, their consent to sweatshop labour is not morally transformative. The 
transformative argument fails.  
Second, even if  we grant that labourers’ consent to sweatshop work is sound in 
quantity and quality, their consent would not cancel the wrongness of  exploitation. We can 
think of  cases where B is rich and thus that B has a much better than adequate range 
available to him. However, suppose B desperately wants to be a member of  a prestigious 
club and A is willing to support B’s application only if  B gives A a large sum of  money 
that B can easily afford. In the case, A exploits B by taking advantage of  B’s desperate 
desire to gain the membership, even though the quantity and the quality of  B’s option 
satisfy the standards of  acceptability. The fact that B’s voluntarily entering into an 
exploitative contract just would not cancel the wrongness that A exploits B. As Zwolinski 
himself  acknowledges, the transformative argument is only a pro tanto good-making feature 
of  the NWC that can be trumped by other moral considerations (2007: fn.13). Sweatshop 
The morality and political morality of  sweatshop labour 
213 
 
labourers’ consent does not suffice to diminish the wrongness of  exploitation. Hence, B’s 
consent would not turn otherwise morally impermissible exploitation into morally 
permissible. 
Consequently, if  I am correct that it is dubious that sweatshop labourers’ consent to 
exploitation is morally transformative and that their consent would not cancel the 
wrongness of  exploitation, then we can leave the transformative argument aside since the 
normative power of  the consent alone cannot provide an all-things-considered reason of  
moral permissibility of  sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.2.3. Two Responses to the Inconsistency Argument 
 
The inconsistency argument contends that, provided that non-transaction with the poor is 
morally permissible and that sweatshop exploitation benefits the poor, it is inconsistent 
that we condemn sweatshop exploitation but forgo those who do nothing to help the poor. 
I offer two responses to Zwolinski’s complaint.  
 
7.2.3.1. Exploitation is not Helping 
 
Although exploitation, for Zwolinski, is not particularly wrong when compared to the 
morally permissible act of  non-transaction, it is misleading to equate exploitation with 
being rescued. The stark difference between exploitation and a rescue is that while 
exploitation involves how A and B allocate social surplus, generated by their transaction, a 
rescue generates no social surplus. If  mutually beneficial exploitation amounts to a rescue, 
I wonder why it is always sweatshop exploiters who gain more than the poor relative to a 
fairness baseline. To put the same point differently, it is odd when a rescuer says that she 
is willing to help the poor only if  she constantly gains from their transaction. Quite the 
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contrary, a duty bearer of  a rescue tends to be the one who takes the cost of  the rescue. 
The fact that mutually beneficial exploitation happens to have the same effect as rescuing
－benefiting the poor or the need－does not mean that exploitation is similar in morally 
relevant ways to rescuing. Hence, it is misleading to say that sweatshop owners are helping 
the poor.  
However, even if  mutually beneficial exploitation does not amount to rescuing, this 
would not diminish the inconsistency argument. There are two points in the argument: one 
is the inconsistent moral assessment between no help and sweatshop exploitation; another, 
more crucially, is that sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered. 
Let us consider the first point first and then the second.  
 
7.2.3.2. No Help is Morally Impermissible 
 
A simple way to respond to the first point of  the inconsistency argument is to indicate that 
no help is morally impermissible. If  no help is morally impermissible, sweatshop 
exploitation should be morally condemned even if  sweatshop exploitation is no worse than 
no help.  
Joe Horton’s response to Zwolinski’s view is straightforward: non-transaction is 
morally impermissible, “[i]f  you can spare someone from significant harm at no cost to 
yourself  or others, and without violating any moral constraint, you ought to do so” (2019: 
5). He called this Costless Rescue (CR). CR is moderate in that the rescuer needs not to donate 
most or all her wealth to help the poor; rather, whenever it is costless for the rescuer to 
help the poor, the rescuer has a moral duty to recuse. CR is moderate in that it claims that 
people have a moral duty to help others, not at the expense of  their most wealth, but only 
if  the cost of  rescue is little for them. Hence, Horton concludes that, by rejecting the 
premise that non-transaction is morally permissible, we can decline Zwolinski’s view that 
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sweatshop exploitation is not wrong and the counterintuitive conclusion that we ought to 
leave sweatshop labourers in poverty rather than exploit them (ibid.). Rather, since both 
non-transaction with the poor and sweatshop exploitation are morally impermissible, the 
first point of  the inconsistency argument ceases.  
Nonetheless, whether or not people assess sweatshop exploitation and no help in a 
morally consistent way would not bother Zwolinski. His main point in the inconsistency 
argument is rather that sweatshop exploitation that benefits the poor (the evaluative claim) 
cannot be a serious wrong. The evaluative claim underpins the moral permissibility of  
sweatshop exploitation. In what follows, I distinguish between the evaluative claim and the 
first-party deontological claim. Once the distinction has been indicated, Zwolinski’s view 
is implausible.  
 
7.2.4. The Evaluative Claim and the First-Party Deontological Claim 
 
The distinction is most clear when we look at how Horton and Zwolinski are talking past 
each other. Zwolinski evaluates and justifies sweatshop exploitation by reference to the 
evaluative claim. Horton, by contrast, focuses on the exploiter’s action to judge the moral 
wrongness of  sweatshop exploitation, that is, the first-party deontological claim. Once the 
distinction between the evaluative claim and the first-party deontological claim has been 
separated, which is conflated by Zwolinski, it is clear that it is morally impermissible for 
sweatshop owners to exploit the poor in developing countries when and because they are able 
to provide a non-exploitative offer to the poor. The first-party deontological claim is true 
even if  the evaluative claim－being left in poverty is morally worse than sweatshop 
exploitation in effect－is true. The fact that sweatshop exploitation benefits the poor, 
nevertheless, would not affect our moral assessment that sweatshop owners ought not to 
exploit their employees if  they can. Horton, then, is correct that sweatshop owners have a 
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moral duty to offer a non-exploitative contract with the poor, were they able to do so at 
no or little cost. 
Nonetheless, Horton and Zwolinski, I will argue, fail to distinguish between two 
major kinds of  sweatshop exploiters: discretionary and structural exploiters. While 
discretionary exploiters are able to pay non-exploitative wages but refuse to do so, 
structural exploiters are unable to pay non-exploitative wages because of  structural market 
competition. When the distinction has been specified, it becomes clear that different kinds 
of  exploiters bear different moral duties, which have been neglected by Zwolinski. Hence, 
contra Horton (2019: 5-6) who holds that as long as the exploiter is capable of  exploiting 
the poor, she is also able to help the poor costlessly. There are structural exploiters who 
are unable, but not unwilling, to pay non-exploitative wages to the labourers. Contra Powell 
and Zwolinski (2012) who hold that sweatshop exploiters are incapable of  offering non-
exploitative wages to the labourers, there are discretionary exploiters who are able, but 
unwilling, to pay non-exploitative wages. As such, it is important to distinguish different 
kinds of  sweatshop exploiters because they bear different moral duties, and the distinction 
will affect whether sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible. Let us introduce the 
difference between discretionary and structural exploiters. 
 
7.3. An Examination of  the First-Party Deontological Claim 
 
This section indicates that whether or not sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, 
all things considered, depends on what kind of  sweatshop exploiters we refer to. Following 
Robert Mayer’s distinction between discretionary, impure structural and pure structural 
exploiters (2007b), I discuss the moral duties of  the three exploiters and the moral 
permissibility of  sweatshop exploitation in each case. 
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7.3.1. The Difference Between Discretionary and Structural Exploiters 
 
In discretionary exploitation, the exploiter is capable of  offering non-exploitative wages 
but chooses to press her advantage against the exploitee to gain unfair benefits (Mayer, 
2007b: 610). For the discretionary exploiter, it is possible to interact with others in a 
mutually beneficial and non-exploitative way without “placing that agent at a competitive 
disadvantage” (ibid.). Paying non-exploitative wages would not deprive the employer of  
just returns and instead makes the discretionary exploiter disadvantageous in market 
competition.115 In Greedy Mountain Rescuer, Allen is a discretionary exploiter because he can 
ask for a fair price of  the rescue from Bob at no cost but chooses to take unfair advantage 
of  Bob’s desperation.  
Structural exploitation, by contrast, refers to a situation where the exploiter’s decision 
to pay non-exploitative wages is very costly that she will not make any profits or/and has 
to close her firm (ibid.). Structural exploitation occurs mostly in the market competition 
where market agents cannot pay non-exploitative wages without raising the price of  their 
commodities and reducing the profit rate of  their business. In either case, structural 
exploiter faces a market disadvantage that the survival of  her firm is at risk. Structural 
exploiters, thus, cannot pay non-exploitative wages without placing their firms at fatal risk. 
We might wonder whether sweatshop owners have a duty to pay non-exploitative wages at 
the expense of  reducing their profits or closing their firms. This position echoes Powell 
and Zwolinski’s view that “The competitive forces between firms cause them to improve 
compensation as productivity increases” (2012: 458). When adopting Young’s definition 
of  structural injustice to understanding structural exploitation, we may say structural 
exploitation encourages exploitation and make non-exploitation particularly costly (Young, 
 
115 By remaining market competition, I mean the employs need not reduce the profit rate and raise the 
price of  their commodity.  
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2006: 114). Hence, unlike discretionary exploiters, structural exploiters are confined by the 
established rules of  structures and games that their best strategy is to exploit their employees. 
Otherwise, non-exploitation will pose a competitive disadvantage on them.  
The moral difference between the two cases differs greatly, but, very often, the 
distinction has been conflated in Powell and Zwolinski’s discussion. For instance, 
sometimes they acknowledge that “MNEs [multinational enterprises] have power in the 
form of  wealth to rescue these [sweatshop workers]. However, rather than providing that 
rescue out of  common kindness or a sense of  moral obligation, they make it contingent 
on an onerous payment” (Powell & Zwolinski, 2012: 466). In other places, they treat the 
exploiter from an impersonal perspective: “Businesses employ labor up until the last 
marginal labourer no longer generates profits” (Powell & Zwolinski, 2012: 457). Powell 
and Zwolinski, then, conflate the morally significant distinction between discretionary and 
structural exploiters. The distinction will affect our moral assessment of  whether or not 
sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things considered. Let us consider the 
moral duty of  the discretionary exploiter. 
 
7.3.2. Discretionary Exploiters Ought to Pay Non-exploitative Wages 
 
The moral duty of  the discretionary exploiter is to pay non-exploitative wages. Their duty 
could be either because, as Horton suggested, whenever we can prevent others from 
suffering significant harm at no cost to ourselves, we ought to do so, or because, as Kagan 
indicated, whenever one chooses to rescue, she must choose the best reasonable option 
(1991: 16). In Kagan’s case, there is a burning house with a bird and a child stranded in it. 
Suppose the rescuer is only capable of  saving one of  them and chooses to save, surprisingly, 
the bird. For Kagan, the rescuer has done something wrong, because even if  the rescuer 
is not morally required to undertake the risk, once she decided to rescue, other things being 
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equal, she ought to promote the greater good by saving the child (ibid.). Then, if  sweatshop 
owners, as Zwolinski conceives it, decide to help the poor, which they are not morally 
required to do so, they have a moral duty to promote the greater good, that is, offering 
non-exploitative wages to the poor in developing countries. 
On the other hand, Andrew Mason argues that citizens have a duty not to seek or 
gain an unfair advantage when compliance with the duty is costless for them (2012: ch.5). 
Such duty stems from our compliance with principles of  justice, and it is not demanding 
because we ought to obey moral duties to the extent that they would not “generate 
excessive or unreasonable burdens of  compliance” on us (Mason, 2012: 140). The duty, 
thus, applies to domestic (and offshore) discretionary exploiters who exploit their fellow 
citizens in sweatshop factories to gain unfair benefits. If  so, domestic discretionary 
exploiters violate their duty not to seek or gain an unfair advantage for themselves when 
they can obey the duty at no or little cost. Thus, the above accounts provide different 
grounds to justify the discretionary exploiters’ duty not to exploit when and because paying 
non-exploitative wages is costless for them.  
On the other hand, Cohen’s critique of  the Nozickian proviso can be applied to the 
case of  discretionary exploiters as well. Nozick claimed that an appropriation of  an 
unowned thing is justified if  and only if  its withdrawal from the general use would not 
make anyone worse off  than they would have been if  the thing remained in the general 
use (Nozick, 1974: ch.7; Cohen 1995: 76). In other words, it is morally justified to 
appropriate a thing whenever the appropriation of  that thing would not make others worse 
off  than status quo ex-ante. However, for Cohen, the status quo ex-ante is not the only or 
the appropriate baseline to assess whether or not others will be worse off  after the 
appropriation. Rather, Cohen argued that other counterfactual baselines, such as joint 
ownership where people can work together to create more social surplus, should be taken 
as an appropriate baseline, rather than the status quo ex-ante baseline (1995: 78-84). 
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Analogically, even though sweatshop exploitation is better than being left in poverty, there 
are other relevant baselines that should be considered to assess whether or not sweatshop 
transactions are fair or unfair.  
If  by sweatshop exploitation we mean discretionary exploiters, sweatshop 
exploitation is morally impermissible, all thing considered. This is because the discretionary 
exploiter’s behaviour is a form of  moral blackmail in that it is their unwillingness, rather than 
incapacity, to pay non-exploitative wages that make their employees worse off  than a 
fairness baseline. 116  The discretionary exploiter is the one who makes the poor’s 
alternatives morally problematic. The discretionary exploiter then is acting wrongfully even 
if  the evaluative claim is true. The fact that discretionary exploiters benefit the poor in 
developing countries would not make their action morally permissible. Hence, it is morally 
impermissible for the discretionary exploiter to take unfair advantage of  the poor’s desperation, all things 
considered.  
 
7.3.3. Structural Exploitation: The Dilemma  
 
Where the sweatshop exploiter refers to structural exploiters, a dilemma appears. Structural 
exploiters are unable to pay non-exploitative wages (irrespective of  whether they are willing 
to pay better wages or not) because paying non-exploitative wages are very costly, and they 
will suffer great market disadvantages. In this section, by further distinguishing between 
impure and pure structural exploiters, I argue that while impure structural exploiters ought to 
withdraw from the market competition, pure structural exploitation requires collective action.  
 
 
116 By moral blackmail, I mean “to perform a wrongful act that forces someone to do something by making 
her alternatives morally unacceptable” (Keller, 2018: 489).  
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7.3.3.1. The Impure Structural Exploiter 
 
Structural exploiters, unlike discretionary exploiters who have room to decide whether to 
exploit or not at little cost, face market competition such that they have to take unfair 
advantage of  “dependent third parties” so that they can remain competitive against rivals 
who also exploit (Mayer, 2007b: 612). Note that structural exploiters are facing a hard, but 
not a moral, choice between exploitation and bearing huge losses. Thus, exploitation is 
structural in the sense that agents within structures are confined and motivated by the 
socio-historical paths of  the structure to act in an exploitative way (Young, 2006: 114). In 
some cases, structural exploiters in competitive settings may have room to operate, but 
only to the extent that they would not lose in the competition. However, even when facing 
market competition, structural sweatshop owners still have choices: between competing 
and quitting. When choosing competition, they have a choice between following the 
established rules of  the market competition and breaking the rules (Mayer, 2007b: 612-
613). Therefore, their choices introduce two further kinds of  structural exploiters who 
bear different moral duties: impure and pure.  
Impure structural exploiters refer to those who engage in structural exploitation but 
choose to break the established rules so that they can stay competitive or survive in the 
market (Mayer, 2007b: 613).117 Impure structural exploiters, for instance, violate the labour 
law such that they do not pay the minimum wage, demand overtime work, and provide 
terrible working conditions that fail to meet basic health and safety standards. However, it 
has been argued that one of  the moral duties of  MNEs is to respect the laws of  the foreign 
countries where they operate sweatshops (Arnold & Bowie, 2003: 227-228; Preiss, 2014: 
66-67). By violating the laws, the MNEs violate the legal rights of  labourers and, therefore, 
 
117 For the sake of  argument, I shall leave aside the question of  whether market agents have an obligation 
to obey the established rules of  the market. Suppose that these rules are basically fine and market agents are 
obligated to follow these rules.  
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disrespect them and local governments. Their illegal behaviours are problematic not only 
because the labour law is enforced to protect labourers from exploitation, but because 
MNEs are morally repugnant when they, on the one hand, rely on the laws enforced by 
foreign countries to protect their properties and enjoy tariff  reduction, and on the other, 
they refuse to obey the labour laws so as to remain competitive or survive (Arnold & Bowie, 
2003: 228). Impure structural exploiters, then, exploit by breaking the established laws. 
The moral duty of  impure structural exploiters, thus, differs from that of  
discretionary exploiters. Structural exploiters, in general, have three choices: quitting, 
competing by the established rules, and competing by breaking the established rules. 
Among the three choices, impure structural exploiters choose to break the established rules 
to remain competitive in the market. By doing so, they impose great negative externalities 
on the exploited and third parties. For instance, because they do not follow the labour law, 
the working condition in their factories is particularly awful than other factories who obey 
the law. Their employees have to bear the extra cost of  keeping the impure structural 
exploiter competitive in the market, such that they have to work for long hours without 
payments. Besides, in some cases, they emit pollution without paying for it, which generates 
negative externalities on third parties. Hence, impure structural exploiters not only exploit 
their employees, they also generate great negative externalities on society because they are 
reluctant to take huge losses of  the market competition.  
Impure structural exploiters, then, have a moral duty to quit the market competition 
and compensate their employees and third parties for their extra burdens. Even if  
structural exploitation makes non-exploitation an extremely costly choice, impure 
structural exploiters ought to withdraw from the competition rather than break the 
established rules that make the situation even worse. Therefore, sweatshop exploitation in 
terms of  impure structural exploiters is morally impermissible, even if  they benefit the 
poor in developing countries, all things considered. This is because the fact that impure 
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structural exploiters face a costly choice does not morally justify their exploitation by 
breaking the rules. They have a moral duty to withdraw from the competition that leaves 
them unable to earn a decent income. The case of  pure structural exploiters, however, is 
different from that of  impure structural exploiters.  
 
7.3.3.2. The Pure Structural Exploiter 
 
Pure structural exploiters are those who engage in structural exploitation but do not break 
established rules of  competitions to exploit (Mayer, 2007b: 613). The primary force of  the 
established rules in structural exploitation is to exploit. As Mayer indicated, “The exploiters 
do take unfair advantage but they are nonetheless playing by the established rules of  the 
competition. The rules permit substantively unfair exchanges and competitive pressure 
compels one to offer no more than this to the exploited party” (2007b: 615). Structural 
exploitation, thus, is composed of  two main parties: the exploiter and the exploited. Most 
people within structural exploitation have relatively limited choices such that they are either 
exploiters, exploitees. Alternatively, they may suffer something in between, such as 
joblessness or precarious employment. In a highly competitive market, pure structural 
exploiters face the dilemma that on the one hand, the exploitative system “encourages their 
practices and constrains their ability to modify those practices” (Young, 2003: 40) and on 
the other, when they lose they will suffer huge losses and fall into being the exploited party.  
On my interpretation, Marx’s description of  capitalist exploitation represents a 
paradigmatic case of  pure structural exploitation. For him, capitalist exploitation is not 
about discretionary exploiters who are capable of  paying the non-exploitative wages but 
choose to exploit. Nor does capitalist exploitation, primarily, refer to impure structural 
exploiters who exploit by breaking established rules. Rather, capitalists are pure structural 
exploiters because, as structural exploitation, the capitalist mode of  production confines 
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and motivates agents within it to act exploitatively, even if  they may be unaware of  their 
exploitative actions. As Marx indicated, “this circumstance [capitalists gain at the expense 
of  workers] is a piece of  good luck for the buyer [of  human labour-power], but by no 
means an injustice towards the seller [of  human labour-power]” (1990: 301). The quoted 
sentence suggests that capitalism is a form of  structural exploitation because employers 
are in a position to gain more benefits from their relationship with employees due to the 
design of  capitalism. For Marx, capitalist exploitation primarily refers to pure structural 
exploitation without involving the issue of  rights and duties among individuals, though 
capitalist exploitation could be a form of  discretionary exploitation as well.118  
The exploiter that Powell and Zwolinski have in mind, I believe, is pure structural 
exploiters. The non-exploitative wages are very costly, and sweatshop owners seem to have 
no reasonable choice due to market competition. However, as I indicated, they mistakenly 
reduce three different kinds of  exploiters to just one category－pure structural exploiters. 
Nonetheless, even when facing structural exploitation, pure structural exploiters have a 
moral duty to act jointly with others to correct structural exploitation. Even if  structural 
exploitation is not caused specifically by pure structural exploiters, they should seek to act 
together with other structural participants to correct the exploitative rules whenever 
possible. The dilemma requires collective action.  
However, if  by definition structural exploitation is not caused by any specific groups 
or individuals in particular, we cannot find a particular person who is morally responsible 
for the evil of  structural exploitation, not to mention to repair the whole system. Why do 
pure structural exploiters bear a moral duty to correct the rules of  structural exploitation 
together with others? This question is misleading, though. 119 The fact that structural 
 
118 There was a debate upon whether Marx has a theory of  justice. I myself  think that Marx consciously 
addressed the issue of  capitalist exploitation from an amoral perspective, though it is possible to interpret 
the issue from the point of  view of  morality. For relevant discussions of  the issue, see Marshall Cohen (2014), 
G.A. Cohen (1983b), Norman Geras (1985), Allen Wood (1972) and John Rawls (2007: 317-372). 
119 For relevant discussions, see Jonathan Glover (1975: 171-176) and Dereck Parfit (1984: Part 1).  
The morality and political morality of  sweatshop labour 
225 
 
exploitation is not caused by pure structural exploiters does not imply that they have no 
moral duty toward structural exploitation. Iris Marion Young (2006) proposed that, in 
addition to personal strategic choices, such as quitting the competition at the expense of  
huge losses or monopolising the market by exploiting more, pure structural exploiters (and 
all relevant participants) have a political responsibility to correct structural exploitation. 
The moral responsibility of  correcting structural exploitation, then, belongs to 
collective, not individual, obligations (Mayer, 2007b, 616). The liability model, which aims to 
assign a particular wrong to a particular person, then is not sufficient to deal with structural 
injustice in general (Young, 2006: 118). Instead, in responding to structural injustice, the 
social connected model of  responsibility, proposed by Young, suggests that “individuals bear 
responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to the 
processes that produce unjust conditions” (2006: 119). On the social connected model, 
one’s responsibility concerning structural injustice derives not from one’s wrongdoing but 
from “participation in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice” 
(ibid.). The social connected model, then, proposes a specific model of  responsibility for 
dealing with structural injustice, such as structural exploitation in which no specific person 
is liable for or is capable of  correcting alone structural injustice.  
The core idea of  Young’s social connected model is that no one is an outsider of  
structures because structural injustice implicates everyone. Therefore, the fact that 
structural injustice is produced and reproduced by all participants implies that they all bear 
the responsibility, more or less, to correct structural injustice. If  so, pure structural 
exploiters have a moral duty to repair structural exploitation, even though they are not 
particularly liable for, and are incapable of  correcting by themselves, the evil of  structural 
exploitation. For Young, agents in structural injustice bear political responsibility to cooperate 
and organise political associations which tackle the structural roots of  injustices (2006: 
123). Pure structural exploiters, then, bear political responsibility to cooperate with the 
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government and other participants to correct structural exploitation, even though they are 
not morally liable for structural exploitation and paying non-exploitative wages is not a 
reasonable choice for them.  
For Young, those who participate in the process and the institution of  structural 
injustice bear different kinds of  responsibility to correct structural injustice according to 
their power, privilege, and interests (2006: 127-129). Pure structural exploiters, thus, bear 
relatively greater responsibility than others to correct structural exploitation, because they 
have de facto power to change the norms in factories and to cooperate with the local 
government and other factory owners to form reasonable rules. Also, since they are the 
main beneficiary in structural exploitation, they bear more responsibility than others to 
repair structural exploitation. Hence, although it is arguable whether or not pure structural exploiters 
have a moral duty to pay non-exploitative wages at fatal costs, it is clear that they have a moral duty to act 
jointly with other agents in the structure to correct the rules of  structural exploitation, all things considered.  
 
7.3.4. Real-World Sweatshop Exploitation and Conclusion 
 
By distinguishing and scrutinising three kinds of  sweatshop exploiters, I argue that 
sweatshop exploitation in terms of  discretionary and impure structural exploiters is morally impermissible, 
all things considered. I thus object to Zwolinski’s view on the moral permissibility of  
sweatshop exploitation. Moreover, even in structural exploitation, pure structural 
exploiters have a moral duty to correct the established rules of  structural exploitation. 
Since Zwolinski slides between the evaluative claim and the first-party deontological claim, 
and since he fails to distinguish between different kinds of  exploiters and their different 
moral duties, his claim that sweatshop exploitation is morally permissible, all things 
considered, is misleading.  
On the other hand, the distinction between three kinds of  exploiters helps to 
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understand the real-world sweatshop exploitation. In reality, I believe that sweatshop 
owners are very often discretionary exploiters where they are unwilling, rather than unable, 
to pay non-exploitative wages. The case of  pure structural exploitation is relatively rare. 
Of  course, this is an empirical question. However, in either case, they bear a moral duty to 
prevent exploitation, either by paying non-exploitative wages or by acting jointly with other 
agents to correct the exploitative structure, even though sweatshop exploitation is better 
than being left in poverty for people in developing countries. Having answered the second 
question, I then turn to the third question, that is, whether or not it is morally permissible 
for the state and other third parties to interfere with sweatshop exploitation. Contra 
Zwolinski, my answer is that the state and other agents’ interference is morally permissible, 
all things considered. 
 
7.4. The Moral Permissibility of  The Third-Party Interference of  Sweatshop 
Exploitation 
 
For Powell and Zwolinski, it is morally impermissible for any third parties to interfere with 
sweatshop exploitation, regardless of  whether the interference is done by consumer 
activism, bans, boycotts, or legal regulation (Zwolinski, 2007: 696-700; Powell & Zwolinski. 
2012: 457-463). The third-party interference includes legal prohibition, consumer boycotts, 
international sanctions and so on. Now even if  sweatshop exploitation, in my view, is, all 
things considered, morally impermissible, it does not follow that it is, all things considered, 
morally permissible for third parties to interfere with it. In this section, I object to 
Zwolinski’s view that all interferences, conducted by the third parties, are morally 
impermissible, all things considered.  
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7.4.1. Zwolinski on the Moral Impermissibility of  The Third-Party Interference 
 
For Zwolinski, because mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation is morally better 
than being left in poverty (the evaluative claim), “it is wrong to ‘take away’ the option of  
sweatshop labor from those who would otherwise choose to engage in it” (Zwolinski, 2007: 
696), no matter this is done by a legal ban or consumer activism or some other means. 
Therefore, what defenders of  sweatshops infer from the NWC is non-interference by third 
parties. Indeed, most worry that the prohibition of  exploitation by the state will leave the 
poor in desperation that they have to find other ways worse than being exploited to survive, 
such as street hustling and prostitution (Macaskill, 2015: 162-163). Besides, on child labour, 
Cook indicates that “Simply eliminating it would make many poor children poorer” (2018: 
294). If  all the third party can do is to remove exploitation from the poor’s option-set 
without adding options better than being exploited, then most, including myself, will object 
to their interference. Thus, making the poor worse off  than being exploited is the state of  
affairs that Zwolinski and most want to avoid. Call this The Undesirable Outcome: the state of  
affairs that leaves the poor worse off  than being exploited.  
On the other hand, Zwolinski implicitly presumes that the undesirable outcome is all 
the third parties can and will do. Hence, I shall add the element (6) to the NWC:  
 
 (6) The undesirable outcome－the state of  affairs that leaves the poor worse off   
than being exploited－is that all the third parties can and will bring about.  
 
7.4.2. The Falsity of  (6): Third Parties can do Better Than the Undesirable 
Outcome 
 
(6) is false because third parties can do better than just prohibiting exploitation and leaving 
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the poor in poverty. As Zwolinski himself  acknowledged, “whether governmental 
regulation will produce better outcomes than a free market will depend crucially on the 
kind of  governmental regulation at issue” (2010: 342). The state can regulate sweatshop 
factories effectively rather than just prohibit them. Governmental inference includes 
prohibition and other policies. While Zwolinski is correct that we should avoid the 
undesirable outcome, he fails to notice that prohibition is just one of  the governmental 
tools and could be accompanied by the enactment of  other policies. For instance, the state 
can encourage sweatshop factories to promote working conditions by tax reduction. Or, 
other third parties can work effectively to eliminate exploitation without incurring the 
undesirable outcome. Most critics of  sweatshops do not support closing the factories 
because this will leave labourers in poverty (Elliott & Freeman, 2003: ch.3; Barnes, 2013: 
41). Also, in order to prevent children from being exploited and to avoid the undesirable 
outcome, the third parties send official representatives to protect children’s interests, which 
is now widely established (Flekkøy, 2002; Cook, 2018: 300). These are cases where third-
party interference can avoid undesirable outcomes.  
On the contrary, non-interference with mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation 
might bring about the undesirable outcome. Consider the case of  organ selling. Organ 
markets may “reinforce incentives against addressing extreme poverty” because to 
eliminate poverty will reduce the supply of  organs (Koplin, 2018: 43). Organ selling is a 
paradigmatic case of  how exploitation reinforces poverty. Since people are willing to sell 
their organs because of  their destitution, the buyers and relevant stakeholders in the organ 
market might resist policies to eliminate poverty so that the supply of  organs would not 
be terminated. Consequently, non-interference with the organ market might see 
exploitation and poverty continue. Thus, it is misleading to conclude from the NWC that 
the third parties should not interfere with sweatshop exploitation under any circumstance.  
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7.4.3. The Third-Party Response to Structural Exploitation  
 
Let us consider how third parties can respond to structural exploitation. Concerning 
discretionary exploitation, third parties have a variety of  tools to make discretionary 
exploiters pay non-exploitative wages. However, structural exploitation is difficult to 
reduce because structural exploiters face pressure to keep profiting and competing with 
other owners. Most useful tools in discretionary exploitation will not work in structural 
exploitation. Paying non-exploitative wages will reduce earnings or competitiveness, which 
is vital for the survival of  sweatshop factories and might harm the local economy. 
Exploitation, thus, is the best strategy to maintain competitiveness and profits. If  so, in my 
view, the state and other third parties should increase the cost of  exploitation. This can be 
done in many ways. For instance, the state may require that a labour union must be 
established in every factory, and their opinions must be considered by sweatshop owners. 
The compulsory labour union in sweatshop factories will help sweatshop labourers to resist 
exploitation and, therefore, generate more pressure on the owners. Another way to increase 
pressure to sweatshop owners is to publish the name of  those who do not comply with 
working standards. Consumers might then refuse to buy their products. Consequently, 
once the cost of  exploitation increases, sweatshop owners might think of  reducing their 
profit rate or improving their competitiveness by technological innovation to maintain 
profits.  
In sum, whether or not it is morally permissible for the third parties to interfere with 
sweatshop exploitation will depend on the actual effect of  their inference. If  the 
governmental regulations leave sweatshop labourers worse off  than being exploited, it is 
morally impermissible for the state to interfere with sweatshop exploitation, all things 
considered. Conversely, it is morally permissible to interfere with sweatshop exploitation, all 
things considered, if  the governmental regulations can and will make sweatshop labourers 
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better off. Therefore, the moral permissibility of  third-party interference depends on 
whether or not they can act effectively and avoid the undesirable outcome. Hence, we may 
conclude from the NWC that third parties should always interfere with sweatshop exploitation 
whenever their interference avoids the undesirable outcome. 
 
7.5. Objections and Replies  
 
In this section I examine an objection to the moral impermissibility, and an objection to 
the legal permissibility, of  sweatshop exploitation.  
 
7.5.1. Positive Externalities Outweigh Negative Externalities  
 
Others might argue that the externalities of  sweatshop exploitation matter in deciding its 
moral permissibility. When sweatshop exploitation generates great positive externalities on 
society, even though it is exploitative, it is morally permissible. This view faces a major 
problem. Sweatshop exploitation may reinforce background injustice and vice versa. Since 
exploitation could be a form of  historical injustice (Cohen, 1995; Roemer, 1988; Steiner, 
2010), it is caused by a prior injustice and may, in turn, reinforce background injustice. In 
Steiner’s view, a prior rights violation causes exploitation. Exploitation may, in turn, 
generate more rights violation and therefore, more exploitations. As a result, “These chains 
of  exploitations, which can extend over generations and centuries, all have their origins in 
rights violation but, thereafter, those exploitations can become self-reproducing” (Steiner, 
2017: 440, his italics). Steiner’s view echoes one of  Marx’s main arguments. 
As Marx indicates, “Capitalist production therefore reproduces in the course of  its 
own process the separation between labour-owner and the conditions of  labour. It thereby 
reproduces and perpetuates the conditions under which the worker is exploited” (1990: 
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723). Capitalism, for Marx, is a process of  the proliferation of  social inequality in all aspects 
of  social life. The exclusion of  a group of  people from possessing productive assets forces 
the proletariat to sell their labour-power to the capitalist (Cohen, 1983c). The unjust social 
division makes capitalist exploitation possible and exploitation in turn strengthens and 
expands the structure of  unjust social classes. As a result, the process of  capital 
accumulation via class exploitation generates more exploitation and strengthens the 
subjection of  the proletariat to the capitalist. As Marx puts it, “Along with the constant 
decrease in the number of  capitalist magnates, who usurp and monopolize all the 
advantages of  this process of  transformation, the mass of  misery, oppression, slavery, 
degradation and exploitation grows” (1990: 929). Call this The Reinforcement Thesis. 
If  it is true that sweatshop exploitation reinforces global and local inequalities by 
increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, even if  it generates positive externalities 
on society, our worry about the circulation between sweatshop exploitation and global and 
local inequalities, outweighs its positive externalities. Sweatshop exploitation remains 
morally impermissible, all things considered. Defenders of  sweatshops, then, have to 
explain when and how the positive externalities are so considerable that they may outweigh 
the concern of  the Reinforcement thesis.  
 
7.5.2. An Objection to the Moral Permissibility of  the Third-Party Interference 
 
An objection to the moral permissibility of  the third-party interference may contend that 
the increase of  wages or the improvement of  working conditions “usually come at a cost 
to someone” (Powell & Zwolinski, 2012: 467), whether they are owners, customers, or 
workers. To raise wages and to improve working conditions, very often, will result either 
in “threatening the short-term or long-term health of  the company” or “firing other 
workers” (Preiss, 2014: 61). The objection rejects any improvement of  wages and working 
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conditions enforced by the state because doing so will make some firms leave, and this 
would cause unemployment. The objection holds that the enforcement will make some 
discretionary exploiters pay fair wages and expire other discretionary exploiters. 
Consequently, the overall welfare of  workers after the enforcement will decrease, 
compared to the overall welfare before the enforcement. If  we care about worker’s welfare, 
the third-party interference with sweatshops is morally impermissible, all things considered.  
I have two replies. First, I acknowledge that the enforcement will generate costs that 
some firms will choose to leave and cause unemployment. However, when combining 
short-term and long-term benefits, 120  sweatshop labourers’ welfare may increase and 
benefit from the enforcement. Matthew Coakley and Michael Kates (2013) have challenged 
Powell and Zwolinski (2012) on the actual effect of  increasing wages via legislating the 
minimum wage law. On its short-term effect, enforcing the minimum wage law will bring 
about unemployment; nonetheless, the long-term effect of  raising wages and setting the 
minimum wage law will generate “a large welfare gain” (Coakley & Kates, 2013: 556). The 
long-term effects can be seen in many ways. The rise of  wages will benefit sweatshop 
workers immediately and the subsequent workers in the country; also, it might bring about 
industrial transformation and promote local economy (ibid.). Besides, empirical research 
has shown a positive correlation between the salary increase and productivity (Bliss & Stern, 
1978). The impact of  rising wages and the minimum wage law, therefore, could be positive 
in some cases.121 Hence, the correlation between the rise of  wages and unemployment 
remains an empirical question and varies case by case, which is not an eternal truth.  
Second, if  we care about unemployment caused by the enforcement of  the minimum 
wage law, then the government should compensate for short-term losses and help the 
 
120 By short-term benefits, I mean the benefits that will be received right after the transaction. By long-term 
benefits, I mean the benefits that will receive only after some time.  
121  Some economic research has shown that there is no positive correlation between wages rise and 
unemployment. For instance, see Doucouliagos & Stanley (2009), Lee & Suardi (2011) and Arnold &Bowie 
(2003: 237-239).  
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unemployed find jobs. More importantly, we have to think of  whether it is worth keeping 
the whole country at a low wage just because some sweatshop owners threaten to leave 
when they are able, and legally required, to pay non-exploitative wages. The point at stake 





I have argued against Zwolinski that sweatshop exploitation in terms of  discretionary and 
impure structural exploiters is morally impermissible, all things considered, even though 
sweatshop exploitation benefits the poor in developing countries. Also, I have argued that 
it is, all things considered, morally permissible for third parties to interfere with sweatshop 
exploitation if they can avoid the undesirable outcome. Hence, even if  capitalism has 
created an unprecedented level of  wealth in human history, capitalism as structural 
exploitation ought to be terminated and rectified. This is because it exploits people and 




8. Conclusion: A World Without Exploitation 
 
I close the thesis by summarising the core arguments in each chapter, how the thesis 
emerges into general theses, and by indicating its limits and further applications.  
 
8.1. A Summary of  The Core Arguments 
 
In Part 1, I proposed and defended an account of  exploitation against alternatives. I argued 
that my account is more comprehensive than alternatives because I resolved the contrast 
between Wertheimer’s fairness account and Sample’s disrespectful account by merging 
them into two forms of  wrongful gain. Further, my formulation of  the advantage-taking 
behaviour can identify a wide range of  the asymmetrical relationship between parties. Thus, 
my account of  exploitation can accommodate previous accounts and identify exploitative 
cases that would not be regarded as exploitation by previous accounts. In Part 2, I reviewed 
the disagreement between luck and social egalitarianism, which has helped to deepen our 
understanding of  egalitarian justice and, since non-exploitation is an inherently egalitarian 
ideal, it gives us a better understanding of  why exploitation is unjust. More importantly, in 
Chapter 6, I contended that luck egalitarians fail to notice and deal with exploitation that 
emerges from a just world. Hence, luck egalitarianism is incomplete in that respect, and it 
needs an independent principle of  non-exploitation. Specifically, it needed the principle 
that I developed at the end of  Chapter 6: exploitation as a free-standing injustice. Against 
those that argue that exploitation is a derivative injustice that must stem from a prior 
injustice, I have argued that exploitation is a free-standing injustice and that exploitation is 
unjust on its own, regardless of  its history. Consequently, the exploitation objection poses 
a challenge to luck egalitarianism. Whereas many common relational egalitarian critiques 




exploitation argument) succeeds. Luck egalitarians cannot fully capture an important kind 
of  injustice: the injustice of  exploitation. 
Having proposed and defended an account of  exploitation and having explored two 
ways to perceive the injustice of  exploitation, in Part 3, I examined whether sweatshop 
exploitation, which benefits the poor in developing countries and is mutually consensual, 
is morally permissible, all things considered. I also considered whether it is morally 
permissible for third parties to interfere with exploitation. Contra Zwolinski, who 
contended sweatshop exploitation is all-things-considered morally permissible since it is 
better than no-transaction for the poor in developing countries, I argued that since the 
sweatshop owners should not exploit their employees, even if  sweatshop exploitation 
benefits the poor in developing countries, it is all-things-considered morally impermissible. 
Further, it is always morally permissible for third parties to interfere with sweatshop 
exploitation, when and because the interference can make the exploited better off.  
The thesis, then, has three major contributions. First, I outline and defend my own 
account of  exploitation by criticising leading accounts of  exploitation (those of  
Wertheimer, Sample, Steiner, Roemer, etc.). Second, I offer an analysis of  the relationship 
of  exploitation to equality and illustrate how luck egalitarians are vulnerable to the 
exploitation objection. Third, I rebut the non-worseness claim, which states that mutually 
consensual and beneficial exploitation is morally permissible, and that third parties should 
not interfere with sweatshop exploitation.  
 
8.2. Exploitation, Marxism, and Egalitarianism  
 
The thesis uses the notion of  exploitation to probe the nature of  egalitarian justice. The 
first implication is that both luck and relational egalitarians need to engage more with the 




has largely been ignored in the literature of  relational egalitarianism because relational 
egalitarians tend to focus on social oppression and domination. In contrast, it is equally 
surprising that leading luck egalitarians, such as Cohen, Roemer, Arneson, and Steiner, 
focus much attention on exploitation because luck egalitarians are considered by relational 
egalitarians to focus exclusively on the distributive notion of  equality. The image is clearly 
misguiding.  
Some might reply that, if  exploitation is not a serious problem, and if  relational and 
luck egalitarians fail to pay enough attention to it, why should we care? Well, a prima facie 
response is that, if  they aim to offer a complete theory of  egalitarian justice, both relational 
and luck egalitarians should think about how to deal with exploitation in principle. The 
issue of  exploitation then raises some theoretical interests. However, as Marx and Marxists 
have constantly argued, exploitation is an inner drive that facilitates social and global, 
inequalities and, in itself, is a form of  objectionable inequality. More importantly, the 
endless pursuit of  profits through exploitation tends to cause the cyclical crisis of  
capitalism, oscillating between inflation and recession, boom and slump (Harvey, 2010; 
Clark, 1994; Carchedi & Roberts, 2018; Weeks, 2010; Yagi, Yokokawa, Shinjiro, & Dymski, 
2013). Marx treats capitalism as a social system and exploitation is the central issue 
surrounding capitalism. These issues are connected and can hardly be solved alone. If  one 
wants to argue that exploitation is not a serious problem, one needs to spend equal efforts 
to respond to the extensive, theoretical and empirical literature on exploitation. If  
exploitation, as Marx and Marxists point out, is such a serious issue at the heart of  
capitalism, it is clear that egalitarians should put more emphasises on it.  
The second implication, summarised from the claim that luck egalitarianism is 
vulnerable to the ahistorical concept of  exploitation, seems to demonstrate that luck 
egalitarianism is also vulnerable to similar notions, such as interpersonal, oppression, 




egalitarian agenda, these ahistorical notions are likely to occur in a just world where no one 
suffers unchosen disadvantages. If  so, luck egalitarianism needs to think about how to 
prevent unequal treatments between individuals in principle. How could they respond to 
choices that will affect others? One’s voluntary choice could be another’s bad brute luck.122 
A reflection on how luck egalitarians can plausibly deal with exploitation, therefore, 
indicates the incompleteness, rather than the implausibility, of  luck egalitarianism and 
suggests that they also need to consider how to address oppression or domination that 
arises justly from just background conditions.  
The third implication is about the conversation between liberal egalitarianism and 
Marxism. Liberal egalitarianism and Marxism are like two parallel lines without substantial 
dialogue. Cohen, and analytical Marxism, are a few exceptions. The concept and the 
injustice of  exploitation, then, are the places where both sides can start a meaningful 
dialogue. There are other similar issues worth discussing, such as market socialism, 
property-owning democracy, workplace democracy, and, more importantly, Marx’s position 
on the methodology of  political philosophy. A healthy and real dialogue can help to clarify 
our view and why we disagree with each other. In any sense, this is a good thing and what 
Cohen had kept doing.  
 
8.3. The Limits of  The Thesis 
 
The thesis has, at least, two limits. The first limitation concerns my formulation of  unfair 
exploitation, which is based on a baseline of  fairness that is objective, rather subjective.. 
For instance, just price theory claims that the price of  a commodity is just if  it reflects the 
cost of  a commodity. A just price, thus, is objective in the sense that the cost of  a 
 
122 Some luck egalitarians have addressed these issues. For example, Dworkin discusses his principle of  




commodity would not be affected by individual preferences. Some are very doubtful about 
whether such an objective baseline of  fairness is possible. In cases of  really egregious 
exploitation, we might not need to derive a specific account of  the objective baseline (since 
any plausible view would condemn egregious exploitation is unjust). However, once we 
encounter less clear-cut cases, an objective baseline of  fair distribution between parties is 
required to assess whether A gains fairly or unfairly. In practices, such baselines are required. 
The first limit then is that I did not defend any such baselines.  
The limit is similar, if  not identical, to the debate between the internal and the 
integrationist principles in international trade. James (2012a: 100-127, 2014: 177-200) and 
Risse (2012), hold that principles for international trades are independent of  a wide range 
of  other moral issues; the integrationist principles, proposed mainly by Caney (2012a: 283-
285; cf. Caney, 2009, 2011, 2012b), maintains that distributions in different domains should 
be intertwined because we have no reason to treat them as special or sui generis.123 Based 
on Caney’s integrationist approach, Walton proposes two further kinds of  integrationism 
for trade, namely, substantive and procedural integrationism (2020). While procedural 
integrationism for trade states that distributions in trade can be tainted by moral claims 
outside trade, such as colonialism and security, substantive integrationism for trade claims 
that justice with respect to the losses and gains of  trade should be sensitive to participants’ 
overall levels of  advantage (Walton, 2020: 53-61). Put differently, the internal approach to 
trade, it seems, rejects that moral concerns in domains other than trade can affect justice 
in trade; the integrationist approach, in contrast, insists that moral concerns in different 
domains should jointly determine how to distribute the losses and gains in trade.  
In reply, first, I reject the internal approach in the sense that it denies that other moral 
concerns should jointly determine how to distribute losses and gains in trade. On the other 
 




hand, regarding the just price theory, I think we need to distinguish two claims: the first is 
that a price is fair, perhaps just, when and because it reflects its cost of  production; the 
second is that a commodity has the cost, but its price could be effected either by supply 
and demand of  the whole market or by individual preferences;124 the price of  a commodity 
that reflects either supply and demand of  the whole market or by individual preferences is 
not necessarily unfair. I acknowledge both claims. However, for those who reject the just price 
theory, the first claim is false, either because they do not think a commodity has the cost, 
or because they reject that a price is fair or just when and because it reflects its cost of  
production or both. Moreover, they might insist that a just price can only be generated 
under just background conditions, in which no one suffers unchosen disadvantages.  
The issue is complex because the commodities that we are talking about will 
determine whether they have the cost of  production. For instance, Van Gogh’s paintings 
have no objective price, and people are willing to pay as much money as they can to bid 
his works. In this case, the just price theory, or an objective baseline of  fairness, do not 
apply, and the price is determined happily by individual preferences. Nonetheless, if  we are 
talking about commodities, produced by mass production, such as pens, books, and 
computers, it is clear that their selling price is very often correlated to their cost of  
production, and their price is affected by supply and demand of  the whole market, rather 
than individual preferences. Therefore, it is important that we have a clear object. In the 
case of  Van Gogh’s painting, exploitation occurs when one of  biding parties suffers 
injustice that makes the bidder of  Van Gogh’s painting gain unfairly in the sense that the 
seller could have sold the painting at a higher price had the injustice not occurred.125 
On the other hand, if  one insists that the price of  a commodity is fair or just if  and 
only if  it is generated under just background conditions (the ideal price), she has to 
 
124 Note that the price of  a commodity could be affected either by the micro-, macro-, or by both economies, 
which each represent different cases. 




acknowledge that all the exchanges in our world are, more or less, unjust according to the 
ideal price. If  so, exploitation is everywhere. Sweatshop labour and transactions in local 
shops are all exploitative because they are generated under unjust background conditions. 
The view, though it is theoretically defensible, has no practical implication. Instead, even 
if  the ideal price is fairer and juster than an objective baseline of  fairness－such as the just 
price theory, an objective baseline maintains that it can specify when and why a transaction 
in our unjust world is exploitative, rather than treat all transactions as exploitation. I hope 
I have explained why we need an objective baseline of  fair exchange, even if  such baselines 
are less fair and just than the ideal price.126 
Another limit concerns exploitation as free-standing injustice. I have explained that 
exploitation is unjust because the exploitee is excluded by the exploiter from the process 
that determines their relevant interests and being treated as inferior. However, this 
explanation is somehow unspecified and underdeveloped. What is behind the egalitarian 
explanation seems to be the notion of  social exclusion and, therefore, a conception of  
democracy. If  so, one might wonder whether exploitation is unjust because it is 
undemocratic or inegalitarian. We need more explanations to clarify the relationship 
between exploitation, social exclusion, and democracy. We might wonder how the three 
notions connect to each other in a meaningful way without subjecting one concept to 
another. Until their relationship has been fully explained, we will not be able to know 
precisely why exploitation, and similar notions, is unjust from the perspective of  egalitarian 
justice. The above two limits could be further developed in the future.  
 
8.4. Further Applications 
 
 
126  The substantive principles of  just exchange are underdeveloped in the current literature. See 




The issue of  exploitation has received much attention in applied ethics. Although I did not 
discuss exploitation in trade particularly, the notion of  exploitation is one of  the central 
issues in theories of  trade justice (Risse, 2007; Kurjanska & Risse, 2008; Risse & Wollner, 
2019; Miller, 2010: 63-69; James, 2005, 2012b; Walton, 2013: 700-703, 2018, 2020; de Bres, 
2019; Brandi, 2014), and of  global justice (De‐Shalit, 1998; Pearson, 2011; Risse, 2012, 272; 
McKeown, 2017a, 2017b). For instance, by demanding direct trade relationships and pre-
financing, fair trade can prevent exploitation by middlemen (Walton, 2010: 434). Besides, 
exploitation in clinical research is another important issue (Wertheimer, 2010; Hawkins & 
Emanuel (Ed(s).), 2008; Wenner, 2015). Also, many have focused on exploitation in guest 
workers (Mayer, 2005; Attas, 2000), prostitution (Shelby, 2002), organ selling (Greasley, 
2014; Koplin, 2018; Islam & Gasper, 2017), price gouging (Sample, 2017; Zwolinski, 2008), 
and commercial surrogacy (Panitch, 2013; Wilkinson, 2013; Mitra, 2017). More broadly, 
exploitation is intertwined with gender (Panitch, 2017; Lange, 2017), race (Mills, 2017), and 
class (Miller, 2017).  
My account of  exploitation has an advantage in assessing whether or not these cases 
involve exploitation. That is, it offers two kinds of  exploitation－unfair exploitation and 
disrespectful exploitation－to examine whether exploitation takes place in these cases. We 
can ask, for instance, whether or not child labour is exploitative because of  the wage is 
unfair relative to a principle of  a fair wage, or, more importantly, because to commodify 
child’s labour for beneficiary use is disrespectful and should be prohibited. Or, in the case 
of  clinical research, we can ask whether or not exploitation occurs because the contract of  
a clinical trial is unfair relative to a fairness baseline, or because clinical research is a 
disrespectful way of  beneficiary use. My account of  exploitation, thus, can assess whether 
exploitation in these cases is about the terms of  a transaction, or that we should not profit 
in a certain way. As such, we can prescribe to the right medicine to the right kind of  
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